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Kin-Chung Yau. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1995. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 225-238). / List of Tables --- p.ii / List of Figures --- p.iii / Preface --- p.iv / Chapter Chapter One --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter Chapter Two --- The Social Organization of Domestic Production and the Linkage with the World-Economy --- p.7 / Chapter Chapter Three --- Domestic Node in Buyer-Driven Global Commodity Chains --- p.39 / Chapter Chapter Four --- The Connection: Local Trading Firms in Buyer-Driven GCCs --- p.54 / Chapter Chapter Five --- Local Organization of Production and the Networks of Interdependence --- p.91 / Chapter Chapter Six --- Industrial Governance and the Social Construction of Trust --- p.146 / Chapter Chapter Seven --- Conclusion --- p.206 / Appendix 1 Glossary --- p.223 / Appendix 2 List of Interviewees --- p.224 / Bibliography --- p.225

by Desmond Cheung Chi-hung. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1990. / Bibliography: leaves 34-35. / ABSTRACTS --- p.i / ACKNOWLEDGEMENT --- p.ii / TABLES OF CONTENTS --- p.iii / LIST OF TABLES --- p.v / Chapter I. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Chapter II. --- RESEARCH METHODOLOGY --- p.5 / Chapter III. --- CORPORATE GOAL AND VALUE --- p.6 / Corporate Goal --- p.6 / Corporate Value --- p.7 / Chapter IV. --- CORPORATE CONTROL --- p.9 / Is Manager Acting in Shareholder Interest --- p.9 / Is Director Work in Shareholder Interest --- p.10 / Managerial Competition --- p.11 / Mechanisms of Market of Corporate Control --- p.12 / Wealth Effects of Takeover Activities --- p.12 / Internal Control vs. External Control --- p.16 / Chapter V. --- HONG KONG SITUATION --- p.19 / Hongkong Hotel --- p.22 / Hongkong Land --- p.23 / Li and Fung --- p.25 / Privatization --- p.27 / Chapter VI. --- CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS --- p.30 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.34 / APPENDIX --- p.36

Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong. / Bibliography: leaf 249-300.

by Wong Ka-chung. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 103-111). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract in English / Abstract in Chinese / Acknowledgments / Tables and Figures / Chapter Chapter 1 --- Socializing Economic Transformation --- p.1 / The Puzzle: Why Frontrunner Finishes Last --- p.1 / Beyond the Myth of Free Market --- p.6 / In Search of a Social-Organizational Approach --- p.9 / Hong Kong Electronics Revisited --- p.24 / Chapter Chapter 2 --- Hong Kong as A Follower in the Rear --- p.30 / The Electronics Industry in Retrospect --- p.30 / Inertia in Upgrade as a Strategic Choice --- p.40 / Flexibility or Rigidity: a Second Thought --- p.51 / Chapter Chapter 3 --- Uncovering Local Dynamics --- p.53 / International Subcontracting as a Double-edged Sword --- p.53 / Uncovering Local Dynamics --- p.59 / Handicapped Firms in Truncated Market --- p.69 / Reinstating Local Dynamics in Global Continuity --- p.75 / Chapter Chapter 4 --- Reinstating Possibilities for Upgrade --- p.76 / Alternative Organizational Forms Unearthed --- p.76 / The Institutional Effect Reinstated --- p.86 / Hong Kong Upgrade Failure Reconsidered --- p.93 / Chapter Chapter 5 --- Social Selection of Upgrade Trajectory --- p.95 / References --- p.103 / Appendix 1 The Data Set of 53 Electronics Companies Listed on HKSE / Appendix 2 The Schedule for In-depth Interview with Hong Kong Electronics Firms

This dissertation consists of three essays examining how and why firms set prices in markets. In particular, this dissertation shows how firms may utilize nonlinear pricing to price discriminate, how firms may experiment with the prices they set to learn about the demand function in the market they serve in later periods and the effects of these pricing strategies on consumer welfare. In Essay 1, I show how firms in the milk market use nonlinear price schedules -- quantity discounts -- to price discriminate and increase profits. I find that firms have a greater ability to price discriminate on their own ``private label'' products rather than regional branded that they sell alongside their own. Though some consumers benefit from a lower price as a result of the price discrimination, total consumer surplus is lower than if the store had to offer a fixed price per unit. Additionally, I compare my structural demand estimates, which using the Nielsen household panel data include consumer demographic information and actual household choices, to the standard approach in the literature on price discrimination that uses only market level data. By doing so I find that ignoring demographic information and actual consumer choices leads to biased parameter estimates. In the case of the milk market, the biased parameter estimates due to ignoring household demographic information and actual consumer choices lead to underestimating welfare harm to consumers on average. After finding that price discrimination harms consumers overall in this market, I quantify which consumer demographic are better off and which are worse off. I find that households with children and low income households with children are the only households to benefit from the price discriminatory practices of firms in this market. Since these groups are particularly vulnerable, I suggest that policymakers take no action to correct this market, as any action will directly hurt these consumer groups. In Essay 2, I study how firms learn about the demand in a new market by exploiting a significant change in Washington's state's liquor laws. In 2012, the state of Washington switched from a price-controlled state-store system of selling liquor to one in which private sellers could sell liquor with minimal restrictions on price and range of products. As a result, a heterogeneous group of firms entered the liquor market across the state with little knowledge of the regional demand for alcohol in the state of Washington across heterogeneous localities. Using the Nielsen retail scanner data I am able to observe the variation in pricing and offerings seasonally and over time to see if there is convergence in offerings and prices, and how quickly that convergence occurs across different localities depending on local demographics and competition. I also investigate the extent to which the variation is "experimentation'' by the firms, i.e., the firms purposely experimenting to learn more about demand and the extent that local demographics and competition can affect the experimentation and whether there are spill-overs from local competition (i.e. do firms learn from each other and does this effect how much they experiment and how quickly they learn). My main findings are that over time, firms within this market have learned better how to price discriminate over the holiday season; firms experiment more with prices for the pint sized products than the larger sizes; and that menu of options that firms have offered has been expanding but at a slower rate, suggesting that they are approaching a long-run steady state for the optimal menu of options.

Diss. Stockholm : Univ., 2003.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 1999. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 302-323). Available also in a digital version from Dissertation Abstracts.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 1999. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 302-323). Available also in a digital version from Dissertation Abstracts.