It is the purpose of this thesis to point out areas of failure and weaknesses in the Federal independent regulatory commissions, and recommendations for improvement, as seen by Louis J. Hector, James M. Landis, Emmette S. Redford, Bernard Schwartz and the Special Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight. A secondary purpose of the study is to present action taken by Congress and President Kennedy in response to recent criticisms of the commissions. The scope of the thesis is limited to the major problems of policy-making, personnel matters, and efficiency of the major independent regulatory commissions. The material presented in the thesis covers five chapters. Chapter I includes a general introductory statement, the purpose and scope of the study, and the method of organization. Chapter II is a presentation of the criticisms and recommendations of Hector, Redford, and Landis in respect to the problems of policy-making and coordination faced by the independent commissions. Chapter III examines the problems of commission personnel in respect to qualifications, turnover, and ethical conduct. Chapter IV concerns the efficiency of the independent commissions, showing examples of delay and incompetence in the performance of the functions of the CAB, the FPC, and other commissions. Criticisms and recommendations include those of Hector, the Special Subcommittee, and Landis. Chapter V, the conclusion, re-emphasizes the importance of the problems facing the commissions. Attention is given to action taken by Congress and President Kennedy to improve the efficiency of certain commissions. An analysis of the criticisms and recommendations of the sources used is presented.

The issue of environmental risks from the pharmaceutical endocrine disrupter 17 alpha-ethinyl oestradiol (EE2), which is an active ingredient in the contraceptive pill, confronts government responsibilities for citizens' health with potential environmental risks from its presence in aquatic ecosystems. Further to a risk appraisal process conducted under the Water Framework Directive (WFD) between 2006 and 2012, the European Commission recommended the imposition of an environmental quality standard for EE2. In 2013, this recommendation was rejected by politicians. The outcome was both contested and commended. The UK Government was particularly vehement in its opposition and claimed that the risk assessment process for EE2 was not robust. The UK Government also insisted that it had swayed opinion of other EU Member States to convince them that action for EE2 was not proportionate given the extremely elevated costs of risk control options. At the present time, environmental policy for EE2 and other endocrine disrupters remains resolutely ineffective. Despite three distinct policy interventions recommending precautionary action for EE2 during the past twenty years, emissions of this potent, oestrogenic endocrine disrupter continue unabated. This thesis explains why European politicians rejected the European Commission’s risk governance recommendations for EE2 in 2013 under the Water Framework Directive. This comprises its principal empirical contribution. A novel analytical framework which draws on insights from the policy sciences, risk governance and wicked problems literature is developed. This framework is employed to determine whether the policy outcome for EE2, and the decision-making processes that preceded it, were legitimate. The research findings in this respect advance understanding of the implications of specific properties of wicked problems, of which it is argued, EE2 is an example, for the legitimacy of decision-making processes during the risk appraisal and political phases of policy development in Europe. This comprises the principle theoretical contribution of the thesis. Recommendations to promote more effective and legitimate policy development for wicked problems in similar multi-level governance contexts are also made.