This thesis argues that the honour of the Crown and the reconciliation agenda are engaged in the sentencing of Aboriginal offenders, given grossly disproportionate Aboriginal incarceration rates and their underlying causes, including socio-economic problems, community breakdown and cultural dislocation that arise at least partly from the history of Crown-Aboriginal interaction. Such an interpretation facilitates a new relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples and will contribute to the rehabilitation of the rule of law. I address not only the underlying legal questions pertaining to the engagement of the honour of the Crown and the reconciliation agenda in sentencing Aboriginal offenders, but also interrogatories relating to the role of morality in the law and the rule of law for Aboriginal peoples in the sentencing context. Fundamentally, the honour of the Crown and reconciliation principles are interpreted and applied such that the sentencing of Aboriginal offenders can accommodate and attempt to ameliorate colonialist history. This distinctive history produces a legal requirement of reconciliation and honour-based governance if the rule of law is to be a reality for Aboriginal peoples in Canada. Section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code and Gladue analysis provide a vehicle for the courts to inject the honour of the Crown into the sentencing of Aboriginal offenders, albeit at one remove. However, the honour of the Crown requires a vigorous Gladue type analysis by judges sentencing Aboriginal offenders regardless of the existence of section 718.2(e). Canada must be prepared to accept responsibility and directly address some of the fallout in the criminal justice system from the history of Crown / Aboriginal relations. The honour of the Crown requires a different sentencing approach for Aboriginal offenders independent of section 718.2(e) and reconciliation is an interpretive normative principle underlying the sentencing of Aboriginal offenders, shaping the honour of the Crown and infusing the rule of law for Aboriginal peoples. Aboriginal offender rehabilitation needs to go hand in hand with the rehabiltation of the rule of law for Aboriginal peoples as a pivotal component of reconciliation. / Thesis (Master, Law) -- Queen's University, 2012-04-23 18:41:36.57

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The existing rights paradigm in Aboriginal law accepts Crown sovereignty claims grounded in ethnocentric conceptions of terra nullius and discovery, and views Aboriginal rights as arising out of prior occupation. The Supreme Court of Canada has shaken this paradigm by characterizing Crown sovereignty as merely de facto until reconciled with Aboriginal sovereignty and legitimated by a treaty, by developing the duty to consult, and by characterizing reconciliation as a process that is part of a generative constitutional order. The moves the Court toward a new paradigm rooted in the principle of the equality of peoples in which treaties provide a framework for sharing sovereignty. As part of the Canadian federation, Aboriginal sovereignty can strengthen Canadas territorial integrity and contribute to Canadas economic development.<p> In the past, courts allowed the act of state doctrine to shield Crown assertions of sovereignty from scrutiny. This doctrine protects Canadas territorial integrity, but does not shield the Crowns actions from legal and constitutional scrutiny. The fundamental constitutional principle of rule of law and the de facto doctrine will protect interests that relied on assumptions of Crown sovereignty that lacked constitutional legitimacy.<p> The transformation in the fundamental principles of Aboriginal law has parallels to Thomas Kuhns description of a paradigm shift in the natural sciences. The rights paradigm is in a crisis with moral and practical dimensions. It is incommensurable with the equality paradigm, and therefore the choice of paradigms will depend on normative criteria. Fundamental principles of the Canadian constitution, international standards of human rights and the perspectives of growing numbers of practitioners in the field that are of Aboriginal ancestry are all forces that will complete the shift to the equality paradigm.<p> An equality paradigm will result in the abandonment of some Aboriginal law doctrines, and the modification of others. Aboriginal title is inconsistent with an equality paradigm because it assumes the legitimacy of the Crowns claims to sovereignty, gives the Crown a superior title, and limits Aboriginal nations to a burden of only limited and subordinate rights. The fiduciary relationship rooted in the honour of the Crown will grow into a non-hierarchical relationship with reciprocal obligations.<p> Decisions of courts can play a supporting role, but only negotiations and treaties can build a genuine partnership, effective and equitable sharing of sovereignty and ultimately reconciliation between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples in Canada.

The existing rights paradigm in Aboriginal law accepts Crown sovereignty claims grounded in ethnocentric conceptions of terra nullius and discovery, and views Aboriginal rights as arising out of prior occupation. The Supreme Court of Canada has shaken this paradigm by characterizing Crown sovereignty as merely de facto until reconciled with Aboriginal sovereignty and legitimated by a treaty, by developing the duty to consult, and by characterizing reconciliation as a process that is part of a generative constitutional order. The moves the Court toward a new paradigm rooted in the principle of the equality of peoples in which treaties provide a framework for sharing sovereignty. As part of the Canadian federation, Aboriginal sovereignty can strengthen Canadas territorial integrity and contribute to Canadas economic development.<p> In the past, courts allowed the act of state doctrine to shield Crown assertions of sovereignty from scrutiny. This doctrine protects Canadas territorial integrity, but does not shield the Crowns actions from legal and constitutional scrutiny. The fundamental constitutional principle of rule of law and the de facto doctrine will protect interests that relied on assumptions of Crown sovereignty that lacked constitutional legitimacy.<p> The transformation in the fundamental principles of Aboriginal law has parallels to Thomas Kuhns description of a paradigm shift in the natural sciences. The rights paradigm is in a crisis with moral and practical dimensions. It is incommensurable with the equality paradigm, and therefore the choice of paradigms will depend on normative criteria. Fundamental principles of the Canadian constitution, international standards of human rights and the perspectives of growing numbers of practitioners in the field that are of Aboriginal ancestry are all forces that will complete the shift to the equality paradigm.<p> An equality paradigm will result in the abandonment of some Aboriginal law doctrines, and the modification of others. Aboriginal title is inconsistent with an equality paradigm because it assumes the legitimacy of the Crowns claims to sovereignty, gives the Crown a superior title, and limits Aboriginal nations to a burden of only limited and subordinate rights. The fiduciary relationship rooted in the honour of the Crown will grow into a non-hierarchical relationship with reciprocal obligations.<p> Decisions of courts can play a supporting role, but only negotiations and treaties can build a genuine partnership, effective and equitable sharing of sovereignty and ultimately reconciliation between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples in Canada.

Simply put, Crown liability doctrine in Crown/Aboriginal Law in Canada is a mess. Demonstrably, there are fiduciary-based duties, fiduciary-based principles, an over-arching honour of the Crown principle, Crown honour-based duties, and a constitutional Crown/Aboriginal “reconciliation” imperative. How the various pieces are meant to fit together is atypically unclear. In this project, Ronald Dworkin’s rights thesis is invoked as a conceptual tool in an attempt to help bring some order to the disarray. It is argued that the Supreme Court of Canada made a fundamental (Dworkinian) mistake in the manner in which they adopted fiduciary concepts into the core of Crown/Aboriginal Law; that this mistake has led to a dysfunctional doctrine; and that the Supreme Court has implicitly acknowledged their error and are now in the process of incrementally mending their materially flawed doctrine. Crown liability doctrine in Crown/Aboriginal Law in Canada is now centrally organized around the principle that the honour of the Crown must always be upheld in applicable government dealings with Aboriginal peoples. Enforceable Crown honour-based “off-shoot” duties operate to regulate the mischief of Crown dishonour in constitutional contexts. The Supreme Court has now stated that a (non-conventional and fundamentally unresolved) Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary obligation is one such “off-shoot” duty. This emergent “essential legal framework” is meant to protect and facilitate the over-arching project of reconciling the pre-existence of Aboriginal societies with the de facto sovereignty of the Crown, which reconciliation project, it is argued here, is to be fundamentally undertaken by the executive and legislative branches of government working collaboratively with Aboriginal peoples. The judicial branch of government is then largely limited to the more modest task of regulating the mischief of constitutional Crown dishonour. This project ultimately purports to theorize this relatively new Crown honour-based framework, and to conceptualize what residual role there is for fiduciary accountability to play in applicable Crown/Aboriginal contexts moving forward. It is concluded there is likely only a narrow jurisdiction remaining for fiduciary accountability in Crown/Aboriginal contexts, which jurisdiction appears destined to take the form of conventional fiduciary doctrine which, as will be demonstrated, has itself been fundamentally reconfigured in recent years.

In this thesis I offer a brief overview of the current legislative, regulatory and treaty frameworks impacting emergency management in British Columbia, with a particular emphasis on Crown-identified First Nation roles. I show that the regime overwhelmingly positions non-First Nation governments, contractors and other organizations to manage emergencies on behalf of First Nations. I explore emergency management as a manifold process that includes protracted planning, mitigation and recovery phases, which, unlike emergency response, are carried out with lower levels of urgency. I consider Canadian Constitution Act, 1982 (s. 35) Aboriginal rights in light of the lack of statutorily prescribed inclusion of First Nations in off-reserve emergency management, particularly at the planning, mitigation and recovery phases concluding that the jurisprudence to date (including the duty to consult and Aboriginal title) does not appear to have revolutionized the regime. While the constitutional status of Aboriginal rights should operate to insure adequate First Nation direction in each stage of emergency management, the regime continues to restrictively prioritize other constitutional priorities, such as division of powers and civil liberties. To better understand the omission, I theorize the lack of Crown implementation of s. 35 Aboriginal rights generally as an ‘obligation gap’, highlighting how an analysis of s. 35 Aboriginal rights as ‘negative rights’ fails to compel implementation of the full scope of Crown obligations implicit within the jurisprudence to date. I then offer a new framework for s. 35 as justiciable ‘recognition rights’ and juxtapose ‘recognition rights’ with the idea of justiciability of government inaction through a brief comparative analysis of socioeconomic rights in South Africa’s constitution and Canada’s constitutional Aboriginal rights. With a decided emphasis on the obligations of the Crown, this thesis attempts to offer fodder to First Nations and legal practitioners seeking to challenge the emergency management landscape where First Nations seek an enhanced role in protecting and restoring their respective territories in anticipation of, and in the wake of, disaster. For convenience and clarity, contemporary geographical and jurisdictional references to the areas now known as Canada and British Columbia are used throughout the thesis without intention to detract from the integrity of First Nation claims to their traditional and ancestral territories.