No description available.

No description available.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1958. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 371-383).

It is the purpose of this thesis to point out areas of failure and weaknesses in the Federal independent regulatory commissions, and recommendations for improvement, as seen by Louis J. Hector, James M. Landis, Emmette S. Redford, Bernard Schwartz and the Special Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight. A secondary purpose of the study is to present action taken by Congress and President Kennedy in response to recent criticisms of the commissions. The scope of the thesis is limited to the major problems of policy-making, personnel matters, and efficiency of the major independent regulatory commissions. The material presented in the thesis covers five chapters. Chapter I includes a general introductory statement, the purpose and scope of the study, and the method of organization. Chapter II is a presentation of the criticisms and recommendations of Hector, Redford, and Landis in respect to the problems of policy-making and coordination faced by the independent commissions. Chapter III examines the problems of commission personnel in respect to qualifications, turnover, and ethical conduct. Chapter IV concerns the efficiency of the independent commissions, showing examples of delay and incompetence in the performance of the functions of the CAB, the FPC, and other commissions. Criticisms and recommendations include those of Hector, the Special Subcommittee, and Landis. Chapter V, the conclusion, re-emphasizes the importance of the problems facing the commissions. Attention is given to action taken by Congress and President Kennedy to improve the efficiency of certain commissions. An analysis of the criticisms and recommendations of the sources used is presented.

Traditional analyses of agency output are typically performed at the institutional level, characterizing the agency in question as a unitary actor with a singular preference. I test these assumptions using a variety of statistical methods, including a dynamic linear model that estimates ideal points of FCC commissioners for every year, 1975-2000. Voting within the FCC is essentially unidimensional and commissioner preferences are stable over time. Aggregate analyses of the ideal points of individual commissioners suggest that FCC commissioner voting has become profoundly ideological only recently. Future agency research must carefully consider the time period of analysis and previous findings should be reexamined.

No description available.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available online.

Tez (Yüksek Lisans) - Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Kamu Yönetimi Anabilim Dalı, 2007. / Bibliyografya var.

Thesis--Johns Hopkins University. / Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 399-414).

Thesis--Johns Hopkins University. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 399-414).