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This study traces the development of the principles of insurance law in the Netherlands from 1500 to 1800. In the first part the origin of the insurance contract and its recognition and distinguishing features, and its classification and definition in pre-codified Dutch law are described. The adjudication of disputes arising from insurance contracts and the jurisdiction of Dutch courts in this regard are also considered. In the second part the principles of pre-codified Dutch insurance law are detailed, from the general requirements for the conclusion of a valid insurance contract to the termination of insurance contracts. In the process matters such as the object of risk and the perils insured against in marine insurance; aspects of non-marine insurance; the parties to the insurance contract, including the involvement of third parties; the premium, the duration, alteration and control of the risk; insurance fraud; loss and its prevention, notice and proof; the principle of indemnity and co-insurance, double insurance, over- insurance and under-insurance; and the insurer’s right of recourse and the doctrine of abandonment are also analysed.The primary materials consulted for this research were the published sources of Dutch insurance law prior to the beginning of the nineteenth century. In order to place developments in the Netherlands in a broader perspective, some comparative investigation was also undertaken into the earlier position in Spain, the contemporary position in Hamburg and London, and the subsequent codifications of insurance law in the Wetboek van Koophandel in the Netherlands and in the Marine Insurance Act of 1906 in England. / Law / LL.D.

This diploma work describes the no-fault insurance project for specific entrepreneurial subject. The work includes the characteristics of selected company, hazard analysis, the selection of the most suitable insurance company and the optimal no-fault insurance plan that would minimize the most severe hazards of the company.

The aim of this research was to generate a theory to predict the success levels of assurance sales representatives. A sample of 245 participants from a life insurance company in South Africa was selected to participate in the study. The sample consisted of 213 males and 32 females; of these, 159 were European, 78 African and 8 Asian; the average age was 40.37 years. The Schepers Locus of Control Inventory (Schepers, 1995), the Entrepreneurial Attitude Orientation Scale (EAOS) (Robinson, Stimpson, Huefner&Hunt, 1991) and a biographical questionnaire were administered to the participants. Factor analysis was conducted to test the psychometric quality of the locus of control and the attitude scale. Hypotheses were tested for the variables with two performance outcomes: commissions earned and lapse ratios. Using the information obtained from the analyses, a model was built of the significant relationships between the performance criteria and the independent variables. Results indicated that neither the EAOS nor the Locus of Control Inventory scales predicted performance outcomes as hypothesized for sales professionals. The significant correlations that did result were generally counter to expectations. Demographic variables had limited success in predicting performance outcomes of sales professionals. The nature of the employment contract (full or part-time w/NEK, F = 5.61; p<0.05), population groups (White South Africans vs. African South Africans w/NEK, F = 5.22; p<0.05), job status (Manager vs. Sales Representative wNEK, F = 3.51; p<0.05), years in sales (w/NEK, r = •0.14345; p<0.05), and desired salary (w/NEK, r = 0.19571; p<0.05) were correlated with the performance outcome measures. Cultural and management implications are discussed with regard to the use of psychometric measures for selection. Research implications also are discussed. / Dissertation (MA (psychology))--University of Pretoria, 2001. / Psychology / unrestricted

This dissertation consists of three essays on access to primary care and the design of health insurance markets. These essays share a methodological framework. In each, I estimate a model of the market using detailed administrative data sets. Then, I employ the estimated model to answer policy-relevant research questions. The first chapter, entitled Access to Care in Equilibrium, studies consumer access to medical care as an equilibrium outcome of a market without prices. I use data from the Northern Ontario primary care market to estimate an empirical matching model where patients match with physicians. The market is cleared by a non-price mechanism: the effort it takes to find a physician. I use the model to study the distribution and determinants of access to care. By employing a model of the market, I am able to define a measure of access to care that accounts for patient preferences and market conditions: the probability that a patient who would attain care in a full access environment currently attains care. I find that access to care is low and unevenly distributed. On average, a patient who would attain care in a full access environment will receive care 73% of the time. The issue is particularly acute in rural areas. Further, physicians discriminate in favor of patients with higher expected utilization, thereby increasing access for older and sicker patients while decreasing access for younger and healthier patients. The estimated model is used to decompose access into its contributing factors. In rural areas, the geographic distribution of physicians is the primary determinant of low access. In contrast, low access in urban areas is primarily driven by capacity constraints of physicians. Interestingly, equating physician to population ratios across Northern Ontario would not improve rural access. In the second chapter, entitled Increasing Access to Care Through Policy: A Case Study of Northern Ontario, Canada, I employ the estimated model from Chapter One to assess the impact of policy on access to medical care. I study two policies: (1) grants to incentivize physicians to practice in low-access areas and (2) a payment reform that provided incentives for physicians to increase the numbers of patients on their books. Using the estimated model, I simulate market outcomes in counterfactuals where each policy is removed. By comparing these simulations to outcomes in the current market, I estimate policy impacts while accounting for equilibrium effects. I find that both policies are effective at increasing access to care. However, the policies target different subsets of the population. The grant program increases access most for rural patients, whereas the payment reform increases urban access most. Lastly, Chapter Three is a paper co-authored with Kate Ho and Michael Dickstein entitled Market Segmentation and Competition in Health Insurance. We study the welfare consequences of market segmentation in private health insurance in the US, where households obtain coverage either through an employer or via an individual marketplace. We use comprehensive and detailed data from Oregon’s small group and individual markets to demonstrate several facts. First, enrollees in the small group market have lower health care spending than those in the individual market conditional on plan coverage level. Second, small group enrollees benefit from tax exemptions and employer premium subsidies that create a wedge between premiums charged by insurers and the prices they face. However, these benefits are offset by relatively high plan markups over costs, which generate premiums (prior to employer contributions) that are at least as high as those in the individual market. These findings suggest that recent policies to merge the two markets, allowing small group enrollees to shop on the individual exchanges while maintaining their tax exemptions and employer contributions, may stabilize the individual market without much loss to small group enrollees. However, the new equilibrium outcome depends crucially on the preferences and characteristics of the two populations. We use a model of health plan choice and subsequent utilization to estimate household preferences in both markets and predict premiums and costs under a counterfactual pooled market. We find that integration mitigates adverse selection issues in the individual market, while decreasing government and employer expenditures on premium subsidies. Small group households benefit from lower premiums for low coverage plans in the merged market. However, they face higher premiums for high coverage plans and are constrained to a smaller set of insurance options. Thus, the effects of integration on small group households are heterogeneous.

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