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Locke's critique of innate ideasBowler, Arthur Wilson January 1952 (has links)
Thesis (M.A.)--Boston University. Page 7 misnumbered. / From the year in which John Locke's volume, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding was published (1690), to the present time his theory of Innate Ideas has received both praise and criticism, some of which, in each case was justified and some unwarranted.
It is the purpose of this thesis to defend Locke's theory of Innate Ideas against such extreme criticisms as "Locke's polemic is a straw man argument", "No man in his right mind ever claimed ideas to be innate in the sense which Locke attacks them", and "Locke destroyed innate intelligence with his polemic" [TRUNCATED]
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Cartesian Linguistics: From Historical Antecedents to Computational ModelingBehme, Christina 07 June 2011 (has links)
Chomsky’s Cartesian Linguistics frames into his linguistic work and the resulting debates between rationalists and empiricists. I focus on the following key aspects: (i) the historic connection of Cartesian Linguistics to previous linguistic theorizing, (ii) the development of Chomsky’s own theorizing, (iii) the empirical work addressing the problem of language acquisition and (iv) the problem of computational modeling of language learning. Chomsky claims that his view is situated within a rationalist Cartesian tradition and that only rationalists will be able to account fully for all aspects of human language. My thesis challenges both claims.
I found only remote connections between Cartesian and Chomskyan commitments. Chomsky holds that (i) language is species-specific, (ii) language is domain-specific, and (iii) language acquisition depends on innate knowledge. Descartes accepted (i), but argued that language is an indicator of domain-general intelligence. Innate resources play a different role for language acquisition for Chomsky and for Descartes.
Chomsky revived linguistics during the 1950s by promising to make it a rigorous part of the biological sciences. However, his work has not resulted in a better understanding of language acquisition and use. Key concepts like ‘innateness’, ‘Universal Grammar’ and ‘Language Acquisition Device’ remain in need of precise definition, and the Poverty of the Stimulus Argument does not rule out data-driven domain-general language acquisition.
Empirical work in developmental psychology has demonstrated that children acquire and practice many language-related cognitive abilities long before they produce their first words. Chomsky’s dictum that language learning is uniform across the species and invariably follows genetically determined stages remains empirically unconfirmed. Computational modeling has accounted for some internal structure of language acquisition mechanisms and simulates the specific conditions under which children learn language. Contemporary models use samples of child-directed-speech as input and have replicated numerous aspects of human performance.
Given my findings I suggest that Chomskyan linguistics is not Cartesian in substance or in spirit. Descartes was wary of those “who take no account of experience and think that truth will spring from their brains like Minerva from the head of Jupiter” (CSM I, p. 21). His science relied on sense experience (empiricism) and deduction (rationalism) and a truly Cartesian Linguistics will revive this part of the Cartesian tradition.
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Sebevědomí a sebepoznání. Studie k roli subjektu a vědomí myšlení v Descartově filosofii / Self-Consciousness and Self-Knowledge. A Study on the Role of the Subject and the Awareness of Thought in Descartes' PhilosophyKollert, Lukáš January 2014 (has links)
The thesis aims at examining Descartes's so called cogito from a wider perspective, especially as regards to the role in the development of Meditationes de prima philosophia (1641) and in the context of other relevant texts. Being an attempt to give a broad account of Descartes's "first cognition" the study deals not only with the cogito itself, e.g. with its logical structure, but also with other key Cartesian doctrines, so that we can understand the cogito as an integral part of Descartes's philosophy. The thesis inquires for this reason into the question of meditator's identity, the methodological skepticism, the question whether logical principles are called into question in the First meditation, the problem of the Cartesian circle, the distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge, the doctrine of innate ideas and finally, the question how to explain, according to Descartes, the awareness of our thoughts. Sometimes the considerations become rather systematic and go beyond a mere exegesis of Descartes's philosophy, especially when they concern the problem with the presence of ego in cogito and the explanation of our self-consciousness. There are three competing approaches to the second issue mentioned that are introduced and assessed in the last chapter. I have chosen this way of...
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L'innéité des facultés de l'esprit : Repenser l'innéité comme condition du développement / The innateness of the faculties of the mind : Rethinking innateness as a developmental conditionReynaud, Valentine 08 December 2011 (has links)
Dans ce travail, nous proposons d’interroger la notion d’innéité des facultés de l’esprit, dans l’histoire de la philosophie et dans le débat contemporain. Nous commençons par montrer que toute hypothèse concernant l’innéité des facultés de l’esprit – qu’elle soit innéiste ou empiriste – pose un problème explicatif que nous nommons le « problème de la tautologie ». C’est en dévoilant les présupposés épistémologiques de chaque hypothèse que nous révélons la présence de ce problème au sein du débat classique sur les idées innées, mais aussi au cœur du débat contemporain amorcé par les travaux en linguistique de Noam Chomsky. L’identification d’une faculté innée spécifique ou d’une capacité générale semble toujours découler de choix métaphysiques ou épistémologiques a priori. En ce sens elle n’est jamais justifiée de façon satisfaisante. C’est pourquoi, une position intermédiaire (constructiviste) apparaît plus convaincante. En outre, l’analyse des différentes définitions de l’innéité souligne la nécessité de renoncer non pas à la notion même d’innéité certains philosophes contemporains le pensent, mais à l’attribution d’un contenu a priori à l’innéité. Nous pensons que l’innéité est un terme épistémique auquel il est seulement possible d’attribuer de façon a priori un statut formel. L’innéité doit donc être redéfinie comme une condition du développement. Le terme condition permet en effet, d’une part, de souligner le statut épistémique de l’innéité qui est un terme relatif à une explication, celle du développement ; d’autre part, d’insister sur le fait que l’innéité n’est pas dénuée de consistance ontologique. Le développement cognitif n’aurait tout simplement pas lieu sans elle. Nous défendons ainsi l’idée qu’il est possible de minimiser le « problème de la tautologie » par une redéfinition de la notion d’innéité et par l’élaboration d’une méthodologie propre à établir l’innéité de certaines facultés de l’esprit sans la présupposer et qui prend en compte le développement cognitif. Pour finir, nous appliquons la méthodologie proposée à l’exemple de la faculté de langage et nous essayons de défendre une hypothèse précise concernant son innéité. / In this work, we examine the notion of innateness of faculties of mind, in the history of philosophy as well as in the contemporary debate. Firstly, we show that any hypothesis on innateness of faculties of mind – whether innatist or empiricist – raises an explanatory problem that we called “the tautology problem”. Identifying epistemological presuppositions of each hypothesis leads us to reveal the presence of this problem within both the classical debate on innate ideas and the contemporary debate on innate mind structure initiated by Chomsky’s linguistic work. Assumptions on domain-specific innate faculty or general capacity always seem to follow from a priori metaphysical or epistemological options. If so, they are not satisfactory justified. The constructivist position appears to be an intermediary relevant way, with conditions to be defined. Furthermore, analysis of different definitions of innateness reveals the necessity to renounce to attribute an a priori content to innateness (and not to renounce to the concept of innateness as some contemporary philosophers argue). We think that innateness is an epistemic term to which it is only possible to attribute a priori a formal status. We claim then that innateness must be redefined as condition of development because the term condition underlines on the one side the epistemic status of innateness, which is an explanatory-dependent term; on the other side its propensity to have an ontological plausibility: cognitive development does not occur without something innate. Thus, we advance that it is possible to minimize “the tautology problem” by redefining innateness and by elaborating a methodology capable of establishing innateness of some faculties of mind without presupposing, taking into account cognitive development. To conclude, we apply the advanced methodology to the example of the faculty of language and try to defend an assumption about its innateness.
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