Originally presented as the author's thesis (PhD)--Wilhelms-Universität Münster, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references and index.

Thesis (M.A.) - Carleton University, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 180-184). Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Honors Project--Smith College, Northampton, Mass., 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 79-86).

Thesis (M.A.)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2004. / "September 2004." Includes bibliographical references (p. 69-73). Also available online.

Thesis (M.A. (Political and International Studies))--Rhodes University, 2005. / A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Waikato, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 326-348). Also available via the World Wide Web.

Undergraduate honors paper--Mount Holyoke College, 2007. Program in International Relations. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 133-136).

This thesis examines the discourse on human security, in particular the 2001 report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect. I contend that the human of human security is deeply indebted to an account of the modern subject that is also responsible for producing the model of the citizen/state relationship to which human security is conceived of as a response. Human security reaffirms the appropriateness of the sovereign state while at the same time re-conceiving sovereignty as responsibility and empowering certain international actors to intervene in sovereign states should they fail to act responsibly. Like the citizen, the ostensibly universal category of the human is produced through the exclusion or dehumanization of some ways of being human and some human beings. However, I also consider the ways in which human security works to humanize its subjects, producing the kinds of humans that can be secured.

A partir do exame da formação e identificação da norma consuetudinária, consoante os pressupostos da teoria dos dois elementos, investiga-se a índole consuetudinária das intervenções humanitárias no contexto do Direito Internacional Contemporâneo, a fim de verificar se tais práticas estatais teriam se constituído em um costume internacional e, por conseguinte, se elas ampliaram o rol das exceções ao princípio da proibição do uso da força pelos Estados nas relações internacionais esculpido no artigo 2 (4) da Carta das Nações Unidas. Dada a polissemia existente para a expressão intervenção humanitária, esta pode ser compreendida como o recurso à força armada por um Estado, ou grupo de Estados, para além das suas fronteiras, conforme discricionariedade própria, ou seja, sem a autorização do CSNU, com o propósito de cessar práticas em largas escalas, persistentes e generalizadas, comissivas ou omissivas, de graves violações dos Direito Humanos e Internacional Humanitário. A partir da apuração dos elementos que conformam esse conceito estabelecido, do exame dos casos de ocorrência e das justificativas legais apresentadas pelos Estados interventores para essa prática interventiva, conjugado com a reação dos demais Estados à essa conduta, por uma considerável e persistente falta de expresso reconhecimento do caráter de direito para a intervenção humanitária, é possível afirmar que os Estados sucessivamente reafirmaram o reconhecimento do princípio da interdição do uso da força pelos Estados nas suas relações internacionais e, que nos quadros do Direito Internacional contemporâneo, a este tipo de intervenção não é um costume internacional porque carece de opinio iuris. / From the examination of the formation and identification of international customary, depending on the assumptions of the theory of the two elements, investigates the customary nature of humanitarian interventions in the context of Contemporary International Law, in order to verify whether such State practice would have incurred an international custom and, therefore, if they expanded the list of exceptions to the principle of prohibition of the use of force in international relations States carved in article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations. Given the existing polysemy for the term humanitarian intervention, this can be understood as the use of armed force by a State or group of States, beyond its borders, according to own discretion, i.e. without the permission of the UNSC, to cease practices in wide ranges, persistent and widespread, comissivas or omissivas, of serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. The examination of the elements that make up this concept established and the cases and legal justifications submitted by States interveners to this practice interventional, combined with the reaction of other States that conduct by a considerable and persistent lack of expressed recognition of the character of the right to humanitarian intervention, it is possible to affirm that the States successively reaffirmed recognition of the principle of prohibition of the use of force by States in their international relations and, that in the frames of contemporary international law, this type of intervention is not a customary international because lacks opinio iuris.

This thesis seeks to identify the factors necessary to drive the United States to intervene in a humanitarian crisis. While some scholars have argued that humanitarianism in and of itself is a sufficient reason for an armed military intervention – I challenge this assumption and argue that while the United States can exhibit humanitarian impulses at times, that there are very observable limitations to these impulses. I argue that while humanitarianism can be a factor in the decision to intervene, that ultimately either national interest or another domestic political channel must also fervently push for intervention in order for action to occur. In testing my hypothesis, I examine American foreign policy in four modern humanitarian crises – Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Syria.