M.Comm. / Paying for performance is however not an easy solution for organisational performance problems. As stated by Wright (1991: 16), "even the most ardent supporters of performancebased reward systems recognise that it is extraordinarily difficult to manage well". There is also a school of thought that rejects the claims made of performance-based rewards. A recent survey of British Telecom executives carried out by the Society of Telecom Executives (1991: 35) revealed that only 6 per cent of those responding to the survey thought that performance-based rewards improved their performance compared with an overwhelming 70 per cent who thought it had not. Research conducted by Carmen and Wood (1992: 8) on behalf of the Institute of Personnel Management and the National Economic Development Office into payment schemes, did not confirm that performance-based pay was a motivator. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with 40 personnel directors and managers from large and medium organisations. They concluded that the personnel managers interviewed were by no means certain that performancebased rewards succeed in motivating people. Most were not convinced they could unequivocally identify that performance-based rewards was increasing either individual or organisational performance. When these research findings are closely investigated, it can normally be established that specific reasons contribute to the failure of the performance-based reward systems to increase motivation and organisational performance. Armstrong and Murlis (1994: 252) believe these reasons are mostly: A failure to involve employees sufficiently in the design and implementation of the system; A mistaken belief that the performance-based reward system on its own will achieve the expected increase in motivation and performance; and The poor people skills of those managers that are responsible for managing implemented performance-based reward systems.

The purpose of this study was to determine what the motivational drives are for employees working in an investment bank and whether money plays a roll in motivating employees working for an investment bank. The target group for this study was all the employees who have been in the employment of the target organisation for one year and longer. This group was divided into subgroups of specialist transactors and specialist support personnel. The profile of these two subgroups included a variety of ages, gender, races and educational backgrounds. Data was collected using a questionnaire that was discussed with each employee who agreed to participate in the study. The study clearly illustrates that money can be the primary drive for motivation to certain employees within an investment bank. When one ranks what makes the two subgroups work, it is quite clear that the ability to earn a bonus and the ability to earn more money is highest on the list of specialist transactors, whereas the specialist support personnel enjoys the culture of the bank and has to get job satisfaction to make them work. These results reflect the motivational drives of the sample group at the time of this research. The study concludes that one of the primary motivational aspects for the subgroup of employees which was subject to the empirical study is that these employees are motivated by the mere fact that they can earn more money and a bigger bonus as well as obtaining job satisfaction and having the ability to make their own decisions. The study discussed Maslow’s and McClellands need theories as well as various other motivational theories and approaches employers can introduce to motivate employees. Maslow’s and McClelland’s need theories were directly related to the empirical study with the view whether these two motivational theories can be applied successfully within an investment bank. Based on the results of the empirical study, the researcher came to the conclusion that both these theories can be equally successfully applied to employees working in the target organisation. / Dr. K. Stanz

M.B.A. / The aim of this research study was to understand the needs of knowledge workers and to determine if the current reward system is appropriate to promote the objectives of a knowledge intensive organisation. The objectives of this study were to identify factors that motivate and satisfy knowledge workers, to determine if monetary or non monetary reward is of, greater value, to establish the benefits and shortcomings of the existing reward system in the organisation and to recommend changes to the reward system within a knowledge organisation.

Ph.D. (Human Resource Management) / Orientation: Employee retention remains an ongoing challenge for South African organisations. As a vehicle for aiding employee retention, reward and more specifically reward preferences, are not fully understood. Occupational culture and occupational group is suggested as a practical segmentation approach in researching employee preferences. Occupational culture relates to the shared values, meanings, and behaviours of occupational groups and impacts on employee preferences. In researching employee reward preferences from an occupational culture and occupational group perspective, organisations may be better positioned empirically to differentiate their reward strategies along occupational group lines. In this way reward strategies may better meet the needs of the organisation and employees and maximise the employment exchange relationship. Research purpose: The main purpose of the study was to research reward preferences from an occupational culture perspective with the view to shedding empirical light and practical evidence on the influence of occupational culture on the reward preferences of specific occupational groups in South African organisations. The primary objective of the research was to propose and evaluate a structural model of the relationship between occupational culture dimensions and reward preferences of specific occupational groups in the South African context. The additional influence of Occupational Group, Race, and Gender on the reward preferences in a model that already contains occupational culture main effects was considered as per the secondary research objectives.

This thesis applies the existing agency theory into the problem of production planning in a centrally planned industry. The planner's objective is to maximize social welfare contributed by the industry, while the firms individually want to maximize utility over money compensation minus disutility over effort. The problem contains both moral hazard and adverse selection because each agent privately observes a predecision information about the production process. A model is built for determining the optimal incentive compatible scheme. The analysis starts with the problem of fixed proportions production. An optimal incentive compatible scheme is first derived in single agent settings. It is then extended to multiple agent settings. Under the optimal incentive scheme, the principal is able to derive all the rent. The solution is the first-best when the agents are all risk neutral, and strictly second-best otherwise. The subgaming issues amongst the agents are investigated. When the agents are not cooperative, a sufficient condition is given for the incentive scheme to be effective, i.e., the equilibrium induced by the scheme is implementable. It is also concluded that, if the agents are able to cooperate, there always exist some state realizations under which the scheme is not effective. Finally, a different type of production problem, namely, production with substitutable inputs, are studied. And an incentive compatible compensation scheme is again proposed. / Business, Sauder School of / Graduate

Game theory was used to analyze compensation systems based on individual and group incentives. Payoff formulas were developed for these incentives assuming different preferences for individual and social outcomes. Two levels of contributions were considered: (1) Defection. The minimum acceptable level of contributions, and (2) Cooperation. A level of discretionary contributions above the minimum. The discretionary contributions associated with cooperation were represented as a cost to the individual. A classification scheme for uniform n-person games was developed using the approach of Rappaport and Guyer (1966) for 2 x 2 games. This classification scheme defines the natural outcome (cooperation or defection) for each game. The analysis considered the Individual motive, based on maximizing self-interest, and five social motives (Collective, Competitive, Altruism, Equity and Aggression). These motives reflect preferences for outcomes based on payoffs to self and others. The results indicate the natural outcome and game category for different values of the individual and group incentive factors. Satisficing theory was also used to analyze the natural outcome for the Individual motive. Evolutionary game theory was used to develop two simulation models for social motives. The models interpret social motives as (1) genuine preferences for specific social outcomes, or (2) indirect strategies for maximizing individual payoffs. These models explore the interaction of social motives and the resulting impact on the level of cooperation. The results were used to develop effectiveness criteria for selecting inducement systems which should promote cooperation. Additionally, cost curves were used to determine the least cost inducement system. Based on these results, inducement systems using absolute incentives are recommended over systems using competitive incentives. Competitive incentives should only be considered when there is limited need for coordination between individuals and where aggressive and/or competitive behavior is acceptable. The study has theoretical as well as practical implications. Game theory provides a method for expanding expectancy theory to include expectations about the actions of others and provides a framework for integrating expectancy theory and other theories based on social motives (e.g. equity theory). The use of dynamic models from evolutionary game theory breaks new ground in the theory of motivation.

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The effects of different types of reward systems on perceived conflict and coalition formation among those involved in organizational buying decisions are investigated. The buying decision process is examined as group behavior, and the group or buying center is used as the unit of analysis. An experimental design is utilized to test a number of hypotheses concerning the impacts of cooperative, competitive, and independent reward systems on the level of perceived conflict and the extent of coalition formation within the buying center. Groups consisting of representatives from a number of different departments within a hypothetical organization are asked to make a series of vendor choice decisions while being evaluated in terms of one of these three reward systems. The findings suggest that perceived conflict increases as one moves from a cooperative to an independent, and then to a competitive, reward system. Coalitions appear most frequently under an independent reward system, less frequently under a competitive reward system, and infrequently under a cooperative reward system. Implications are drawn both for buying and selling organizations. / Ph. D.

Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 1992. / Caption title.