Michal Stránecký - Human Enhancement: Vision of a better Humankind? Thesis in Philosophy SUMMARY: Human Enhancement: Vision of a better Humankind? This thesis deals with the problems of Human Enhancement, i.e. a possibility of making human better by biotechnologies. Chapter 2 shows the position of John Harris, the main Human Enhancement defender. Chapter 3 describes objections raised by Michael J. Sandel, one of the opponents of John Harris. Chapter 4 shows risks of genetic manipulations. Chapter 5 discusses the unacceptable risks of Human Enhancement for the whole society. Chapter 6 deals with the problem of freedom and human rights that would be these procedures jeopardized. This thesis ends with a reflection on which human properties and qualities are really worth enhancement. Conclusion is that Human Enhancement would cause more harm than good.

This essay discusses the futuristic view of radical human enhancement through the lenses of the transhumanist project. The focus of the essay is on the transhumanistic values proposed by Nick Bostrom, and the technological progress that transhumanism proposes. In this essay I ask if the transhumanist project is a desirable project and in our long-term interests as humans. I propose that at least two of three criteria must be fulfilled in order for any radical human enhancement project to be a desirable project. Of these 3 criteria, two will be addressed in this essay. The two criteria discussed is named “The worthwhile criterion”, and “The obsolescence criterion”. The thirds criteria regarding feasibility will not be addressed in this essay. The conclusion is that transhumanist project cannot fulfill these two criteria and thus it is not a desirable project. / Den här uppsatsen diskuterar den futuristiska synen på radikal mänsklig förbättring genom linserna av det transhumanistiska projektet. Fokuset i uppsatsen ligger på de transhumanistiska värderingar som förslagits av Nick Boström, och det de tekniska framstegen som transhumanism föreslår. I denna uppsats ställer jag frågan om det transhumanistiska projektet är ett önskvärt projekt i våra långsiktiga intressen som människor. Jag föreslår att åtminstone två av tre kriterier måste uppfyllas för att ett radikalt mänskligt förbättringsprojekt ska vara ett önskvärt projekt. Av dessa tre kriterier så kommer två att behandlas i denna uppsats. De två kriterierna som diskuteras heter ”Det värdefulla kriteriet” och ”Föråldrande kriteriet”. Det tredje kriteriet angående genomförbarhet kommer inte att behandlas i denna uppsats. Slutsatsen är att det transhumanistiska projektet inte kan uppfylla dessa två kriterier och därför inte är ett önskvärt projekt.

The thesis’ study of life expansion proposes a framework for artistic, design-based approaches concerned with prolonging human life and sustaining personal identity. To delineate the topic: life expansion means increasing the length of time a person is alive and diversifying the matter in which a person exists. For human life, the length of time is bounded by a single century and its matter is tied to biology. Life expansion is located in the domain of human enhancement, distinctly linked to technological interfaces with biology. The thesis identifies human-computer interaction and the potential of emerging and speculative technologies as seeding the promulgation of human enhancement that approach life expansion. In doing so, the thesis constructs an inquiry into historical and current attempts to append human physiology and intervene with its mortality. By encountering emerging and speculative technologies for prolonging life and sustaining personal identity as possible media for artistic, design-based approaches to human enhancement, a new axis is sought that identifies the transhuman and posthuman as conceptual paradigms for life expansion. The thesis asks: What are the required conditions that enable artistic, design-based approaches to human enhancement that explicitly pursue extending human life? This question centers on the potential of the study’s proposed enhancement technologies in their relationship to life, death, and the human condition. Notably, the thesis investigates artistic approaches, as distinct from those of the natural sciences, and the borders that need to be mediated between them. The study navigates between the domains of life extension, art and design, technology, and philosophy in forming the framework for a theory of life expansion. The critical approach seeks to uncover invisible borders between these interconnecting forces by bringing to light issues of sustaining life and personal identity, ethical concerns, including morphological freedom and extinction risk. Such issues relate to the thesis’ interest in life expansion and the use emerging and speculative technologies. 4 The study takes on a triad approach in its investigation: qualitative interviews with experts of the emerging and speculative technologies; field studies encountering research centers of such technologies; and an artistic, autopoietic process that explores the heuristics of life expansion. This investigation forms an integrative view of the human use of technology and its melioristic aim. The outcome of the research is a theoretical framework for further research in artistic approaches to life expansion.

The aim of this thesis is to provide an argument that enhancement technologies are a form of enablement more significant than their physical effects; rather, that enhancement might be a fundamental element of humanity. This allows a refutation of the standard bioconservative position, that to increase capacity beyond that of a "normal" Homo sapiens necessarily defeats humanity, or at least nebulous aspects of it. I here argue instead that humanity is affirmed, and furthermore that enhancements are in fact inherently good, valuable, and worthwhile pursuits; on the assumption that it is, as critics of enhancements and transhumanism say, inherently good, valuable, and worthy of preservation to be human. I suggest thus that to enhance is the essence of, and the key to, the continuum of humanity. In the introduction, I set out the reasons why this type of research is increasingly necessary, namely that it is important to rationally consider the effects which new enhancement and related technologies will have on our persons and on our society. Secondly, it presents my rationales for taking liberal stances on questions such as the scope and definition of enhancement, the supposed therapy- enhancement divide, and on access to enhancement technology; in order to provide a reasoned base from which to build the core themes of the thesis. It goes on to address a number of the archetypical critical arguments against enhancement, in support of these core themes. Part II of the thesis contains the papers and delivers the main arguments in sequence- firstly, the need for the application of rationality in policymaking and commentary on bioethical concerns, and secondly the importance of considering motivation when attempting to divine the best course of action to regulate beings and technologies that we have not yet experienced, and the manner of which we cannot entirely predict. This is followed by an argument as to whether it is reasonable to treat enhanced or other purported novel beings that could result from these technologies as different from ourselves, and thus warranting such policy considerations. To accomplish this, the thesis delivers a fresh angle on the relationship between Homo sapiens sapiens, the human, and whatever is posited to supersede it, the posthuman. A central theme is the idea that humanity is a "matter of sufficiency"- an end-state for moral status, not a stepping-stone which one can be 'post'. These arguments culminate in a contention that it is enhancement that acts as the unifying factor in our evolution and existence, and that there is therefore unlikely to be any good reason to see beings that follow the humans of today as being different in any significant way. The thesis concludes with an exploration of the progression of these themes, as well as identifying the place of my work amongst the wider academic literature around enhancement and the nature of the human. Finally, the most promising avenues for future research are explored.

Dans son analyse de la démarche de socialisation des enfants, Émile Durkheim met en garde contre « toute action positive destinée à imprimer une orientation déterminée à l’esprit de la jeunesse ». Notre thèse explore les déclinaisons contemporaines de ces « actions positives » qui émanent de l’État et de différents éléments de la société, et qui, en modifiant le fonctionnement cérébral, entendent orienter le comportement d’enfants non malades vers davantage d’attention et moins d’impulsivité. Cette orientation recouvre un enjeu politique : la réduction des inégalités dans les capacités cérébrales, qui tendent à devenir des inégalités majeures dans la société de performance contemporaine. Notre objet de recherche est constitué par les nouveaux pouvoirs exercés par les adultes sur les enfants, au moyen de techniques biomédicales nouvelles, en particulier par des substances chimiques : les médicaments psychostimulants. Les moyens biomédicaux s’exercent directement sur le fonctionnement cérébral, de manière intrusive, sans la médiation du langage et de la communication, et posent de ce fait des nouvelles questions liées à leur puissance d’action. Ce travail se donne pour objectif de contribuer à une théorie de la justice cognitive pour les enfants. Les nouvelles significations des inégalités d’attention dans les apprentissages, les enjeux sociaux de ces inégalités dans une société de performance et les nouvelles possibilités d’intervention biomédicales sur le fonctionnement cérébral des enfants convergent vers de nouvelles formes dans l’économie psychique des enfants. Il semble possible d’interpréter ces nouvelles forces à l’œuvre comme s’inspirant d’un principe de justice. Le débat autour d’une justice cognitive reflète alors le caractère ressenti comme insupportable socialement des inégalités d’attention et le caractère ressenti comme inévitable de la réponse pharmacologique qui lui est associée. Le recours à la théorie d’une justice cognitive implique, pour l’analyse des pratiques de prescription massives de Ritaline, de se situer au-delà du paradigme habituel de contrôle social et de contrôle des comportements par la médicalisation de la société. / The analysis of children’s socialization process made by Emile Durkheim warns us against any actions intended to have an impact on the orientation of the young spirits. Our thesis explores the contemporary range of these positive actions issued from the state as well as from different parts of society. Those ones, by modifying the proper cerebral functioning, are guiding the behaviour of non-ill toward more attention and less impulsivness. This subject has a significant political concern: the reduction of cerebral inequal capacities which tend to become more and more important in our contemporary performance oriented society. Our research investigates new powers exerciced by adults on children, through the use of modern biomedical techniques, and particuly through psychostimulant pharmaceuticals. Biomedical tools directly reach the functioning brain, in an intrusive way, without the intermediate of either language or communication, which therefore arises new questions about their power of action. The aim of this study is to contribute to a theory of a cognitive justice for children. The new meanings of the inequalities of focus in learning, the social issues of these inequalities in a performance society and the new possibilities of biomedical intervention on the functioning brain converge towards new forms in psychic economy of children. It seems possible to interpret those new forces in action through a principle of justice. The debate around a cognitive justice reflects the unbearable social aspect of the disparities in attention capacity and the hypothetically unavoidable pharmacological answers associated to it. The solution of the theory of cognitive justice involves, for the pratical analysis of the massive instruction of Ritaline, to be situated beyond the usual paradigm of social control and behavioural control through society’s medicalization.

abstract: This dissertation engages with the philosophical, psychological, and scientific literature on two important topics: empathy and human enhancement. My two broad goals are to clarify the role of empathy in ascriptions of responsibility and to consider how enhanced empathy might alter those ascriptions. First, I argue that empathy is best thought of as a two-component process. The first component is what I call the rational component of empathy (RCE). RCE is necessary for moral responsibility as it allows us to put ourselves in another's shoes and to realize that we would want help (or not to be harmed) if we were in the other's place. The second component is what I call the emotive component of empathy (ECE). ECE is usually an automatic response to witnessing others in distress. Expanding on Michael Slote's view that moral distinctions track degrees of empathy, I argue that it is ECE that varies in strength depending on our relationship to specific people. Second, I argue that in order to achieve Peter Singer's goal an "expanding circle" of care for all human beings, it will be necessary to use some form of artificial empathy enhancement. Within this context, I try to show that empathy enhancement is 1) a reasonably foreseeable possibility within the next decade or so, and 2) morally defensible. Third, I argue that philosophers who argue that psychopaths are not morally responsible for their actions are mistaken. As I see it, these philosophers have erred in treating empathy as a singular concept and concluding that because psychopaths lack empathy they cannot be held morally responsible for their actions. The distinction between RCE and ECE allows us to say that psychopaths lack one component of empathy, ECE, but are still responsible for their actions because they clearly have a functional RCE. Fourth, I paint a portrait of the landscape of responsibility with respect to the enhanced empath. I argue that the enhanced empath would be subject to an expanded sphere of special obligations such that acts that were previously supererogatory become, prima facie, morally obligatory. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation Philosophy 2016

Essay I explores brain machine interface (BMI) technologies. These make direct communication between the brain and a machine possible by means of electrical stimuli. This essay reviews the existing and emerging technologies in this field and offers a systematic inquiry into the relevant ethical problems that are likely to emerge in the following decades. Essay II, co-written with professor Sven-Ove Hansson, presents a novel procedure to engage the public in ethical deliberations on the potential impacts of brain machine interface technology. We call this procedure a Convergence seminar, a form of scenario-based group discussion that is founded on the idea of hypothetical retrospection. The theoretical background of this procedure and the results of the five seminars are presented here. Essay III discusses moral enhancement, an instance of human enhancement that alters a person’s dispositions, emotions or behavior in order to make that person more moral. Moral enhancement could be carried out in three different ways. The first strategy is behavioral enhancement. The second strategy, favored by prominent defenders of moral enhancement, is emotional enhancement. The third strategy is the enhancement of moral dispositions, such as empathy and inequity aversion. I argue that we ought to implement a combination of the second and third strategies. / <p>QC 20121206</p>

Transhumanism is the name given to the cultural and philosophical movement which advocates radical human technological enhancement. In what follows, I use perspectives drawn from existential philosophy to problematize transhumanists' desire to recast human finitude as a series of technical problems with technical solutions. The ontological account of transhumanism offered here questions the assumed benefit and inevitability across six chapters. Following an introductory chapter, Chapter 2 introduces the key players, and present the philosophy of transhumanism and the opposing view of bioconservativism. Chapter 3 offers a narrative of transhumanism beginning with its mythical antecedents, and proceeds to describe the emergence of contemporary transhumanist institutions. Chapter 4 focuses on the challenge that transhumanists Aubrey de Grey and Ray Kurzweil present to mortality. The chapter asks whether human immortality is a coherent idea, and consider the consequences of achieving a data-driven amortality. Chapter 5 continues the analysis of transhumanism as it challenges limits to knowledge (ignorance), and limits to well-being (suffering). Ray Kurzweil is presented as a key figure of transhumanist thought, along with David Pearce, who desires to eradicate suffering through genetic engineering. The hubris of transhumanism is viewed through the lens of Friedrich Nietzsche in chapter 6. Nietzsche's critique of the "last human" is interpreted in terms of transhumanist thought, and a role for the philosopher in the context of transhumanism is presented. Finally, chapter 7 offers Buddhism as an alternative response to suffering. This chapter profiles "Buddhist Transhumanists," and consider what connection transhumanism has with Buddhism's philosophy of impermanence.

Artikelns syfte är att undersöka hur vi kan skapa en gestaltning som väcker tankar kring ‘Human Enhancement Technologies’ (Pariseau-Legault et al., 2018) genom kritisk design och VR-teknik. Detta har skett genom ett utforskande av våra fysiska händers beröring (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2009) i vardagliga aktiviteter samt spelarens beröring i en VR-upplevelse. Denna undersökning ledde till en gestaltning som vill förändra en spelares upplevda beröring i samband med en vardaglig aktivitet, där vi genom teknologiska modifikationer ger dina händer ny funktionalitet. / This article aims to research how we can design an experience that challenges our ideas about ‘Human Enhancement Technologies’ (Pariseau-Legault et al., 2018) through critical design and VR-technology. This through exploration of our hands physical touch (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2009) in everyday activities and exploring touch in Virtual Reality. This research helped to create a design that aims to change a player's touch in connection with an everyday activity where we through technological modifications give your hands new functionality.

Yes / In this chapter we will review experimental evidence related to pharmacological moral enhancement. Firstly, we will present our recent study in which we found that a drug called propranolol could change moral judgements. Further research, which also investigated this, found similar results. Secondly, we will discuss the limitations of such approaches, when it comes to the idea of general “human enhancement”. Whilst promising effects on certain moral concepts might be beneficial to the development of theoretical moral psychology, enhancement of human moral behaviour in general – to our current understanding – has more side-effects than intended effects, making it potentially harmful. We give an overview of misconceptions when taking experimental findings beyond the laboratory and discuss the problems and solutions associated with the psychological assessment of moral behaviour. Indeed, how is morality “measured” in psychology, and are those measures reliable?