Thesis (Ph.D.)--Cleveland State University, 2009. / Abstract. Title from PDF t.p. (viewed on Dec. 11, 2009). Includes bibliographical references (p. 141-153). Available online via the OhioLINK ETD Center and also available in print.

We construct a measure of CEO concern for non-equity stakeholders based on corporate social responsibility (CSR) scores, and we investigate how such incentives affect firm leverage and cash holding. In general, we find that non-equity stakeholder incentives decrease leverage and increase cash holding, after controlling for CEO managerial incentives and other firm characteristics. Our findings suggest that corporate social responsibility benefit non-equity stakeholders, which may come at the expense of shareholders.

This thesis investigates how CEO risk taking incentives related to compensation in the form of executive stock options affect the decision to engage in merger and acquisition (M&A) activities with particular attention to same-industry versus cross-industry acquisitions. Risk taking incentives increase the propensity of M&As, especially for same-industry M&As. Furthermore, risk taking incentives increase the likelihood of cash payment for both same and cross-industry acquisitions. We do not find a significant direct stock price response difference between same-industry and cross-industry acquiring firms. The market responds favorably when risk taking incentives are higher for both same-industry acquisitions and cross-industry takeovers. We further find that the acquiring firm’s post-acquisition cash flow volatility is also positively related to risk taking incentives for both same- and cross-industry M&As.

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This dissertation consists of three essays that explore economic issues on information security and risk management. In the first essay, we develop an economic mechanism which coordinates security strategies of Service Providers (SPs). SPs are best positioned to safeguard the Internet. However, they generally do not have incentives to take such a responsibility in the distributed computing environment. The proposed certification mechanism induces SPs to voluntarily accept the liability of Internet security. SPs who take the liability signal their capability in conducting secure computing and benefit from such recognition. We use a game-theoretic model to examine SPs' incentives and the social welfare. Our results show that the certification mechanism can generate a more secure Internet communication environment. The second essay studies the impact of cyberinsurance and alternative risk management solutions on firms' information security strategies. In the existing literature, cyberinsurance has been proposed as a solution to transfer information risks and reduce security spending. However, we show that cyberinsurance by itself is deficient in addressing the overinvestment issue. We find that the joint use of cyberinsurance and risk pooling arrangement optimizes firms' security investment. In the case with a large number of firms, we show that firms will invest at the socially optimal level. The third essay examines the information role of vendors' patching strategies. Patching after software release has become an important stage in the software development cycle. In the presence of quality uncertainty, we show that vendors can leverage the patch release times to signal the quality of their software products. We define a new belief profile and identify two types of separating equilibria in a dynamic setting.

Bakgrund: Efter en litteratursökning har vi uppmärksammat att forskning kring leverantörsrelationer existerar, men däremot är bristfällig när det kommer till kopplingen mellan incitament, interorganisatorisk styrning och osäkerheter. Att studera detta samband är därför av intresse för oss eftersom det bidrar till den akademiska forskningen inom interorganisatorisk styrning. Detta genom att införa en infallsvinkel på incitament, då vår teoretiska härledning menar att incitament hanterar osäkerheter i en leverantörsrelation. Syfte: Syftet med denna studie är att beskriva vilka interorganisatoriska osäkerheter som köparen upplever i en leverantörsrelation samt vilken effekt osäkerheterna har i leverantörsrelationen. Syftet är även att beskriva hur köparen med incitament hanterar interorganisatoriska osäkerheter i en leverantörsrelation. Genomförande: Genom att kombinera en teoretisk osäkerhetsmodell med kvalitativa intervjuer har en jämförande fallstudie av leverantörsrelationerna till Arcadia, Nexus och Valhalla genomförts för att besvara syftet. Slutsats: Uppsatsen bekräftar att det finns fyra olika typer av osäkerheter i en leverantörsrelation, vilka är uppgiftsosäkerhet, uppgiftsberoende, osäkerheter i omgivningen och relationell stabilitet. Effekten av dessa osäkerheter härleds i en teoretisk osäkerhetsmodell som även empiriskt bekräftas. I de studerade leverantörsrelationerna identifieras även olika incitament som hanterar osäkerheter som köparen upplever i en leverantörsrelation. / Background: After a literature review we discovered that research about supplierrelationships exists, but that the connection between incentives, interorganizational controlssystems and uncertainties is absent. To study this connection is therefore in our interestbecause it contributes to academic research in the field of interorganizational controlsystems. This is because incentives bring a new perspective to the connection betweeninterorganizational control systems and uncertainties. Purpose: The purpose of this study is to describe which interorganizational uncertaintiesa buyer experiences within a supplier relationship and how the uncertainties affect thesupplier relationship. The purpose of the study is also to describe how a buyer can handleinterorganizational uncertainties with incentives. Completion: A comparative analysis of the supplier relationships to Arcadia, Nexus andValhalla was achieved by combining a theoretical uncertainty model and qualitativeinterviews. Conclusions: The study confirms that there are four different types of uncertainties in asupplier relationship, which are task uncertainty, task interdependency, environmentaluncertainties and relational stability. The effect of the uncertainties in a relationship isderived in a theoretical uncertainty model and is also empirically confirmed. The studyfurthermore identifies incentives that handle uncertainties the buyer experiences in asupplier relationship.

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Στόχος της παρούσας εργασίας είναι η διερεύνηση των κινήτρων και του βαθμού της αυτοεκτίμησης των γηγενών και των αλλοδαπών μαθητών και ο ρόλος τους στην επίδοσή τους. Αρχικά, θα αναφερθούν θεωρίες σχετικές με τη μάθηση και παράγοντες που την υποβοηθούν και στη συνέχεια τα βασικά σημεία της θεωρίας των κινήτρων επίδοσης τα οποία αποτελούν τους άξονες του θεωρητικού υπόβαθρου της έρευνας. Εν συνέχεια, θα παρουσιάσουμε τα αποτελέσματα της έρευνάς μας για το βαθμό αυτοεκτίμησης γηγενών και αλλοδαπών μαθητών, των κινήτρων που θέτουν τόσο χωρίς την επίδραση εξωτερικών παραγόντων όσο και μετά την παρέμβαση και τις παραινέσεις των δασκάλων. Τέλος, θα παρουσιαστούν τα αποτελέσματα της έρευνας που διεξήχθη. / -

I denna uppsats undersöks hur moral hazard påverkas i grupplån vid frånvaro av sociala band, övervakning, och kontinuerliga krediter. Undersökningen förklarar grupplån i teori men presenterar även empiriskt material från andra författares artiklar. Undersökningen visar att de sociala banden inte har den avgörande betydelsen som teorin förutsätter. Vidare konstateras att nära övervakning och låntagarens behov av framtida lån har stor betydelse för att reducera moral hazard.

This thesis seeks to provide an extensive theoretical framework for the potential incentive effects from debt relief. The objective is achieved by integrating the positive incentive model by Krugman with a negative incentive framework developed by drawing on the theories of a soft budget constraint. The analysis shows that the existence of bailouts offers the possibility that debt relief can produce negative incentives for the debtor instead of positive incentives for improved performance. Taking on a game theoretical perspective suggests that strategic behavior in the interaction between the debtor and the creditor can increase the likelihood of a specific incentive effect to prevail. Such an interactive game also highlights the importance for the creditor to obtain reliable information about the behavior of the debtor.