The main topic of this diploma thesis is Unemployment in the region Most and the ways how to solve this problem. The theoretical part of the diploma thesis explains, what is the unemployment, what are its causes and shows the real numbers of the unemployment in our country and in the World. The second portion assesses the theory of active policy of employment in the Czech republic in its form of investment incentives. The practical portion assesses the region Most, that suffers from long term the highest rate of unemployment and explains the historical and present causes of this situation. Next there is a detailed analysis of the companies in the region Most, which got the investment incentives, and assesses their gain for the reduction of unemployment. The central part of this thesis is about a company EUROPAHAUS GROUP, Ltd. and a description of the procedure of getting its investment incentives.

A research report submitted to the Faculty of Management, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Management. 1994 / Organisations in South Africa are. paying out millions of Rands in financial incentives to executives without ,knowing conclusively whether or not company performance actually improves as a result of financial incentive schemes. Unions, tne media, workers, politicians and others are paying increasing attention to the levels of compensation that executives receive. The question being asked is whether these levels ate really necessary. This, the first research of its mud in South Africa, surveys the views of 121 top managers, from 17 organisations using incentive schemes, on the, impact of these schemes. There is convincing evidence that they are perceived to increase motivation and company performance, build teamwork and are effective in aligning the interests of managers and shareholders. The schemes are valuable in attracting, retaining and motivating executives" Given the complexity of setting executive remuneration, it is submitted. that there be no interference in the level of incentive scheme payouts. The factor analysis yielded a four factor solution, which was interpreted in terms of the literature review and constructs in the questionnaire. The first factor revealed that incentives are a motivator and increase company performance. The) build teamwork and are effective in aligning the interests of managers and shareholders. The second factor state; that incentives should be underpinned by openness and transparency. A fundamental principle behind this is that the relevant financial position should be known by all participants. It was also stated that the whole organisation i.e, all IfNels , should be on an incentive scheme, The third factor highlighted risk aversion in these executives and that basic salary is most important. The fourth factor, locus of control, stressed the importance of the scheme to the individual personally in terms of motivation, focus, reward, retention of services and the ability to control the incentive scheme payout. 111e surprising finding was the extent to which SA executives were risk averse and just how important the basic salary is. Guidelines, based on the factor analysis, content analysis and oo:rrespohd~nce analysis conducted on the questionnaires, ate offered to the designers incentive· schemes. Without correctly designed and aggressive incentive schemes the owners oforgamsations could expect very m.ediocre, "9 to S" type of commitment from their top·management team. Incentive schemes playa vital role in the design of com.petitive remuneration systems. Their importance should not be underestimated. / MT2017

In this work we propose a flexible numerical approach to deal with models of dynamic moral hazard with simultaneous learning about the production function. Because of the complexity of the problem, analytical solutions have so far been limited in scope. The contribution is methodological: through computation, the problem can be studied under few assumptions about functional forms. We depart from a general mechanism, reformulate it as an incentive compatible mechanism, and show how it can be solved by backward induction through a sequence of linear programs. We apply our method to a few cases of interest, and confirm that uncertainty about the production function increases the volatility of the agent\'s utility in order to prevent belief manipulation, as found in the literature. / Neste trabalho, propomos uma estratégia numérica para lidar com modelos de risco moral dinâmico com aprendizado sobre a função de produção. Pela complexidade do problema, soluções analíticas na literatura têm sido limitadas em seu escopo. Nossa contribuição é metodológica: através de métodos computacionais, o problema pode ser estudado sob poucas hipóteses a respeito de formas funcionais. Partindo de um mecanismo geral, reformulamos o problema como um mecanismo compatível em incentivos, e então mostramos como este pode ser resolvido por indução retroativa por meio de uma sequência de programas lineares. Aplicamos o método a alguns casos de interesse, e confirmamos a conclusão da literatura de que a incerteza sobre a função de produção aumenta a volatilidade da utilidade do agente para prevenir manipulação de crenças.

Lai Ho King. / Summary of Chinese. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--The Chinese University of Hongkong. / Bibliography: l. 97-99.

Thesis. 1978. M.S.--Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Alfred P. Sloan School of Management. / MICROFICHE COPY AVAILABLE IN ARCHIVES AND DEWEY. / Includes bibliographical references. / M.S.

Informational problems are prevalent in political organizations. To understand incentive structures, transparency and policy expertise in political organizations, we need to examine their informational problems. This collection of essays is a contribution to the theory and application of information revelation in political organizations. In Chapter 1, I develop a theory of office incentives in a setting in which agents’ effort is crucial for learning policy information. Many organizations, such as government agencies and NGOs, learn about policy effectiveness through de- centralized experimentation. However, unobserved effort by an agent can affect the outcome of an experiment, thus limiting its informativeness. A principal can improve the informativeness of an experiment by motivating the agent, using of- fice as an incentive. The principal may keep the agent in office only when the outcome of an experiment is good, thereby creating high-powered office incen- tives for the agent. High-powered office incentives motivate the agent’s effort in implementing the experiment in order to stay in office. However, they also reduce the agent’s expected informational benefits from experimentation, which can reduce the effort expended by the agent in implementing the experiment. The degree to which the agent values achieving organizational goals affects such trade-offs. I show that the principal is more likely to use high-powered incentives when the agent places a high value on achieving organizational goals and when multiple agents implement the same experiment. In Chapter 2, I analyze a model where an autocrat may choose transparency in disclosing information to members of ruling group, particular information per- taining to the effectiveness of valence-policy by her. The effectiveness of the au- tocrat’s policy directly reflects her competence. The members’ belief about auto- crat’s competence in valence-policy making affects their support. If the autocrat is transparent about policy effectiveness, particularly tell the truth of an ineffec- tive policy, a favorable message of policy effectiveness will be convincing. The members will support the autocrat upon receiving a favorable message thereby. However, transparency also means a higher frequency of unfavorable message which leads to the withdrawal of support by the members of ruling group. The model shows the effect of intra elite conflicts on transparency. When the rul- ing faction doesn’t depend much on the autocrat, the autocrat tends to be more transparent. Further, there is a non-monotonic relationship between the degree of ideological conflict among competing factions and transparency. As conflict increases, transparency increases up to a threshold. Beyond this threshold, in- creased conflict is associated with reduced transparency. In addition, the model has implications on quality of bureaucracies that gather and report information. Finally, in Chapter 3, I study how political polarization at the mass level af- fects politicians’ policy making in common value issues. In the model, politicians representing two groups of voters with divergent ideologies compete for office. Voters have limited information about policy as well as politicians’ competence in policy making. After observing the incumbent’s policy choice, voters make voting decisions. I study two variations of election. First, there is a majority group and a minority group in the society. Second, society is composed of two competitive groups. In both variations, I show that in a society with a high level of polariza- tion, the incumbent politician is more likely to exercise her expertise regarding common value issues.

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In this dissertation, I develop a framework to study the effects of tax-deferred saving accounts on the aggregate economy. I incorporate tax-deferred saving accounts in a theoretical model of household's life-cycle decisions, which is then linked to the real world data by calibration. I study the effects of tax-deferred saving accounts on the aggregate savings and the aggregate output, and further analyze their impacts of different policy changes. In the first chapter, I present the important features of tax-deferred saving accounts in the U.S. and their institutional changes over time. I highlight the differences between IRA and 401(k) on their contribution limits and household's eligibility. While IRA has a lower contribution limit and is available to all households, 401(k) has a much higher contribution limit but is only accessible by a fraction of households. In the second chapter, I present an overlapping-generations model to capture the effects of tax-deferred saving accounts in a general equilibrium framework. There are four key aspects to the model: first, households can save in both ordinary saving account and tax-deferred saving account. Second, there is a nonlinear progressive income tax system. Third, households are heterogeneous in their labor productivity and 401(k) eligibility. Fourth, households decide consumption, savings and labor supply endogenously. The model is calibrated to the US economy in 2000, with the distribution of 401(k) eligibility being an endogenous outcome that matches the data reported in Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) in 2001. In the third chapter, I study the quantitative effects of tax-deferred saving accounts on the aggregate economy and investigate their policy implications. Specifically, I estimate the macroeconomic impacts of eliminating tax-deferred saving accounts from the economy. To highlight the role played by the heterogeneity of 401(k) eligibility, I conduct a quantitative exercise that provide universal 401(k) eligibility to all households. In these experiments, I maintain government revenue neutrality by introducing a new proportional income tax (subsidy) that has the same effects as a upward (downward) shift of all marginal tax rates in the US income tax schedule. Since the institutional settings of tax-deferred saving accounts essentially provide consumption tax treatments on households retirement savings, I further explore the implications of tax-deferred saving accounts for a proportional consumption tax reform. Results from this study indicate that tax-deferred saving accounts have significant impacts on the aggregate economy and demonstrate that these accounts substantially reduce the impacts of a consumption tax reform.

This thesis examines the impacts of four major negotiating elements in the 2011 NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement. This first entails considering the financial impacts of the Collective Bargaining Agreement through adjustments to the salary cap and changes in the rookie pay scale in conjunction with the increase of the veteran minimum salary. Veteran players sought to improve their earnings potential through the creation of the rookie pay scale and increases in the veteran minimum salary, but research has shown that these policies may not have actually accomplished the goal. Next, I inspect the changes in preseason training rules, which were intended to keep players safer and fresher during the offseason. This also may not have had the anticipated result, since the incidences of players with conditioning related injuries has increased since the implementation of the new rules. Finally, the impact of increased punitive powers for Commissioner Goodell on the NFL presents one of the most interesting debates for the upcoming negotiations. While players strongly dislike Goodell’s level of influence over league discipline, they must be willing to sacrifice something significant in the next round of negotiations to initiate change. After careful consideration, it is evident that the players were the worst off from the 2011 Collective Bargaining negotiations because they were unable to accurately anticipate the impacts of their new policies.