This thesis analyses the ratchet effect in the context of the performance scheme implemented by Brazilian tax collection in 1988 to reward tax officials for their effort in collecting taxes and uncovering tax violations, using panel data for 110 tax agencies from August 1989 to April 1993 and employing the GMM-system estimator. The estimates suggest the presence of ratchet effect, i.e., the more the tax officials do today, the more the tax officials are asked to do in the future. This result endangers the credibility of the Brazilian tax authority's incentive program as an incentive system.

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This experiment investigated how different percentages of incentive pay affected performance on a number-entering task. It was hypothesized that the critical factor in incentive pay systems was the absolute amount of money that could be earned in an incentive pay paradigm. A counterbalanced single-subject reversal design was employed to examine effects of incentives on performance. Twelve subjects were used in the experiment with three subjects assigned to one of four experimental paradigms. Two of the experimental paradigms incorporated 10% and 100% incentive pay conditions, while the other two experimental paradigms incorporated absolute pay conditions equal to the 10% and 100% incentive pay conditions. Results indicated that similar trends in productivity occurred across subjects in all four experimental paradigms.

Univ., Fak. für Wirtschaftswiss., Diss.--Magdeburg, 2005.

To meet global competition many companies have reorganized work process systems, eliminated management levels, formed employee work groups and implemented variable compensation systems. This study investigated the effect of group incentives on individual sales performance in two specialty shops located in a large metropolitan hotel. Two questions were addressed: What effect would adding a group bonus plan have on individual employee's sales performance who had previously received hourly wages in one shop; and, what effect would changing an individual incentive plan to a group plan have on the individual employee's sales performance in the other shop. In one shop 5 of 7 employees' productivity increased: in the other, 1 of 3 subjects' productivity increased. Contingencies in both shops are analyzed and suggestions offered for future research.

Today’s organisation competes in a fast-moving global marketplace. With technological developments, global communications and demanding customers driving increased competition in most sectors, organisations cannot afford to stand still for long (Holbeche, 2004:32). They exist only when their products and services are sold, and salespeople are usually one of the most important elements of making this happen. Organisations’ fiscal health depends on their ability to drive revenue, but without mastering sales management, revenue can quickly decline. Salespeople need to concentrate on sales, not on responsibilities that pull them in different directions (Bailor, 2004:53). According to Clarke (1998:29), for any company to succeed, the various departments must co-ordinate their efforts and work together. The sales team relies on other departments for support; without sales every other department is worthless. The method of selling has also changed and the days of salespeople carrying briefcases overstuffed with brochures and knocking on every door they can find to drum up interest in their organisations’ products are waning. Today’s professional salespeople co-ordinate the resources of their companies to help solve customers’ problems (Weitz et al, 2004:5). For organisations to succeed in this new environment the right organisational climate is vital to create high performance. This is about making the most of employee talents and accountabilities, and managing performance in ways which unleash, rather than constrain, employee potential (Holbeche, 2004:32). 2 The Long Term Insurance Industry in South Africa had to deal with the changing environment and the introduction of the Financial Advisor Intermediary Service Act of 2002 (FAIS). The traditional principles of successful sales are being challenged in a changing South African insurance industry. Sales managers must rethink their philosophies as the Financial Advisory Intermediary Act (37/2002) regulates the rendering of certain financial advisory and intermediary services to clients and provides for matters incidental thereto. Sales managers can no longer simply motivate financial advisors to achieve targets but should also ensure that all new business is compliant and falls within the new legislation. According to Natenberg (2004:1), sales managers must have a purpose to cope with the added challenges and demands because success comes from purpose. Until a sales manager or financial advisor recognises what needs to be accomplished, there will be a lack of motivation necessary to accomplish anything. Financial advisors burn out easily because they cannot visualise the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow. Everyone wants a driven, highperformance sales team. However, not all sales leaders know how to achieve that. The problem could be motivation. Many sales managers see money as the answer to their motivational problem but money is not everything. For all their commitment to keep salespeople inspired, sales managers would do well to stop and consider the simple things their financial advisors desire. Only then might sales managers be able to craft programmes or work situations in which sales people can thrive (Gilbert, 2003:30). “Too often people let life pass them by. They try hard to achieve something, but when they do, they ask, “Is this all there is to it?” That is because they never 3 take a moment to enjoy how monumental their achievements are. When you accomplish what you set out to do, be proud” (Natenberg, 2004:1). / Prof. Chris Jooste

I investigate whether and how auditors address the potential risk of CEO incentive pay and CEO incentives from their equity portfolio as an incentive to commit fraud through their pricing decisions. Using an OLS regression model I find that auditors price CEO incentive pay in the post SOX period. Also, auditors price CEOs' non-linear incentives from their holdings of stock options as a fraud risk factor but do not price linear incentives from CEO holding of stock and restricted stock. Furthermore, auditors consider CEO incentives to manipulate firm performance due to the vested portion of option holdings as a fraud risk factor which is priced, and not the unvested portion of this portfolio. Furthermore, I find evidence to suggest that auditors price CEO opportunity to commit fraud, as well as CEO rationalizing the act of committing fraud, therefore concluding that auditors price all components of the fraud triangle. / by Yezen H. Kannan. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2009. / Includes bibliography. / Electronic reproduction. Boca Raton, Fla., 2009. Mode of access: World Wide Web.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Stanford University, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 109-115).

This study examined the effects of switching from an incentive pay system solely based on productivity to a scorecard-based incentive pay system. Performance of staff and senior accountants was analyzed across three departments for a two-year baseline and a three-year intervention period. Results showed that percent of charge hour goal remained high during the study. Once the scorecard-based incentive system was implemented, performance on the other line items increased or remained at or above goal levels. Incentive payouts were generally higher under the second incentive plan than under the first for top performers. Possible explanations for data trends, weaknesses of the measures within the scorecard, measure/line item alternatives and implications for future research are also discussed.

This study was conducted to determine which incentive programs best influence young workers in corporate casual restaurants. The server and bar staff of the Chili's division of Brinker International, Inc. were surveyed in 18 stores in the Dallas area. From the sample. 356 usable surveys were received. The study was designed to obtain feedback about existing and future incentive programs that will enhance development of a positive working environment, along with higher productivity and a lower turnover rate.