The present enquiry is a study of specific social possibilities in a culture-contact situation, namely the encounter of the Dene and Inuit of the Northwest Territories with Canadian society; and shows how by analyzing the basic content of two traditions in contact with one another, the possibilities for mutual adjustment of one tradition to the other, or the lack of such possibilities, may be logically derived from that content. The study also uses the perspective of cultural ecology to devise and demonstrate a way in which any system of land-tenure may be compared with any other, without the concepts of one system being imposed upon the other. The particular problem of the enquiry is to compare the traditional ideas of land and land-tenure among Dene and Inuit with the ideas of land and land-tenure in Canadian law; and to discover a way whereby the Dene and Inuit may use the concepts of the dominant Canadian system to preserve their own traditional ways of holding land. The analysis begins by outlining the cultural ecosystem of each people, their basic modes of subsistence, the resources used, the kinds of technical operations applied to those resources, the work organization, and relevant parts of social organization and world-view. Then, in order, the idea of land which the people appear to be following, the kinds of land-rights and principles of land-holding recognized by the" people, and the kinds of "persons" who may hold land-rights, are described. The systems are then compared in order to discover the possibilities for "reconciliation". The enquiry concludes that the basic premises and characters of the Dene and Inuit systems of land-tenure are fundamentally irreconcilable with those of Canadian real property law, but that the Dene and Inuit systems can be encapsulated within the dominant Canadian system by means of the Community Land-Holding Corporation (CLHC). The CLHC as proposed in this enquiry would allow the members of a community to hold land among themselves according to their own rules, while the corporation holds the land of the whole community against outsiders according to the principles of Canadian law. / Arts, Faculty of / Anthropology, Department of / Graduate

This thesis makes the legal argument that certain histories of aboriginal child removals in Canada and Australia, that is, the residential school experience in Canada, and the program of child institutionalization in Australia, meet the definition of 'genocide' in Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. My primary focus is on that Convention's requirement that an act be committed with an "intent to destroy a group". My first concern in formulating legal argument around the Convention's intent requirement is to offer a theory of the legal subject implicit in legal liberalism. Legal liberalism privileges the individual, and individual responsibility, in order to underscore its founding premises of freedom and equality. The intentionality of the subject in this framework is a function of the individual, and not the wider cultural and historical conditions in which the subject exists. Using a historical socio-legal approach, I attempt to develop a framework of legal subjectivity and legal intent which reveals rather than suppresses the cultural forces at work in the production of an intent to genocide. Having reacquainted the subject with the universe beyond the individual, I move on with the first limb of my legal argument around intent in the Genocide Convention to address the systemic means through which child removal policy was developed and enforced. In this, I confront two difficulties: firstly, the difficulty of locating in any single person an intent to commit, and hence responsibility for, genocide; and secondly, the corresponding difficulty of finding that a system intended an action in the legal sense. I respond to both of these difficulties by arguing for a notion of legal subjectivity which comprehends organisations, and correspondingly a notion of intent which is responsive (both on an individual and an organisational level) to systematically instituted crimes such as genocide. The second limb of my argument around intent confronts the defence of benevolent intent. In this defence, enforcers of child removals rely on a genuine belief in the benevolence of the 'civilising' project they were engaged in, so that there can be no intent to destroy a group. I reveal the cultural processes at work to produce the profound disjunction between aboriginal and settler subjectivities, especially as those subjectivities crystallize around the removal of aboriginal children. I locate this disjunction in the twin imperatives of colonial culture, those of oppression and legitimation. I argue that colonial culture exacts a justification for oppression, and that aboriginal people have been "othered" (in gendered, raced, and classed terms) to provide it. Intent to destroy a group, then, will be located via an enquiry which confronts the interests of colonial culture and aligns them firstly with the oppression of aboriginal people, and secondly with the discourses which developed to render that oppression in benevolent terms. The interpretation of the Genocide Convention is thus guided by the demands of context: and in context is revealed an intent to genocide by child removal. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

This thesis argues that despite political promises and rhetoric to the contrary the federal and provincial governments maintain through their policies, legislation, and regulations the continued assimilation of First Nations; under the guise of supporting First Nations attempts to resume governance over child and family services. It is my assertion that governments both federal, provincial and First Nations need to begin a process and transition towards self-governance in child and family services based on our traditional laws and practices, in order to ensure the continued survival of our nations. I have set out a number of preliminary options for assisting in the process of decolonization in the area of child welfare. This thesis is written from my perspective as a First Nations woman engaged in the practice of law in the area of First Nations child and family services. A perspective which is inspired by the political work of my relations in the advancement of Aboriginal rights and title in British Columbia. In chapter one I discuss the impact of colonization on First Nations children, families, communities and governments and conclude that the state (federal and provincial governments), far from promoting First Nations child welfare, have served to create enormous despair, poverty, dependency, and an erosion of First Nations cultures, languages, and governance. This chapter ends with a discussion of First Nations values, practices and traditions in relation to child rearing and "child protection. Chapter two examines the recent changes to child and family service delivery in British Columbia , changes which effectively continue the process of assimilation. Chapter three examines the current delegated model of First Nations child and family services in British Columbia. I argue that the delegated model is premised on assimilation, in that First Nations are bound to comply with the very legislative and administrative models that were illustrated in chapters one and two to have had such a devastating impact on First Nations children, families, communities and governments. Finally, the fourth chapter provides an overview of the federal and provincial constitutional framework and political "support" for self-government juxtaposed against First Nations' perspectives of their inherent right to self-government. In conclusion I propose a number of interim measures that would support First Nations resumption of self-government of child and family services . It is extremely important, in my opinion, that a process and transition towards true self-governance begin as soon as possible building upon First Nations community values and cultural practices. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

No description available.

No description available.

This thesis questions why young female and aboriginal plaintiffs consistently receive lower damage awards for loss of future earning capacity than young white male plaintiffs. I argue that due to the social construction of law, and specifically tort law, the dividing line between public and private law should be challenged. The effect of tort is partially "public" in nature due to the broad impact tort has on valuing the potential of individual plaintiffs. When damages for female and aboriginal plaintiffs are assessed on a reduced scale due to gender and race, a message is sent that the potential of these plaintiffs, and the potential of the groups to which they belong, is somehow less. Due to the "public" impacts of damages quantification, principles of equality derived from the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms should be considered in the quantification process. I argue further, that the current practice of damages quantification has been the result of the court's over-reliance on "formalist" notions of tort law which has insulated the area from the social context of law. In addition, I suggest that the acceptance by courts of economic evidence, which is often reflective of discriminatory norms in the labour market and our society generally, has had the effect of de-valuing certain members of Canadian society; in particular women and aboriginal plaintiffs. I demonstrate this analysis through an examination of cases dealing with young, catastrophically injured, female and aboriginal plaintiffs. Finally, I suggest that, though an imperfect solution, currently the only equitable method of quantifying damages for loss of future earning capacity is to adopt white male earning tables for all young plaintiffs with no demonstrated earning history.

The Crown has fiduciary obligations to First Nations and must act in consequence. One of this consequence is that the Crown has a duty to consult with aboriginal peoples when it infringes aboriginal or treaty right. The thesis deals with the principles related to the Crown's duty to consult with First Nations. I elaborate on principles established by the courts and also on questions that remain unanswered to date. Those questions include when, how and with whom the consultation should be done. I also examine the situation in New Zealand, where the consultation process is a little more advanced than here in Canada and compare the principles elaborated by New Zealand courts with those existing in Canada. From the New Zealand experience, I suggest consultation guidelines to be used in Canada by the Crown and its representatives.

There is no abstract available for this thesis.

The Crown has fiduciary obligations to First Nations and must act in consequence. One of this consequence is that the Crown has a duty to consult with aboriginal peoples when it infringes aboriginal or treaty right. The thesis deals with the principles related to the Crown's duty to consult with First Nations. I elaborate on principles established by the courts and also on questions that remain unanswered to date. Those questions include when, how and with whom the consultation should be done. I also examine the situation in New Zealand, where the consultation process is a little more advanced than here in Canada and compare the principles elaborated by New Zealand courts with those existing in Canada. From the New Zealand experience, I suggest consultation guidelines to be used in Canada by the Crown and its representatives. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

This thesis questions why young female and aboriginal plaintiffs consistently receive lower damage awards for loss of future earning capacity than young white male plaintiffs. I argue that due to the social construction of law, and specifically tort law, the dividing line between public and private law should be challenged. The effect of tort is partially "public" in nature due to the broad impact tort has on valuing the potential of individual plaintiffs. When damages for female and aboriginal plaintiffs are assessed on a reduced scale due to gender and race, a message is sent that the potential of these plaintiffs, and the potential of the groups to which they belong, is somehow less. Due to the "public" impacts of damages quantification, principles of equality derived from the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms should be considered in the quantification process. I argue further, that the current practice of damages quantification has been the result of the court's over-reliance on "formalist" notions of tort law which has insulated the area from the social context of law. In addition, I suggest that the acceptance by courts of economic evidence, which is often reflective of discriminatory norms in the labour market and our society generally, has had the effect of de-valuing certain members of Canadian society; in particular women and aboriginal plaintiffs. I demonstrate this analysis through an examination of cases dealing with young, catastrophically injured, female and aboriginal plaintiffs. Finally, I suggest that, though an imperfect solution, currently the only equitable method of quantifying damages for loss of future earning capacity is to adopt white male earning tables for all young plaintiffs with no demonstrated earning history. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate