This work set out to assess and examine the position of the individuals as non-state actors within the process of international law creation, in essence taking an existing problem and bringing a new idea. In undertaking this aim three new classifications of non-state actor have been identified in which the evidence gives a better informed theory. These new classifications, the authorised, independent and unauthorised individual, give a more realistic account between the theoretical narrative of the individual and realities seen within international law creation. In contrast to the current theories which are heavily theoretical and abstract, this work has an evidence based approach informing on a new theoretical framework. The authorised individual is someone mandated to perform negotiations of future international law on behalf of an authorised-decision maker, usually a state government. The principal features of the authorised individual are that they are briefed to act on behalf of states, usually conforming to a strict mandate to which they are expected to follow. The independent authorised individual is similarly related to the authorised individual in that they are mandated by an authorised decision maker. The main differences being they are given more freedom to perform the role and are asked to fulfil more general aims and expected outcomes set down by the individual’s home government. John Ruggie and the process used by him in the creation of the UNGP’s provide an excellent example of the work of this category of individual. Finally, the unauthorised individual is someone who by conventional standards and expectations wouldn’t be expected to have a role in the negotiations for international law making, i.e. they have no mandate, and are not acting on behalf of a state. Examples are Raphael Lemkin and John Peters Humphrey. To demonstrate that individuals have a role in law-making, this alternative approach has a focus on the realities of the international system. In using Rational Choice theory models of analysis the effectiveness of the different categories of the individual can be seen, with clear benefits of the work of independent authorised individuals demonstrated as effective law makers within the system.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2016-11-01T17:06:03Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Heloisa Cardillo Weiszflog.pdf: 906744 bytes, checksum: 58fe86a69adeec190f1c8663682e0017 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-11-01T17:06:03Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Heloisa Cardillo Weiszflog.pdf: 906744 bytes, checksum: 58fe86a69adeec190f1c8663682e0017 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-09-13 / The object of this research was the study of the individual and the entity, when the rights of such personalities are concerned, their main feature: non-transferability. Concerning the individual, the starting point was an ontological view that, according to its understandings, grants more strength to the individual’s technical meaning. Thus, it is concluded that the best point of view to reveal such meaning is the one granting the individual material meaning, comprising, in its roots, the human being and their inherent dignity. Regarding the entity feature, the same line of thought was conducted in the research and therefore, the idea defended was that the legal entity is nothing more than the result of the anthological personality from the human being. It must be evaluated, consequently, not only as a legal trait but also as an axiological quid of compulsory recognition by the legal framework. As to the individual’s right, the research highlighted the object by which the individual is referred to, stating that such characteristic, together with powerful doctrine, is found not in the person but in the human nature as a whole. With regard to the non-transferability, there was the concern of presenting its fundaments as they shall be seen; the same as the objects before mentioned, and also the organic format in which we present the entity’s rights in relation to the owner. Then, after preparing the basis to handle the concept of post mortem injunction relief of certain entities’ rights (better yet, its emanations), some pages have been reserved to elaborate on how the practice really takes place. It is vital to clarify that the object of this paper was not to deal with post mortem injunction relief itself, although the hard matter was partially dealt, however difficult it may have been, for reasons of intellectual responsibility, offering a simple attempt of achieving a mere conclusion on the subject, as it falls far from this very overview. In sum, the issues of individuals, entities and the non-transferability of rights from these personalities present themselves as a proposal of competent premises for the setting up of a dogma aiming at effectively reaching the complexity of a theme that involves, in the last resort, what remains from those who have passed away / O objeto da pesquisa foi o estudo da pessoa, personalidade e, no que se refere aos direitos de personalidade, sua principal característica: a intransmissibilidade. No que se refere à pessoa, partiu-se de uma visão ontológica que, segundo se entende, confere maior robustez ao seu sentido técnico. Assim, concluiu-se que a melhor ótica para descortinar-lhe o sentido é a que lhe confere sentido material, abrigando, em sua matriz, o ser humano e sua inerente dignidade. Sobre a personalidade, seguiu-se a mesma linha de pesquisa e, assim, defendeu-se a ideia de que a personalidade jurídica nada mais é do que a decorrência da personalidade ontológica do ser humano. Deve, portanto, ser avaliada não apenas como atributo jurídico, mas como quid axiológico de reconhecimento compulsório pelo ordenamento. Quanto aos direitos de personalidade, foi acentuado o objeto sobre o qual se referem, afirmando-se, ao lado de percuciente doutrina, que não se encontram na pessoa, mas na natureza humana como um todo. Já em relação à intransmissibilidade, houve preocupação no sentido de apresentar seus fundamentos que, conforme será visto, são aqueles mesmos objetos acima referidos e, também, a forma orgânica com que se apresentam os direitos de personalidade em relação ao seu titular. Assim é que, depois de sedimentado o terreno para tratar da tutela post mortem de certos direitos da personalidade (ou melhor, de suas emanações), foram reservadas algumas páginas para elucidar como, na prática, ela ocorre. É importante deixar claro que, conforme se depreende desta síntese, o objetivo do trabalho não foi tratar da tutela post mortem propriamente dita, muito embora, por uma responsabilidade intelectual, se tenha tentado enfrentar o espinhoso assunto, ofertando uma singela tentativa de conclusão. Nesse sentido, a pessoa, a personalidade e a intransmissibilidade dos direitos de personalidade surgem como proposta de fundamentos idôneos para construção de uma dogmática que vise efetivamente alcançar a complexidade de um tema que envolve, em última análise, o que fica daqueles que já se foram