Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, Riverside. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2007. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

The proposition of the thesis is, in its role as the lead offshore petroleum regulator in Ghana, the Petroleum Commission is not competent enough to oversee robust offshore health and safety regulation. Two accounts are developed to support this claim. First, the conferment of dual licensing and health and safety regulatory functions on the Petroleum Commission gives rise to a potential conflict. Secondly, even recognising a distinction between formal and de facto independence, neither is present in the Petroleum Commission. A number of factors justify these assertions: not least the fact that the law establishing the Petroleum Commission confers discretionary powers on the executive and does not provide regulatory independence as a formal requirement. In addition, the Commission's financial and administrative procedures are determinable by influences external to it. Formal independence is not, however, in itself a sufficient condition for the proper exercise of regulatory discretion. It is necessary for the regulatory body in question to be able in fact to behave independently, that is, to develop and take ownership of regulatory values, which in turn depend on the possession of relevant competence and expertise. Based on comparative analysis of global offshore regulatory regimes, and backed by empirical evidence, the thesis recommends legislative reforms in Ghana aimed at a functional separation of petroleum licensing from health and safety regulation.

No description available.

My dissertation examines the influence of partisanship in decision making on redistricting in state commissions and judicial rulings. My central questions are twofold. First, do Republican- and Democratic-appointed federal judges engage in decision making that favors their respective parties? Second, what is the extent of partisan voting on bipartisan state redistricting commissions? These issues possess considerable substantive importance. Some states have considered moving redistricting responsibility out of the legislature and into state commissions, while some political scientists and legal scholars have suggested more vigorous court involvement in the regulation of redistricting. Implicit in many of these arguments is the assumption that federal courts and state commissions will act as neutral arbiters. But, very little social science research exists on the behavior of these institutions. My investigation combines quantitative and qualitative evidence, using interviews I conducted of federal judges and redistricting commissioners across the country, together with statistical analyses of court decisions and commission votes. I have 138 court cases from 1981 to 2006, totaling 414 observations or judicial votes. I argue that federal judges are neither neutral arbiters nor partisan maximizers. Rather, federal judges act as constrained partisans. Judges do not necessarily favor their own party's plans in court cases anymore than they do plans created by both parties under divided government. But, when a federal judge reviews a redistricting plan drawn up by a different party, and where the judge's own party is the victim of partisan line-drawing, she will be more attuned to issues of unfairness in the process. Under circumstances where Supreme Court precedent is unclear, partisan cues become more salient for the judge, increasing the probability she will rely on partisan influences to declare the plan invalid. Interestingly enough, these partisan effects in judicial voting vanish in cases where the Supreme Court delineates unambiguous rules, such as litigation concerning 1 person 1 vote equal population claims. My analysis of state redistricting commissions, based on the votes of commissioners and in-depth interviews with them, illustrates that commissions, like courts, are also not immune to partisan decision-making. Partisan factors tend to be the overriding concern of commissioners. / text

Submitted by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2013-06-25T14:38:53Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Sergio Guerra.pdf: 10901899 bytes, checksum: 17258e78cd74d37d3fa9597bf3f49888 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2013-06-25T14:41:03Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Sergio Guerra.pdf: 10901899 bytes, checksum: 17258e78cd74d37d3fa9597bf3f49888 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2013-06-25T20:01:31Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Sergio Guerra.pdf: 10901899 bytes, checksum: 17258e78cd74d37d3fa9597bf3f49888 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-06-25T20:13:29Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Sergio Guerra.pdf: 10901899 bytes, checksum: 17258e78cd74d37d3fa9597bf3f49888 (MD5) / The object of this research is to show the pattern of the Regulatory State in Brazil, its complexity and the model used in the 90's for its implementation. Was created some special entities with autonomous functional in relation to Central Government. Examining the reason and the form adopted for the management of the regulatory authorities are structured in Brazil in the wake of an attempt to reform the administrative organization in the form of management, we intend to analyze whether this path should be followed, even though part to other state sectors. The present analysis involves the redefinition of the division of tasks and responsibilities between 'Government entities' and public entities whose mission requires continuity ('State entities'), especially in cases of alternation of power. It is intended to contribute to the structuring of organizations dedicated to the development of government policies. / o objeto da presente pesquisa é evidenciar o padrão de Estado Regulador brasileiro, sua complexidade e o modelo adotado, em parte, na década de 90, para a sua implementação, notadamente com a criação de algumas autarquias especiais dotadas de autonomia funcional diferenciada em relação ao Poder Público central. Examinando os motivos e a forma adotada para a estruturação dessas entidades reguladoras, no bojo de uma tentativa de reformar a organização administrativa, sob a forma gerencial, pretende-se analisar se esse caminho deve ser trilhado, ainda que em parte, para outros setores. A análise envolve a possível redefinição da divisão de tarefas e competências entre 'entidades de Governo' e entes públicos cuja missão requer continuidade ('órgãos de Estado'), especialmente, nos casos de alternância do poder. Pretende-se contribuir para a estruturação de entidades vocacionadas para o desenvolvimento de políticas de Estado.