Text in English / The goal of this research was to investigate the relationship between security risk management and business continuity management and to determine how these two methodologies are applied within United Nations Funds and Programmes. These United Nations (UN) agencies have been established to deliver humanitarian aid, economic and social development and reconstruction activities. The locations where these services are required are typically where security risks are also most prevalent. The staff of the UN, the International Red Cross and other humanitarian and development organisations have traditionally been treated as neutral parties and have not been targeted by belligerent groups. This study revealed that there has been an annual increase in security incidents against aid workers and employees of UN organisations. The changing security landscape worldwide and the increasing demand for aid and development services in especially fragile and post-conflict environments, require organisations working in these areas to maintain a high level of resilience. Their resilience can be strengthened by applying robust security risk and business continuity management methodologies. The study included an examination of the global risk environment as it pertains to UN agencies, as well as key risk management concepts such as risk management, operational risk management, security risk management, business continuity management and organisational resilience. For the purposes of this study, security risk management is defined as the systematic approach to assessing and acting on security risks, while ensuring the safety and security of the organisation's personnel and facilities and ensuring that organisational objectives are achieved. Business continuity is a management process that identifies potential threats to an organisation, it assesses the impact to business operations − should the threats materialise − and it furthermore assists in the development of strategies to continue operations in the event of a disruption. In addition to looking at these concepts individually, the relationship between security risk management and business continuity management was also reviewed. The specific objectives set out to achieve the goal of the study were the following:  Explore the perceptions of UN agencies about the link between security risk management and business continuity management.  Analyse the extent of integration between security risk management and business continuity management processes and oversight.  Make recommendations as to how security risk management and business continuity management can operate in an integrated manner with the goal of increasing the overall resilience of UN agencies. To answer the research questions a qualitative research approach was adopted. This enabled the researcher to collect data through interviewing participants and analysing their feedback. The research focused on UN Funds and Programmes as a sub-set of agencies within the UN family of organisations. Each one of these agencies has a specific mandate, such as providing assistance to refugees, promoting food security, poverty reduction, improving reproductive health and family planning services. They also operate in fragile states as well as in emergency and humanitarian crises situations where the security risks are often higher than in normal developing countries. Eight out of 12 UN Funds and Programmes agreed to participate in the study, including: United Nations Children's Fund; United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; World Food Programme; United Nations Development Programme; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; United Nations Human Settlements Programme; and UN Women. Data were collected through conducting semi-structured telephone interviews with the security manager and/or business continuity manager serving in the headquarters of each participating organisation. Findings from the study indicated that security risk management within the UN system has evolved and that security has matured from a purely protective and defensive posture to following a risk management approach. The strength of the UN Security Management System lies in its Security Risk Management Model, which enables a thorough assessment of security risks and the implementation of commensurate mitigating security measures. In contrast to security risk management, the study revealed that business continuity as a management process is a fairly new initiative and has not yet been comprehensively adopted by all UN agencies. When combined, security risk management and business continuity management ensure the safety of staff, maximise the defence of the agencies’ reputation, minimise the impact of events on the agencies as well as their beneficiaries, protect the organisation’s assets, and very importantly, demonstrate effective governance. This can only be done through establishing an organisational risk management model by positioning security risk management and business continuity management within the UN agency’s organisational structure so that they can effectively work together and at the same time allow access to senior management. Good practices and apparent gaps were identified in how these two methodologies are implemented and five specific recommendations were made. The research confirmed the need for both security risk management and business continuity management and the role each function plays to enhance an organisation’s resilience. It also highlighted that while they are two separate management functions, both need to be implemented within a larger risk management framework and need to be closely aligned in order to be effective. The five recommendations are:  Incorporate security risk management and business continuity management functions and responsibilities into the larger agency-wide risk management governance framework.  Expand the scope of business continuity in those UN agencies where it currently sits in the domain of information technology or has not yet been comprehensively implemented across the organisation.  Establish a comprehensive crisis management framework spanning across the whole organisation from their headquarters to country offices.  Develop the capacity to gather risk data across their agency and aggregate the data to view the full spectrum of risks, including security risks and business continuity risks in a holistic manner.  Integrate security risk management and business continuity management processes to enhance their effectiveness. This study contributes to the existing body of knowledge in the field of risk management by gathering relevant information from participating UN Funds and Programmes, comparing the information with other academic sources and drawing conclusions to answer the research questions. While it is expected that each organisation will have its own view on how to implement security risk management and business continuity management, the findings and recommendations as a result of the study present a series of practical recommendations on how the two functions can operate in an integrated manner in order to increase the overall resilience of these UN agencies. Other non-UN organisations working in similar high risk environments could also benefit from the outcomes of the study, as it would allow them to compare their own approaches to security risk management and business continuity management with the information presented in this study. / Security Risk Management / M. Tech. (Security Management)

Thesis (MA (Information Science))--University of Stellenbosch, 2009. / Traditional information protection mechanisms are no longer adequately placed to effectively deal with the adversarial threats that have arisen as a result of the rise in importance of knowledge for today’s organisations. Business counterintelligence appears to be a protective entity, which in principle can effectively engage with and mitigate many of these newly manifested threats. Yet, business counterintelligence is also an entity that is accompanied by a great deal of haze and confusion as to its use, implementation and integration within different organisations. This is evident from the literature where there currently exist multiple fragmented definitions of what business counterintelligence is. Organisations may as a result adopt a particular business counterintelligence definition that may not be effective for their context. This can result in the ineffective protection of critical information assets and the misappropriation of organisational resources; something which is not sustainable. This thesis proposes that in order to allay the confusion caused by these differing fragmented definitions, one needs to be able to arrive at a consolidated definition of what constitutes business counterintelligence; this thesis’s primary objective. This has been examined by firstly contextualising business counterintelligence in order to better understand the topic; the information society was used as a backdrop for this purpose. Secondly, an examination of the prevailing views of business counterintelligence and its role within organisations is offered in order to build clarity. Thirdly, a consolidated definition of business counterintelligence is proposed and its implications for different organisations examined. Finally, the implications of this consolidated definition for the sustainability of business counterintelligence are discussed and conclusions based on the evidence presented within the thesis drawn. Based on the arguments presented, this thesis postulates that a consolidated definition of business counterintelligence is more effective and is thus more sustainable.

Text in English / The goal of this research was to investigate the relationship between security risk management and business continuity management and to determine how these two methodologies are applied within United Nations Funds and Programmes. These United Nations (UN) agencies have been established to deliver humanitarian aid, economic and social development and reconstruction activities. The locations where these services are required are typically where security risks are also most prevalent. The staff of the UN, the International Red Cross and other humanitarian and development organisations have traditionally been treated as neutral parties and have not been targeted by belligerent groups. This study revealed that there has been an annual increase in security incidents against aid workers and employees of UN organisations. The changing security landscape worldwide and the increasing demand for aid and development services in especially fragile and post-conflict environments, require organisations working in these areas to maintain a high level of resilience. Their resilience can be strengthened by applying robust security risk and business continuity management methodologies. The study included an examination of the global risk environment as it pertains to UN agencies, as well as key risk management concepts such as risk management, operational risk management, security risk management, business continuity management and organisational resilience. For the purposes of this study, security risk management is defined as the systematic approach to assessing and acting on security risks, while ensuring the safety and security of the organisation's personnel and facilities and ensuring that organisational objectives are achieved. Business continuity is a management process that identifies potential threats to an organisation, it assesses the impact to business operations − should the threats materialise − and it furthermore assists in the development of strategies to continue operations in the event of a disruption. In addition to looking at these concepts individually, the relationship between security risk management and business continuity management was also reviewed. The specific objectives set out to achieve the goal of the study were the following:  Explore the perceptions of UN agencies about the link between security risk management and business continuity management.  Analyse the extent of integration between security risk management and business continuity management processes and oversight.  Make recommendations as to how security risk management and business continuity management can operate in an integrated manner with the goal of increasing the overall resilience of UN agencies. To answer the research questions a qualitative research approach was adopted. This enabled the researcher to collect data through interviewing participants and analysing their feedback. The research focused on UN Funds and Programmes as a sub-set of agencies within the UN family of organisations. Each one of these agencies has a specific mandate, such as providing assistance to refugees, promoting food security, poverty reduction, improving reproductive health and family planning services. They also operate in fragile states as well as in emergency and humanitarian crises situations where the security risks are often higher than in normal developing countries. Eight out of 12 UN Funds and Programmes agreed to participate in the study, including: United Nations Children's Fund; United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; World Food Programme; United Nations Development Programme; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; United Nations Human Settlements Programme; and UN Women. Data were collected through conducting semi-structured telephone interviews with the security manager and/or business continuity manager serving in the headquarters of each participating organisation. Findings from the study indicated that security risk management within the UN system has evolved and that security has matured from a purely protective and defensive posture to following a risk management approach. The strength of the UN Security Management System lies in its Security Risk Management Model, which enables a thorough assessment of security risks and the implementation of commensurate mitigating security measures. In contrast to security risk management, the study revealed that business continuity as a management process is a fairly new initiative and has not yet been comprehensively adopted by all UN agencies. When combined, security risk management and business continuity management ensure the safety of staff, maximise the defence of the agencies’ reputation, minimise the impact of events on the agencies as well as their beneficiaries, protect the organisation’s assets, and very importantly, demonstrate effective governance. This can only be done through establishing an organisational risk management model by positioning security risk management and business continuity management within the UN agency’s organisational structure so that they can effectively work together and at the same time allow access to senior management. Good practices and apparent gaps were identified in how these two methodologies are implemented and five specific recommendations were made. The research confirmed the need for both security risk management and business continuity management and the role each function plays to enhance an organisation’s resilience. It also highlighted that while they are two separate management functions, both need to be implemented within a larger risk management framework and need to be closely aligned in order to be effective. The five recommendations are:  Incorporate security risk management and business continuity management functions and responsibilities into the larger agency-wide risk management governance framework.  Expand the scope of business continuity in those UN agencies where it currently sits in the domain of information technology or has not yet been comprehensively implemented across the organisation.  Establish a comprehensive crisis management framework spanning across the whole organisation from their headquarters to country offices.  Develop the capacity to gather risk data across their agency and aggregate the data to view the full spectrum of risks, including security risks and business continuity risks in a holistic manner.  Integrate security risk management and business continuity management processes to enhance their effectiveness. This study contributes to the existing body of knowledge in the field of risk management by gathering relevant information from participating UN Funds and Programmes, comparing the information with other academic sources and drawing conclusions to answer the research questions. While it is expected that each organisation will have its own view on how to implement security risk management and business continuity management, the findings and recommendations as a result of the study present a series of practical recommendations on how the two functions can operate in an integrated manner in order to increase the overall resilience of these UN agencies. Other non-UN organisations working in similar high risk environments could also benefit from the outcomes of the study, as it would allow them to compare their own approaches to security risk management and business continuity management with the information presented in this study. / Security Risk Management / M. Tech. (Security Management)

Criminology and Security Science / D. Litt. et Phil. (Criminology)

The problem of this study was to determine to what extent industry was making use of closed circuit television as an implement of industrial security. The data for this study were provided by a group of thirty-two security chiefs of industry, and by another group of fifteen law enforcement officials in the Dallas and Fort Worth Metropolitan area. Of those industrial concerns making use of closed circuit television as an aid to security, a majority use the medium for surveillance of controlled access areas, with theft control and control of plant access following closely behind. For the most part, all surveyed thought that closed circuit television was very efficient.

The aim of this study was to determine the current operational skills requirements for Close Protection Operatives (CPOs) in South Africa. Operational skills refer to those skills that are vital in order for a CPO to effectively protect a designated person (this person is referred to as the `Principal'). In order to determine any shortcomings in the Close Protection industry, twenty in-depth interviews were conducted with current operational CPOs. A detailed literature review was also done in order to create a solid platform for the research and to assist in the verification of the information. During the research, it was found that the task of providing Close Protection could be divided into various sub-categories. This was necessary in order to gain a rounded perspective of a CPO's roles and duties. CPO's tasks in their entirety had to be unpacked into their smaller sub-components. In fact there were many ways to subdivide the skills requirements and functions of CPOs. It was, however, found that the actual subdivisions were less important than the gaining of a comprehensive understanding of how all the aspects are interrelated and should function synergistically. The need for regulation of the South African Close Protection industry was identified as a major concern among all interview respondents. In order to determine the relevant factors involved in regulation, the way countries such as the United Kingdom (UK), Australia and Israel regulate their industries, was assessed. It was noted that the industry in South Africa is `partially regulated'. This means that there is some sort of registration process for CPOs but no comprehensive monitoring and enforcement of accepted minimum competency standards. Currently in South Africa private sector CPOs are rated on the same scale as security guards and must be registered as a Grade level C with the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA). This is not an effective manner to regulate CPOs. CPOs should be viewed as professionals and specialists since their skills far exceed those of a security guard (Grade C). According to South Africa's Skills Development Plan all industries will fall under Sector Education and Training Authorities (SETAs). Close Protection is grouped under the Police, Private Security, Legal, Correctional Services and Justice Sector Education and Training Authority (POSLEC SETA). There is currently a South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA) Unit Standard for Close Protection (Protection of Designated Persons, Units Standard number: 11510). However, the research revealed that while the unit standard correctly outlines the operational skills requirements of CPOs there are no assessment guidelines or clearly defined minimum skills requirements. Before the unit standard can be effectively implemented, agreed industry minimum standards for the relevant skills divisions in Close Protection need to be identified and implemented. But currently there is some confusion regarding which body is responsible for, firstly developing acceptable unit standards; secondly, getting the industry as a whole to agree and accept such standards; thirdly, to see to it that training on those standards is provided; and finally the monitoring of these standards in practice. In this study various training related factors were identified and examined in order to assess whether the way CPOs are trained in South Africa is effective or not. Aspects such as the intensity, focus, duration and content were examined. In general it was found that it is important for the following to be implemented: 1. Effective screening and pre-training evaluation of potential trainees. 2. Training should be job orientated and focus on training CPOs for the functions that they will actually have to perform. 3. Training methodologies should focus on an outcomes based approach and utilise the fundamentals of adult based education. 4. Training should simulate reality including the related stress factors that are placed on operational CPOs such as lack of sleep and high levels of activity interspersed with boring waiting periods. 5. Ongoing training and re-training are vital components to a CPO maintaining operational competency. 6. Close Protection instructors need to have both an operational background and training in instructional methodologies before being considered competent. It is important that in the long term international recognition of South African Close Protection qualifications is achieved. This is essential since many South African CPOs operate internationally. Globalisation and improvements in technology have made it easier for international networking to take place. This has meant that clients are using CPOs in different countries and international comparisons are inevitable. If South African CPOs are to be considered `world class' then internationally recognised minimum standards need to be implemented for the South African Close Protection industry. The research indicated and highlighted various trends that may affect the Close Protection industry. The trends identified that seemed most relevant to the South African Close Protection industry were as follows: * Increased public awareness of international terrorism has resulted form acts such as the 9/11 attacks. This has made people more aware of the need for and benefits of security. Use of well trained CPOs is one of the ways that potential clients are able to minimise their exposure to any potential terrorist attack. * A CPO's ability to communicate and liaise with all relevant parties involved in the Close Protection environment is vital to the success of any operation. Therefore it is vital that these aspects receive the relevant focus during training. * The CPO needs to be well trained in use of unarmed combat and alternative weaponry. He/she can no longer rely on the use of a firearm as the primary force option. * A CPO needs to be able to adapt to many different situations. It is important that a CPO is trained to blend in and use the correct protocol in any given situation. The focus of operations should be on operating in a low profile manner to avoid unnecessary attention. * A CPO needs to be well trained in all aspects of planning and avoidance. The skills needed to proactively identify and avoid threats are vital to modern day operations. The CPO also needs to be quick thinking and adaptable in order to function effectively. * A CPO needs to have a working knowledge of all security related aspects that could enhance the safety of his/her Principal (i.e. multi-skilled). In addition to the above mentioned factors, other recommendations emanating from this study focused on minimum competency standards for the identified subdivisions of close protection. Examples of possible assessment guidelines and criteria were identified covering the following broad classifications: * Prior educational qualifications * Physical abilities * CPO skills * Prior experience in guarding * Firearm skills * Unarmed combat * Protective skills * First aid skills * Security knowledge * Advanced driver training * Protocol and etiquette * Management and business skills * Related skills / Criminology / (M.Tech (Security Management))

A Research Project Abstract submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for Master of Science in Engineering [Electrical]: Telecommunications at the University Of The Witwatersrand, Johannesburg 07 June 2016 / Utilities use Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition systems as their industrial control system. The architecture of these systems in the past was based on them being isolated from other networks. Now with recent ever changing requirements of capabilities from these systems there is a need to converge with information technology systems and with the need to have these industrial networks communicating on packet switched networks there are cyber security concerns that come up. This research project looks at the whether using encryption in an IP/MPLS core network for SCADA in an OT IT environment has an effect on the performance requirements. This was done through an experimental simulation with the results recorded. The research project also looks at the key literature study considerations. The key research question for the research project of this MSc 50/50 mini-thesis is “whether using encryption in SCADA systems, the services performance requirements are still met in OT/ IT environment over an MPLS core network”? The research project seeks to determine if SCADA performance requirements are met over an encrypted MPLS/IP core network in an OT/IT environment. The key focus area of the research project is only encryption in the whole cyber security value chain versus SCADA services performances. This means that the research project only focused on the encryption portion of the whole cyber security value chain and the scope did not focus on other aspects of the value chain. This suffices for an MSc 50/50 mini-thesis research project as a focus on the whole value chain would require a full MSc thesis. Thus the primary objective for the research project is to research and demonstrate that encryption is essential for secure SCADA communication over a MPLS/IP core network. As aforementioned encryption forms an essential part of the Cyber Security value chain which has to achieve the following objectives. Confidentiality: ensuring that the information source is really from that source. Integrity: ensuring that the information has not been altered in any way. Availability: ensuring that system is not comprised but that it is available. These objectives of encryption should be met with SCADA service performance requirements not violated which is the objective of the research project. / M T 2016

The aim of this study was to determine the current operational skills requirements for Close Protection Operatives (CPOs) in South Africa. Operational skills refer to those skills that are vital in order for a CPO to effectively protect a designated person (this person is referred to as the `Principal'). In order to determine any shortcomings in the Close Protection industry, twenty in-depth interviews were conducted with current operational CPOs. A detailed literature review was also done in order to create a solid platform for the research and to assist in the verification of the information. During the research, it was found that the task of providing Close Protection could be divided into various sub-categories. This was necessary in order to gain a rounded perspective of a CPO's roles and duties. CPO's tasks in their entirety had to be unpacked into their smaller sub-components. In fact there were many ways to subdivide the skills requirements and functions of CPOs. It was, however, found that the actual subdivisions were less important than the gaining of a comprehensive understanding of how all the aspects are interrelated and should function synergistically. The need for regulation of the South African Close Protection industry was identified as a major concern among all interview respondents. In order to determine the relevant factors involved in regulation, the way countries such as the United Kingdom (UK), Australia and Israel regulate their industries, was assessed. It was noted that the industry in South Africa is `partially regulated'. This means that there is some sort of registration process for CPOs but no comprehensive monitoring and enforcement of accepted minimum competency standards. Currently in South Africa private sector CPOs are rated on the same scale as security guards and must be registered as a Grade level C with the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA). This is not an effective manner to regulate CPOs. CPOs should be viewed as professionals and specialists since their skills far exceed those of a security guard (Grade C). According to South Africa's Skills Development Plan all industries will fall under Sector Education and Training Authorities (SETAs). Close Protection is grouped under the Police, Private Security, Legal, Correctional Services and Justice Sector Education and Training Authority (POSLEC SETA). There is currently a South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA) Unit Standard for Close Protection (Protection of Designated Persons, Units Standard number: 11510). However, the research revealed that while the unit standard correctly outlines the operational skills requirements of CPOs there are no assessment guidelines or clearly defined minimum skills requirements. Before the unit standard can be effectively implemented, agreed industry minimum standards for the relevant skills divisions in Close Protection need to be identified and implemented. But currently there is some confusion regarding which body is responsible for, firstly developing acceptable unit standards; secondly, getting the industry as a whole to agree and accept such standards; thirdly, to see to it that training on those standards is provided; and finally the monitoring of these standards in practice. In this study various training related factors were identified and examined in order to assess whether the way CPOs are trained in South Africa is effective or not. Aspects such as the intensity, focus, duration and content were examined. In general it was found that it is important for the following to be implemented: 1. Effective screening and pre-training evaluation of potential trainees. 2. Training should be job orientated and focus on training CPOs for the functions that they will actually have to perform. 3. Training methodologies should focus on an outcomes based approach and utilise the fundamentals of adult based education. 4. Training should simulate reality including the related stress factors that are placed on operational CPOs such as lack of sleep and high levels of activity interspersed with boring waiting periods. 5. Ongoing training and re-training are vital components to a CPO maintaining operational competency. 6. Close Protection instructors need to have both an operational background and training in instructional methodologies before being considered competent. It is important that in the long term international recognition of South African Close Protection qualifications is achieved. This is essential since many South African CPOs operate internationally. Globalisation and improvements in technology have made it easier for international networking to take place. This has meant that clients are using CPOs in different countries and international comparisons are inevitable. If South African CPOs are to be considered `world class' then internationally recognised minimum standards need to be implemented for the South African Close Protection industry. The research indicated and highlighted various trends that may affect the Close Protection industry. The trends identified that seemed most relevant to the South African Close Protection industry were as follows: * Increased public awareness of international terrorism has resulted form acts such as the 9/11 attacks. This has made people more aware of the need for and benefits of security. Use of well trained CPOs is one of the ways that potential clients are able to minimise their exposure to any potential terrorist attack. * A CPO's ability to communicate and liaise with all relevant parties involved in the Close Protection environment is vital to the success of any operation. Therefore it is vital that these aspects receive the relevant focus during training. * The CPO needs to be well trained in use of unarmed combat and alternative weaponry. He/she can no longer rely on the use of a firearm as the primary force option. * A CPO needs to be able to adapt to many different situations. It is important that a CPO is trained to blend in and use the correct protocol in any given situation. The focus of operations should be on operating in a low profile manner to avoid unnecessary attention. * A CPO needs to be well trained in all aspects of planning and avoidance. The skills needed to proactively identify and avoid threats are vital to modern day operations. The CPO also needs to be quick thinking and adaptable in order to function effectively. * A CPO needs to have a working knowledge of all security related aspects that could enhance the safety of his/her Principal (i.e. multi-skilled). In addition to the above mentioned factors, other recommendations emanating from this study focused on minimum competency standards for the identified subdivisions of close protection. Examples of possible assessment guidelines and criteria were identified covering the following broad classifications: * Prior educational qualifications * Physical abilities * CPO skills * Prior experience in guarding * Firearm skills * Unarmed combat * Protective skills * First aid skills * Security knowledge * Advanced driver training * Protocol and etiquette * Management and business skills * Related skills / Criminology and Security Science / (M.Tech (Security Management))

Text in English / Industrial sites in Harare contribute significantly to the economy of Zimbabwe. Harare is the capital city of Zimbabwe and therefore has significant manufacturing and commercial activity. The protection of industrial sites is very important because of the presence of valuable assets and operations. Therefore the main purpose of deploying security measures at industry premises is to create a safe and secure environment for the business functions. Security management is consequently an important element of an industrial organisation’s continuity. The implementation of integrated security systems was examined to some extent within this study. The size and nature of industrial facilities influenced this study to view integrated security systems as more effective than stand-alone security measures. The study sought to investigate the various aspects associated with the implementation. The purposes of the research included the following: • Examine current practices, benefits, shortcomings in the implementation of integrated security systems; • Critically evaluate the security management aspects required for the implementation ofintegrated security systems; • Investigate successes and failures associated with integrated security systems and how implementation can be improved; • Examine and identify factors necessary for a best practice approach to integrated security systems; and • Determine a methodology for the effective implementation of integrated security systems. Additionally the study briefly examined how security systems integration can assist in reducing the problem of connivance to theft at receiving and dispatch points at industrial facilities. The report is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 covers the research problem, Chapter 2 deals with the research methods while Chapter 3 has insightful information from literature review. Chapter 4 presents the data and how it was analysed. Lastly Chapter 5 has findings, recommendations and conclusions. The study used the mixed-method approach. This approach includes both qualitative and quantitative research in order to gain a more in-depth understanding of the research problem. The methods of data collection were site visits, interviews and questionnaires. The sample was drawn from a cross-section of sites within the industrial areas of Workington, Southerton, Willowvale, Graniteside, Msasa and few outside industries in the vicinity of Harare. A total of 11 sites were observed. The interviews consisted of 30 participants who were mainly security practitioners at management level as well as some non-security managers. In addition, a total of 102 respondents participated in this study by completing the questionnaire. The majority of the respondents were security practitioners who were the main focus of the study. The findings support the various aspects of the implementation of integrated security systems. The conclusions emanating from the statistical analysis of the collected data included the following: • The critical assets for protection at industrial facilities are infrastructure, products, revenue, people and other movable items or equipment; • The main threat sources are from outsiders, crime syndicates and employees; • Security systems suitable for integration are CCTV, electronic access control, alarms, personnel, policies and procedures backed by information communication technologies. • Security should be functionally integrated with other departments which include Information Technology, Human Resources, Finance, Operations and Marketing; • The preferred mode of linkage was established to be fibre optic on a local area or wide area network using intranet or internet; • The key players in the integration were found to be security practitioners, top management, IT specialist, system suppliers, installers and operators; • The implementation process consists of security policy, survey, system design, procurement, installation, training, operating, review and upgrade; • Factors necessary for best practice include system purpose, availability of resources, top management commitment, skills, and feasibility to implement; • The benefits are mainly improved effectiveness, easy of monitoring, improved outlook and record keeping; • The most significant challenges are system breakdown, sabotage and power outage; and • Connivance to theft can be mitigated by a combination of staff rotation, dedicated CCTV, spot checks, undercover surveillance and functional integration. area network using intranet or internet; • The key players in the integration were found to be security practitioners, top management, IT specialist, system suppliers, installers and operators; • The implementation process consists of security policy, survey, system design, procurement, installation, training, operating, review and upgrade; • Factors necessary for best practice include system purpose, availability of resources, top management commitment, skills, and feasibility to implement; • The benefits are mainly improved effectiveness, easy of monitoring, improved outlook and record keeping; • The most significant challenges are system breakdown, sabotage and power outage; and • Connivance to theft can be mitigated by a combination of staff rotation, dedicated CCTV, spot checks, undercover surveillance and functional integration. / Security Risk Management / M. Tech. (Security Management)

The present study investigated the relationship between level of security clearance in engineering occupations and stress. A total of 63 male employees in the field of engineering and design with varying levels of security clearance employed by a large Southwestern defense company participated in the study. Data was obtained utilizing the Engineering Stress Questionnaire which measures sources of stress, work locus of control, social support, job difficulty, job characteristics, perceived stress, and demographic variables. T-tests revealed no statistically significant differences between employees with low security clearances and high security clearances with regard to perceived stress level. However, correlational support was found for hypotheses involving social support, job difficulty, job characteristics, sources of stress, and perceived stress. Path analysis was performed to investigate the impact of variable relationships.