published_or_final_version / Philosophy / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

This study examines the notion of universal human rights in the context of the importance of social and economic rights for the agency and dignity of human beings. It argues that the recognition of basic rights to what is necessary for physical well-being is essential to any adequate theory of human rights, and that rights of the civil and political variety depend on the recognition of social and economic rights if they are to be exercised. Therefore the secondary status which is usually accorded to social and economic rights results in an imbalanced ideal of human rights both in theory and in practice. This study is an attempt to place second generation rights in their proper context and to argue for them as human rights of equal status and importance. It focuses on the derivation of human rights in general, and shows that second generation rights may be accommodated within this structure. It further supports this position by showing that the categorical differences which are asserted to exist between first and second generation rights are based on a mistaken conception of positive and negative rights and duties, as well as an inadequate conception of liberty. The thesis shows that all rights generate a variety of duties, both positive and negative, and that an adequate theory of rights has to be able to accommodate the inevitability of conflicts of rights at the level of their enforcement. Consequently, this study argues there is no reason to give either class of right primary importance, as both first and second generation human rights are essential to the agency and dignity of a human being, and they are thus interdependent. Furthermore, the thesis shows that human rights can be balanced at the level of the obligations which they generate without compromising the deontological nature of such rights. This thesis argues that a theory of rights which is rooted in the liberal democratic notion of rights, such as that characterised by the choice theory of rights, is inadequate. It therefore argues that a benefit theory of rights must be adopted in order to accommodate conflicts of rights when they arise. The thesis argues that as such conflicts of rights are" most common in cases involving the assertion of social and economic rights, this balancing of rights is of special significance for the enforcement of second generation rights. Furthermore, this thesis argues for a theory of minimal interdependence of first and second generation rights, in order to accommodate the notion of first and second generation rights of equal status and importance, as well as to prevent an inflation of rights claims which would compromise the balancing of rights. It is argued that a reordering of values is necessary to take account of material well-being, as well as civil freedom, as both of these generate fundamental rights of equal status and importance.

This dissertation focuses on the concept of human rights, and in particular on how we should understand the interests protected by human rights and human rights' correlative duties. The work consists of three papers. Human rights and interests In the first paper I consider which conditions interests have to satisfy in order to be protected by human rights. I call these the Interest Conditions. I argue that we need to distinguish between two kinds of Interest Conditions: qualitative and quantitative ones. This means that we need to consider both which type of interests, and how much of these interests, human rights protect. I then consider the content of these conditions. Political accounts and fidelity to human rights practice In recent years, considerable attention has been received by so called "political accounts" of the analysis of human rights. According to these theories, one of the distinctive features of human rights is that they play a certain political function. In particular, a large number of political accounts hold that human rights have political correlative duties. I call this thesis 'Political Duties'. Political Duties has been defended on the grounds of the desideratum of fidelity, according to which the analysis of human rights ought to be faithful to human rights practice. I consider two ways of interpreting this desideratum and the corresponding versions of the argument in support of Political Duties. I argue that neither version successfully supports the thesis. The universal scope of positive duties correlative to human rights In the third paper I focus on duties correlative to human rights. We can distinguish between two different kinds of duties: negative and positive ones. Negative duties are duties not to perform an action, while positive duties are duties to perform an action. I focus on the latter and, in particular, I concentrate on the question of their scope - that is, on understanding who holds them. I defend a refinement of the thesis that all individuals hold positive duties correlative to human rights, which I call the Universal Scope Thesis.

My hypothesis is that social contract theory does not satisfactorily explain why we owe a serious concern or respect to profoundly mentally disabled individuals (PMD). This is a problem for social contract theories if we assume, like I do in this dissertation, that the PMD possess a robust moral status (RMS). My dissertation will explore the main strategies deployed by contractarian and contractualist theorists to bring the PMD within the purview of the social contract, in order to clarify why some aspects of their claims are promising but why they nonetheless fail to fully explain the robust moral status of the PMD. I notably find that they leave morally important dimensions of human relations out of the contractual frame, which means that they exclude the PMD from the scope of justice and morality when they claim that this contractual frame offers the only valid explanation to be a subject of justice and a moral patient. I do not conclude that this requires us to reject social contract theory altogether, nor do I count it as a reason to question whether the PMD have a robust moral status. In my concluding chapter, I will rather suggest a theoretical frame that has the potential of incorporating both contractual and non-contractual relations within the spheres of morality and justice, because both kinds of relation vehicle important intuitions about what is of value in human life. This dissertation will contribute to orientate future research on the moral and political grounds for the rights of profoundly mentally disabled people, as well as question or curtail the breadth of certain key assumptions of social contract theories.

While the United Kingdom has a general commitment to religious freedom, there is currently very little written on what this commitment ought to mean for religious organizations. This thesis contributes to religious freedom literature by considering when United Kingdom law ought to apply to religious organizations. It answers this question by exploring certain potential conflicts between United Kingdom law and religious organizations paying particular attention to those that are under-examined and where the possibility of differential treatment is strongest. The thesis is divided into three parts. Part One consists of Chapter One and sets out the doctrinal and theoretical foundations of religious freedom. Here the thesis accepts that autonomy is the liberal normative justification for religious freedom. Part Two consists of Chapters Two to Chapter Seven and examines the interaction between United Kingdom law and religious organizations in six contexts: employment; the provision of goods and services; membership admission; internal discipline, internal property disputes; and family matters. Each chapter in Part Two is divided into two parts. The first part considers the legal doctrine that applies to religious organizations in that context. It then considers whether that approach can be justified in light of the commitment to religious freedom and autonomy identified in Part One. Part Three consists of the final chapter, Chapter Eight. This chapter uses the conclusions from the preceding doctrinal chapters to suggest a general approach for determining when law should apply to religious organizations. The thesis concludes that a contextual approach, that considers the often competing interests involved, is the best way of determining when law should apply to religious organizations. Such consideration ought to pay special attention to the importance of the particular activity to ensuring that the option of a religious way of life is available.

The concept of human rights holds a distinctive significance in political practice, yet philosophers remain divided over the nature of these rights. The Orthodox View defines human rights as moral rights possessed by all individuals simply in virtue of their humanity. Proponents of this view claim that the contemporary idea of human rights is a continuation of the natural rights project of the eighteenth century and shares many of its basic philosophical assumptions. This thesis argues that the Orthodox View is no longer an appropriate characterisation of the concept of human rights we find in current domestic and international practice. It also rejects recent alternatives offered by supporters of the Political View, who define human rights by particular functions they serve, specifically their role(s) in acting as benchmarks for the legitimacy of states or triggers of international concern. I propose instead a new 'Political Justification View' of human rights, which states that human rights are demands which challenge unjustifiable political-institutional orders, which are the concern of all people, and which protect the equal standing of individuals in political decisions that affect the collective or individual good. This view better captures the diversity of practices that employ the term 'human rights', whilst also explaining its innovative power as a moral language that enables individuals to challenge the official institutional order under whose authority they live. Finally, I argue that within this broader view of human rights there are two distinct moral concepts which pertain to different parts of human rights practice: Domestic Human Rights and International Legitimacy Rights. Separating these two concepts is helpful in resolving long-standing debates about whether human rights are properly thought of as minimalist moral concerns of legitimacy or broader social goals to be achieved through political institutions.

M.A. (Politics) / The human rights discourse is flawed in theory and practise. Despite this, it remains legally entrenched in the South African constitution and enjoys a high degree of rhetorical popularity. This thesis will suggest a theory that will explain the longevity of the human rights discourse based on its ability to open spaces for the development of political agency. This ability is derived from its essentially emotive nature as a discourse comprised of value judgments. The discourse is in turn shaped by the agents that are mobilized through human rights. Hence, human rights will be described as a dynamic, evolving system as opposed to the a priori, deontological facts that they have traditionally been conceived to be.

This thesis explores the normative significance of making a rights-backed, authorized demand as a right holder. Rights, I argue, enable their holders to make a special kind of demand which comes with a special force. It is, in other words, one of rights' functions that they are demands-enabling. I single out what sort of demands I am interested in exploring. I also look at how these special demands are normatively significant. I call them rights-backed, authorized demands. They are normatively significant, first, because of the interesting role they play in other agents' practical-reasoning, and , second, because the very making of these demands, as a matter of rights, is empowering in an abstract way. I go on to contrast my view with other ‘demand theories' in existence and conclude that my view is substantively different. In particular, existing demand theories of rights all fail to sufficiently highlight the importance of actual demands, and instead focus on the ‘status' of ‘being in a position' to make demands. I argue that this focus is a fundamental mistake. I also consider how my view can contribute to some related literature on rights. First, I argue that my view highlights a new function which rights have: it has interesting implications on the shape of the long-standing debate between the will and interest theory of rights. Second, I argue that my view provides us with a new way to counter one of the most discussed criticisms of the existence of welfare human rights, which is the argument that rights must correlate with some specific duties as a necessary existence condition, and that human welfare rights fail on this mark. I conclude that if human rights indeed have a demand-related function as I argue, it weakens the intuitive appeal of this criticism.

Since the late 1980s, efforts made by the international community to deal with the complex and global problem of money laundering have stimulated the creation and definition of the so-called 'international crime of money laundering', which is included in various United Nations and Council of Europe international treaties, as well as European Union Directives. The Central purpose of this thesis is to investigate if the main goal of effectiveness in the adaptation of the international crime of money laundering at the domestic level, might undermine other values that international law is seeking to protect, namely the guarantee of due process and the adequate protection of human rights principles. Then, if the adoption of any element of the crime shows to be inconsistent with civil rights and guarantees, to propose how deficiencies could be remedied.