Since Alejo Carpentier's 1944 encounter with the "real maravilloso" in the ruins of the Citadelle La Ferriáere, Haiti has been linked with the notion of Latin American identity, in particular, and American identity, in general. Interesting to me are the ways and the means by which Haiti resurfaces in Cuban and Puerto Rican narratives and what allusions to Haiti in these texts imply about its relationship to the Hispanic Caribbean. I will combine the ideas of John Beverley, Sybille Fischer, and Mimi Sheller to discuss how representations of Haiti work to perpetuate its disavowal and render it a consumable product for the rest of the Caribbean as a whole, and for the Hispanic Caribbean specifically. I will focus on works by Cuban and Puerto Rican authors who have prepared, processed, and packaged Haiti in such a way that its culture, language, and even sexuality are able to satisfy long-held cravings for that which is local and exotic. Thus, I hope to explain how it has been and will continue to be possible for the Hispanic Caribbean to consume Haiti positively as a symbol of its marvelous reality and negatively as an Afro-Caribbean personification of racial, cultural, and political decadence in literature. / by Walteria C. Tucker. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2011. / Includes bibliography. / Electronic reproduction. Boca Raton, Fla., 2011. Mode of access: World Wide Web.

陳潔儀. / 論文(博士)--香港中文大學, 2000. / 參考文獻 (p. 389-435) / 中英文摘要. / Available also through the Internet via Dissertations & theses @ Chinese University of Hong Kong. / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest Information and Learning Company, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Mode of access: World Wide Web. / Chen Jieyi. / Lun wen (bo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2000. / Can kao wen xian (p. 389-435) / Zhong Ying wen zhai yao.

In this thesis I examine the ideological mechanisms that work to constitute, construct, and maintain subject identity. Such mechanisms include repetition, performativity, identification, and interpellation. I incorporate structuralist, post-structuralist, and psychoanalytic theories as a means to discuss the ways in which gender, sexuality, and identity are performative masquerades. Furthermore, these ideological mechanisms and heteronormative paradigms have the paradoxical power to produce both incurable melancholia and unrealized possibilities alike. Given this conversation, I turn to theorists such as Louis Althusser, Slavoj ��i��ek, and Judith Butler; these theorists employ different theoretical approaches and consequently their explanations regarding how and why identity is manufactured frequently differ. From this productive point of difference, I apply the theories to a literary analysis of Jack Kerouac's On the Road and Ernest Hemingway's The Garden of Eden. Paired together, the critical theories and literary works act to complicate and nuance each other, and collectively introduce valuable insights regarding who or what is subject. / Graduation date: 2013

Thesis supervisor: Alvin Snider. Includes bibliographic references (p. 214-227).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2003. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 166-175). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

Not available / text

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Oregon, 2005. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 213-220). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Georgia State University, 2006. / Title from title screen. Audrey Goodman, committee chair; Thomas L. McHaney, Elizabeth West, committee members. Electronic text (253 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed May15, 2007. Includes bibliographical references (243-253).

No description available.

The central argument of my study is that, among other matters, in his works, J.M. Coetzee could be said to demonstrate that the known Self is an embodied being and is not autonomous. With regard to the latter contention, Coetzee intimates that any two Subjects are implicated in each other’s subjectivities in a reciprocal process that involves what Derek Attridge has called “irruptions of otherness” (2005: xii) into the Subject’s subjectivity. These irruptions, which happen during the encounter, lead to a double loss of autonomy for each Subject and this phenomenon renders the relationship between Subjects non-dichotomus or non-binaric. In other words, the Subject does not produce the contents of his or her consciousness in a sui generis and ex nihilo fashion, and his or her ontological indebtedness to the Other constitutes his or her first loss of autonomy. As for those Others that do possess consciousness, the Subject is implicated in their consciousness and this constitutes the Subject’s second loss of autonomy. These losses counter the near solipsistic Nagelian neo-Cartesianism and paves the way for imagining both intra- and inter-species “intersubjectivity”. It is my view that this double loss of autonomy accounts for the sympathetic and empathetic imagination that we encounter in Coetzee’s fiction. Following Coetzee’s intimations of intersubjectivity through irruptions of otherness, what I see as my contribution to studies on this author’s work through this study is the link I have established between the physicalist strain within the philosophy of mind (whose central thesis is that consciousness is an embodied phenomenon) and a modified Kantian “metaphysics”, especially Immanuel Kant’s conception of concepts as comprising form and content. I have deployed this conception in demonstrating the Subject’s ontological indebtedness to external sources of the content part of consciousness. And, through the Husserlian concept of intentionality, and Kant’s (1929: 27) observation that we cannot have appearances without something that appears, I have linked the Subject to the sources of his or her content and thereby also demonstrated that the Subject is not eternally separated or alienated from those sources. Instead, the Subject is not simply contiguous but coterminous and co-extensive, albeit in a mediated way, with the external sources of the content part of his or her consciousness. Thus, while accepting the thesis of the Other’s radical otherness, I modify the thesis of the Other’s radical exteriority. Ultimately, then, ontologically speaking, the Coetzeean project could be described as one of embodying and grounding the supposedly autonomous, solipsistic and freefloating/disembodied Cartesian Subject. This he does by alerting this Subject, first and foremost, to its embodiedness and, further to that, pointing out its ontological indebtedness to its Others and its implication in the Others’s consciousnesses and so prevent it from continuing with its imperialistic and ecological barbarities. However, ethically speaking, beyond the reciprocal ethics that arises from mutual ontological indebtedness and implication, it is the selflessness that characterises a cruciform logic that comes across as the epitome of Coetzeean ethics.