Thesis (doctoral)--Universität, Bochum, 1999.

<p>In this minithesis, I demonstrate that International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law are two distinct but related fields of law. First, the examination deals with the instance that the aim of both branches of law, the protection of human rights, is common, but the approach to reach this aim is different. In this regard, I show numerous points of divergence of both branches of law which have their origin in the fundamentally different historical developments of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law. I give the main attention to the application of both sets of law, whereby the contractions and legal gaps of the protection of human rights become apparent. The proposals dealing with the solution of these issues are discussed. I argue that a new legal instrument for a comprehensive and compatible protection of human rights is necessary, especially in times of internal strife. Regarding the question as to whether International Humanitarian Law or International Human Rights Law should apply if both branches are applicable, I take the view to apply the roman principle of law lex specialis derogat legi generali in such a way that the more specific rule whenever they have a specific justification for dealing with specific problems is applicable. Both branches of law do not merge to one, but they converge to a harmonious relationship, where they complement each other and provide the highest protection of human rights.</p>

The main objective of this thesis is to investigate, using the dialectical method, why human rights are not only just emancipatory in the international context but are also often used for the legitimation of repressive policies. The argument in this thesis accepts that human rights have an important role in the general development of international law, and that their historical development has had a transformational effect on international politics. My thesis is that political groups have sought to mould political and social interactions by questioning and reshaping both the definitions and the system of human rights. In doing so, those actions – defined as political power – are used to legitimise new social and political constellations by changing the legal definitions of rights and by erecting new forms of protection. In the development of my argument, I analyse first the different historical moments in which significant transformations and redefinitions of human rights occurred. For that, I will identify two processes: the formalisation of rights (emancipatory) and their de-formalisation (repressive). Secondly, I will seek to show that these processes are politically constituted in a dialectic that operates in the implementation of such rights by the State in both domestic and international spheres. I shall then provide an interpretation that tries to explain how this dialectic has helped legitimise the system of international human rights. As a result, it can be observed that while in the West there was, domestically, an emancipatory movement able to formalise rights that progressively reached larger social groups, the same cannot be said for those who lived in the colonial world. Internationally, there have been different interpretations that prevented the expansion and implementation of human rights on the same basis as in the domestic sphere. The dialectic of emancipation and repression, therefore, can be visualised by looking, historically, at political struggles between formalising and de-formalising forces.

The law of Blockade is derived from customary law that developed during the height of eighteenth and nineteenth century naval warfare. As a method of warfare that has the goal of crippling an adversary’s economy, blockade can devastate not only the military apparatus of a country, but the civilian population as well. In this manner, it is a method of warfare that cannot distinguish in its effects between civilians and military objectives. The existing IHL framework governing blockade does not provide satisfactory protections to the civilian populations of affected states. Starvation, malnutrition and disease are the consequential effects of a lengthy and effective blockade. A new approach to the law of blockade is required, one that will codify contemporary practice and obligate those engaging in blockade operations to ensure that humanitarian relief cannot be denied to affected civilian populations. / Thesis (Master, Law) -- Queen's University, 2012-03-03 16:13:35.593

<p>In this minithesis, I demonstrate that International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law are two distinct but related fields of law. First, the examination deals with the instance that the aim of both branches of law, the protection of human rights, is common, but the approach to reach this aim is different. In this regard, I show numerous points of divergence of both branches of law which have their origin in the fundamentally different historical developments of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law. I give the main attention to the application of both sets of law, whereby the contractions and legal gaps of the protection of human rights become apparent. The proposals dealing with the solution of these issues are discussed. I argue that a new legal instrument for a comprehensive and compatible protection of human rights is necessary, especially in times of internal strife. Regarding the question as to whether International Humanitarian Law or International Human Rights Law should apply if both branches are applicable, I take the view to apply the roman principle of law lex specialis derogat legi generali in such a way that the more specific rule whenever they have a specific justification for dealing with specific problems is applicable. Both branches of law do not merge to one, but they converge to a harmonious relationship, where they complement each other and provide the highest protection of human rights.</p>

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 2006. / Title from title screen (site viewed on Nov. 22, 2006). PDF text: ii, 333 p. : ill. ; 1.82Mb. UMI publication number: AAT 3217536. Includes bibliographical references. Also available in microfilm and microfiche format.

This thesis is concerned with reparation for human rights and international humanitarian law breaches committed by or attributed to international organizations. These breaches constitute internationally wrongful acts which according to the International Law Commission's Draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations, give rise to an obligation on the offending organization to afford reparation. However, in practice, the obligation to afford reparation is unimplemented. The thesis explores why this is. The thesis considers how the law of responsibility intersects with the specialised regimes of human rights and international humanitarian law and particularly, their application to remedies and reparation owed to individuals. It reviews the various gaps in the normative framework and the limitations of existing redress mechanisms. The thesis analyses the cogency of the arguments and rationales that have been used by international organisations to limit institutional liability and the scope and functioning of redress mechanisms, included by the resort to lex specialis principles. It is postulated that the standards of reparation must be drawn from the nature of the breach and the resulting harms and not by who is responsible for the breach. In this respect the thesis is an exercise in the progressive development of the law. Having determined that existing redress mechanisms cannot afford adequate or effective remedies and reparation, the thesis explores how to move towards a model that achieves greater compliance. Indeed, should it be accepted that international organizations must afford remedies and reparation for breaches of human rights and IHL that correspond to the standards that exist in those specialised fields then it is argued that there is a corresponding obligation on them to put in place the modalities for that to be achieved.

Magister Legum - LLM / In this minithesis, I demonstrate that International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law are two distinct but related fields of law. First, the examination deals with the instance that the aim of both branches of law, the protection of human rights, is common, but the approach to reach this aim is different. In this regard, I show numerous points of divergence of both branches of law which have their origin in the fundamentally different historical developments of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law. I give the main attention to the application of both sets of law, whereby the contractions and legal gaps of the protection of human rights become apparent. The proposals dealing with the solution of these issues are discussed. I argue that a new legal instrument for a comprehensive and compatible protection of human rights is necessary, especially in times of internal strife. Regarding the question as to whether International Humanitarian Law or International Human Rights Law should apply if both branches are applicable, I take the view to apply the roman principle of law lex specialis derogat legi generali in such a way that the more specific rule whenever they have a specific justification for dealing with specific problems is applicable. Both branches of law do not merge to one, but they converge to a harmonious relationship, where they complement each other and provide the highest protection of human rights. / South Africa

No description available.

The thesis employs critical discourse analysis to map the debate regarding the deployment of armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in warfare and analyses the arguments that legitimise drone strikes and those which criticise their deployment. It also identifies the contentious issues regarding new technologies in warfare. The thesis is aimed at examining the kinds of arguments and justifications that have been provided by different actors for the deployment of armed drone strikes by the United States in Pakistan over a fifteen-year period, beginning with the first strikes in June 2004. It focuses on the bureaucratic debates regarding the strikes and how political leaders have framed the rationale for their deployment. Consequently, it is important to critically analysis how the strikes by United States have been interpreted by different voices and whether the actions of the United States and its drone policy can or cannot be normatively and ethically justified. The thesis sets out by identifying the common themes that emerge from the public discourse and sets out to answer one key question that assesses the intertextual framework that has bounded the official discourse, the wider political, academic and public debate regarding armed unmanned drone strikes. That is: How have the US drone campaigns...