Islamic law, also known as Shari’ah law, is one of the most complex and multifaceted, yet easily misunderstood areas of law. It is complex because its subjects, but not limited to, human rights, politics, religion, economics, and criminal. Islamic law is also misunderstood because it is greatly understudied and grossly over-generalized. This regretfully has lead to a situation where Islamic law is often characterized as an inhumane and discriminatory set of laws which have no respect for human rights. The questions that remain to be answered are whether or not there is a human rights discourse in Islamic law, and is Islamic law compatible with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its two subsequent International Covenants? The aim of this paper is to ascertain whether or not Shari’ah law, as it has been reflected in the Islamic human rights documents discussed, is compatible with universal human rights standards.

Climate change debates have typically centred around the environmental and economic effects of rising greenhouse gas emissions. The focus, however, has recently begun to shift towards acknowledging the human impacts of global climate change, especially in vulnerable regions and communities. This thesis considers whether human rights law can compensate for the inability of traditional, state-centred, environmental law and international law to address the human impacts of climate change. By using the situation of the Canadian Inuit as a case study, this thesis focuses on 'greening' existing human rights to address the environmental damage in the Canadian Arctic as a result of climate change. This study concludes that, although international human rights regimes provide potential forums for groups such as the Canadian Inuit, substantive environmental human rights are necessary in international law in order to best address the complex intersection of environmental degradation, such as climate change, and human rights.

Islamic law, also known as Shari’ah law, is one of the most complex and multifaceted, yet easily misunderstood areas of law. It is complex because its subjects, but not limited to, human rights, politics, religion, economics, and criminal. Islamic law is also misunderstood because it is greatly understudied and grossly over-generalized. This regretfully has lead to a situation where Islamic law is often characterized as an inhumane and discriminatory set of laws which have no respect for human rights. The questions that remain to be answered are whether or not there is a human rights discourse in Islamic law, and is Islamic law compatible with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its two subsequent International Covenants? The aim of this paper is to ascertain whether or not Shari’ah law, as it has been reflected in the Islamic human rights documents discussed, is compatible with universal human rights standards.

Abstract: This thesis examines the foundations of individual human rights. The general thought that informs the discussion is that rights and values are two different kinds of moral discourse. Hence, any attempt to simply state rights in value terms will be problematic because the agent-relative character of values does not lend itself to grounding/ explaining interpersonal rules, like rights. The thesis outlines agent-relative values, showing their plausibility, and then proceeds to show how rights perform a different function. The attempt to move from talk about what is right to what rights we have is termed the ‘moralist fallacy’. Rights are kinds of restrictions that others face on their actions when they are promoting their own good. Axiology is about how best to achieve one’s objective agent-relative good; so values involve trade offs and calculations agents can perform about what is in their best interest, while rights are not open to trade offs and calculations because they are restrictions that agents face when they are pursuing their own good. The main problem the thesis discerns is how rights can be concerned with protecting the concerns of others when what people legitimately care about are their own concerns. Two different views of the motivational legitimacy of rights are examined—the agent well being view and the agent-recipient view. On the former, rights are motivationally appealing and justified because abiding by them can be shown to be part of what constitutes an agent’s (who is subject to abiding by rights) well being; on the latter view, abiding by rights constitutes part of the recipient’s (who has the rights) well being. Taken separately these two views are problematic. Rights legitimacy would seem to require something from both views. But since these views are contraries they do not seem open to combination either. The thesis will attempt to provide a solution to reconciling the agent well being and agent recipient views while trying to retain the nature of rights as restrictions not open to trade offs or reducible to value talk. Rights function as restrictions, but why do they function this way and how are they justified when what people are mostly concerned with is their own agent-relative good? Rights must be a separate kind of moral claim, not reducible to talk about what values we have in order for rights to have the motivational and justificatory strength they need for interpersonal validity and to resist paternalist interferences. Rights will have this strength if they are based on something that all value pursuers require—such as recognition of one’s legitimate claim to possess oneself. First possession based on first come, first serve will provide legitimacy for a system of rights because it will appeal to and motivate agents by relating rights-respect to their well being. I will argue that abiding by others’ rights is in one’s best interest because doing so is a wise choice—while one might believe that not abiding by others’ rights might give one the best outcome, one cannot be sure about this and so ought to choose to abide by rights as a general policy. Also, agents ought to make sure that they voice their concerns over rights violations of others. Even though this may not be to their immediate benefit, it is rational for agents to speak out on this issue and reinforce rights–respecting behaviour because making the system effective will ultimately be in their own long-term self-interest. The thesis also tries to make sense of how rights are compossible and when rights might face thresholds beyond which they no longer hold.

Abstract: This thesis examines the foundations of individual human rights. The general thought that informs the discussion is that rights and values are two different kinds of moral discourse. Hence, any attempt to simply state rights in value terms will be problematic because the agent-relative character of values does not lend itself to grounding/ explaining interpersonal rules, like rights. The thesis outlines agent-relative values, showing their plausibility, and then proceeds to show how rights perform a different function. The attempt to move from talk about what is right to what rights we have is termed the ‘moralist fallacy’. Rights are kinds of restrictions that others face on their actions when they are promoting their own good. Axiology is about how best to achieve one’s objective agent-relative good; so values involve trade offs and calculations agents can perform about what is in their best interest, while rights are not open to trade offs and calculations because they are restrictions that agents face when they are pursuing their own good. The main problem the thesis discerns is how rights can be concerned with protecting the concerns of others when what people legitimately care about are their own concerns. Two different views of the motivational legitimacy of rights are examined—the agent well being view and the agent-recipient view. On the former, rights are motivationally appealing and justified because abiding by them can be shown to be part of what constitutes an agent’s (who is subject to abiding by rights) well being; on the latter view, abiding by rights constitutes part of the recipient’s (who has the rights) well being. Taken separately these two views are problematic. Rights legitimacy would seem to require something from both views. But since these views are contraries they do not seem open to combination either. The thesis will attempt to provide a solution to reconciling the agent well being and agent recipient views while trying to retain the nature of rights as restrictions not open to trade offs or reducible to value talk. Rights function as restrictions, but why do they function this way and how are they justified when what people are mostly concerned with is their own agent-relative good? Rights must be a separate kind of moral claim, not reducible to talk about what values we have in order for rights to have the motivational and justificatory strength they need for interpersonal validity and to resist paternalist interferences. Rights will have this strength if they are based on something that all value pursuers require—such as recognition of one’s legitimate claim to possess oneself. First possession based on first come, first serve will provide legitimacy for a system of rights because it will appeal to and motivate agents by relating rights-respect to their well being. I will argue that abiding by others’ rights is in one’s best interest because doing so is a wise choice—while one might believe that not abiding by others’ rights might give one the best outcome, one cannot be sure about this and so ought to choose to abide by rights as a general policy. Also, agents ought to make sure that they voice their concerns over rights violations of others. Even though this may not be to their immediate benefit, it is rational for agents to speak out on this issue and reinforce rights–respecting behaviour because making the system effective will ultimately be in their own long-term self-interest. The thesis also tries to make sense of how rights are compossible and when rights might face thresholds beyond which they no longer hold.

Abstract The long-term development of a democratic country stems from the establishment of a civil society. The substance and functional mechanisms of a democratic system are very closely connected with the state of the legal system. When the law rests on a basis of democracy, democratic legitimacy underpins the legality of the source of the country's power. In contrast, when the law and democracy have an equivalent relationship, especially under the influence of today's international social consensus and the growing human rights consciousness and social modernization, in the developmental process of the constitutional system, with regard to the people's fundamental rights, the quality of the judicial system and the law will determine the country's ability to realize a modern welfare state and reveal the objective value of a civil society with regard to human dignity; we can then deduce the reasonableness the judicial system must show in the face of objective conditions, which is the basis for the judicial system to represent judicial justice and judicial authority. Taiwan's judicial system has undergone extremely rapid reforms in recent years. The judicial system's interpretation of constitutional principles has led to clear acknowledgement that violations of the principle of equal protection by human rights values and rights and protections suggest that the law is inadequate. This confirms the equal basis of human dignity and rights. In particular, it is necessary to construct a trial system and suit procedures befitting a democratic society. The Judicial Yuan started holding judicial reform committee conferences and national judicial reform conferences in 1993. These conferences brought judicial, prosecutorial, defense, and academic personnel together for far-ranging discussions. The conclusions of the conferences, along with specific reform measures and their timetables, will help meet the challenges of the new century and accelerate judicial reform. A pyramid-shaped suit system and court organization will realize the Judicial Yuan's role as the highest judicial agency and achieve the constitutional intent of institutionalizing the trial system. The three-stage reform framework calls for the merger of agencies and revision of laws. The reforms will also entail the transformation of a "diverse, multi-track" system into a "unified, single-track" system. After the third stage has been completed in 2010, the judicial system will have an all new look, and will be ready to safeguard the people's judicial beneficiary rights. The main purpose of this study is to explore the major changes undergone by Taiwan's judicial system in recent years. These include the change in criminal suit procedures from the traditional inquisitorial system to the improved adversarial system, which serves to strengthen protection of defendants' fundamental human rights. The thorough implementation of the assumption of innocence conforms to the world's trend towards protection of human rights. The institution of a speedy trial system improves trial efficiency. Strengthening the factual review function of the first instance, changing the purpose of the second instance to subsequent review, the use of the third instance for strict legal review, the adoption of a appeal permit system, and various systematic reforms have truly meaningful. In a time of progressive democratic reforms, the practice of law must be comprehensive, feasible, and appropriate if overall reforms are to be completed. Judicial reform can strengthen maintenance of the constitutional order and the protection of fundamental human rights. Keywords: judicial system, trial system, human dignity, fundamental human rights, adversarial system, inquisitorial system

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Santo Tomas, 1966. / Typescript. Vita. Appendices: p. 299-301. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (p. [281]-292).

Thesis (LLD.)--University of Pretoria, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references and index.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of South Florida, 2003. / Title from PDF of title page. Document formatted into pages; contains 295 pages. Includes bibliographical references.

published_or_final_version / Law / Master / Doctor of Legal Studies