O presente estudo investigou se o uso do lucro econômico em contratos de incentivo contingentes ao desempenho motiva os indivíduos a agir de forma mais consistente com os objetivos de longo prazo da empresa quando existe o problema do horizonte. Para tanto, foi utilizado um experimento de fator único entre sujeitos, pré-pós tratamento com grupo de controle, cuja única tarefa dos participantes era investir recursos em ações de longo prazo visando maximizar o fluxo de caixa futuro de uma loja de prestação de serviço. O estudo envolveu a participação de 76 estudantes de graduação, divididos em três grupos, e documentou que, em comparação ao grupo de controle (recompensado com base numa remuneração fixa) e a um segundo grupo de tratamento (recompensado com base numa remuneração variável vinculada ao lucro contábil contemporâneo), os participantes submetidos ao contrato que recompensava com base no lucro econômico agiram de forma mais congruente em relação ao objetivo estabelecido, dedicando mais esforço na realização da tarefa e melhorando o desempenho nas suas decisões de investimentos. Consistente com as predições da teoria da agência, o principal resultado dessa investigação sugere que o lucro econômico ajuda a mitigar o problema de miopia gerencial, indicando que incorporá-lo aos contratos motiva os agentes a agir de forma mais consistente com os objetivos de longo prazo da empresa, mesmo na presença do problema do horizonte. Além disso, a pesquisa documentou novas evidências da inadequação da formulação de contratos de incentivo baseados em medidas de desempenho distorcidas, tal como o lucro contábil. / The present study investigated whether the use of economic profit in performance-contingent incentive contracts motivates individuals to act more consistently with the long-term goals of the firm when the horizon problem is present. An experimental design was conducted. The experiment used a single factor between-subjects and pre-post treatment with a control group. The experimental task was to invest resources in long-term actions with the goal of maximizing the future cash flow of a photocopy store. The study involved the participation of 76 undergraduate students, divided into three groups, and documented that participants rewarded by contracts based on economic profit acted more congruently with the goal set by devoting more effort to accomplish the task and improving performance in their investment decisions when compared to the control group (rewarded on the basis of a fixed wage) and to the second treatment group (rewarded on the basis of a contingent contemporaneous accounting profit incentive contract). The present study\'s key findings are consistent with the predictions of the agency theory and suggest that the economic profit helps to mitigate the problem of managerial myopia. These study findings also indicate that the economic profit in incentive contracts motivates agents to act more consistently with the firm\'s long-term goals even in the presence of the horizon problem. In addition, the present research documented new evidences of the inadequacy of incentive contracts based on distorted performance measures such as accounting profit.

O presente estudo investigou se o uso do lucro econômico em contratos de incentivo contingentes ao desempenho motiva os indivíduos a agir de forma mais consistente com os objetivos de longo prazo da empresa quando existe o problema do horizonte. Para tanto, foi utilizado um experimento de fator único entre sujeitos, pré-pós tratamento com grupo de controle, cuja única tarefa dos participantes era investir recursos em ações de longo prazo visando maximizar o fluxo de caixa futuro de uma loja de prestação de serviço. O estudo envolveu a participação de 76 estudantes de graduação, divididos em três grupos, e documentou que, em comparação ao grupo de controle (recompensado com base numa remuneração fixa) e a um segundo grupo de tratamento (recompensado com base numa remuneração variável vinculada ao lucro contábil contemporâneo), os participantes submetidos ao contrato que recompensava com base no lucro econômico agiram de forma mais congruente em relação ao objetivo estabelecido, dedicando mais esforço na realização da tarefa e melhorando o desempenho nas suas decisões de investimentos. Consistente com as predições da teoria da agência, o principal resultado dessa investigação sugere que o lucro econômico ajuda a mitigar o problema de miopia gerencial, indicando que incorporá-lo aos contratos motiva os agentes a agir de forma mais consistente com os objetivos de longo prazo da empresa, mesmo na presença do problema do horizonte. Além disso, a pesquisa documentou novas evidências da inadequação da formulação de contratos de incentivo baseados em medidas de desempenho distorcidas, tal como o lucro contábil. / The present study investigated whether the use of economic profit in performance-contingent incentive contracts motivates individuals to act more consistently with the long-term goals of the firm when the horizon problem is present. An experimental design was conducted. The experiment used a single factor between-subjects and pre-post treatment with a control group. The experimental task was to invest resources in long-term actions with the goal of maximizing the future cash flow of a photocopy store. The study involved the participation of 76 undergraduate students, divided into three groups, and documented that participants rewarded by contracts based on economic profit acted more congruently with the goal set by devoting more effort to accomplish the task and improving performance in their investment decisions when compared to the control group (rewarded on the basis of a fixed wage) and to the second treatment group (rewarded on the basis of a contingent contemporaneous accounting profit incentive contract). The present study\'s key findings are consistent with the predictions of the agency theory and suggest that the economic profit helps to mitigate the problem of managerial myopia. These study findings also indicate that the economic profit in incentive contracts motivates agents to act more consistently with the firm\'s long-term goals even in the presence of the horizon problem. In addition, the present research documented new evidences of the inadequacy of incentive contracts based on distorted performance measures such as accounting profit.

Notre travail a cherché à éclairer une partie des éléments qui peuvent agir sur la productivité du travail, notamment les contrats incitatifs, les technologies de l’information et de la communication (TICS) et les pratiques organisationnelles. Nous avons naturellement tenu compte de la présence d’asymétries d’information, susceptibles d’influencer la relation d’emploi et les choix de l’entreprise en matière de pratiques organisationnelles et d’introduction des technologies de l’information et de la communication. La thèse se divise donc en deux grandes parties : la première se penche sur les contrats incitatifs optimaux ainsi que sur l’effet des différents modes de rémunération sur la productivité. La deuxième partie, quant à elle, met l’accent sur l’introduction et les effets des TICS et des pratiques organisationnelles. Les résultats empiriques tirés de la première partie montrent que l’effet de la rémunération sur la productivité dépend de la forme de rémunération choisie et de la catégorie socioprofessionnelle des employés concernés. Ils mettent également en évidence un effet de la durée du contrat de travail ainsi que du taux d’endettement à court terme sur la productivité. Les résultats issus des études faites dans le cadre de la deuxième partie de la thèse indiquent que les entreprises ont eu besoin d’un temps d’adaptation, entre 1998 et 1999, avant que les effets positifs des TICS et des pratiques organisationnelles puissent se répercuter sur la productivité des salariés. Leurs effets sont intervenus plus rapidement en 2004, compte tenu de ces délais d’accumulation du capital humain. Enfin, nous avons également pu montrer que le gain de productivité s’avère plus important si l’entreprise choisit de mettre en œuvre les deux changements en même temps. / Our work has tried to identify some elements which may have an effect on labor productivity, among which the incentive contracts, the information and communication’s technologies (ICT) and the organizational practices. We took into account the presence of asymmetric information, susceptible to influence the employment relationships and the firm’s choices concerning the organizational practices or the introduction of ICT. The dissertation is divided into two parts: the first one considers the optimal incentive contracts as well as the effect of various remuneration systems on labor productivity. The second part is devoted to the introduction of ICT and the organizational practices. The empirical results drawn from the first part show that the remuneration’s effect on productivity depends on the adopted type of payment and on the social and occupational group of the beneficiaries. They also indicate that the length of the employment’s contract and the rate of short term debts have an effect on productivity. The results obtained within the framework of the second part of the dissertation show that the employees needed some time to adapt, between 1998 and 1999, before the positive effects of the ICT and organizational practices could appear on their productivity. However given the delays of human capital’s accumulation, the effect on labor productivity of various ICT and organizational practices occurred more quickly in 2004. Finally, we showed that the productivity increases more if the company chooses to undertake both changes at the same time.