The ICMS is the tax the largest revenue in Brazil, besides being the main source of revenue for states. For these reasons, it gets from Constitution 1988 more extensive treatment. The constitutional powers for the States legislate operations movement of goods allowed them to have greater degree of legislative and financial autonomy, however, has led to economic and institutional distortions due to the national vocation of a tax imposed by the state. The first objective is to analyze the formation of the ICMS tax model, constructed through a historical institutional distortion process accumulated along the years. In this context, presents two different scenarios of revenue sharing when on the State: the recipient is or not a taxpayer. Moreover, they are presented descriptively disturbances arising from the weakening and tensions in the political and economic relations between states of the fiscal war , to break with the constitutional rules. Concomitantly, there remains the serious problem of region inequalities. As a consequence, the main goal of this dissertation refers to the examinations of the measures that are shaping the states to try to solve the possible institutional failures of the model, beyond the proposition of alternative models proposed to sharing resulting from operations of interstate movement of goods. In this context, it takes into account the state legislative autonomy and the preservation of neutrality and slowdown in economic phenomenon of fiscal war . The results described in detail form unanticipated problems in the institutional environment, when the construction of the 1988 Constitution, as evidenced by this dissertation. / O ICMS é, sem dúvida, o imposto com a maior arrecadação no país, além de ser a principal fonte de receita dos estados, recebendo por isso da Carta Magna/1988 mais extenso tratamento. A atribuição constitucional para os Estados tributarem operações de circulação de mercadorias lhes permitiu ter maior grau de autonomia legislativa e financeira, no entanto, vem provocando distorções econômicas e institucionais em virtude da vocação nacional de um imposto de competência estadual. O primeiro objetivo deste trabalho é fundamentar a formação do modelo tributário ICMS, construído através de um processo históricoinstitucional com distorções acumuladas ao longo do processo. Nesse quadro, apresenta dois cenários distintos de partilha de receita, quando no Estado destino: o destinatário é ou não contribuinte do imposto. Além disso, são apresentadas descritivamente as perturbações advindas da fragilização e as tensões nas relações políticas e econômicas entre os Entes Tributantes que respaldam o processo da guerra fiscal, até com a quebra de regras constitucionais. Concomitantemente, mantém-se o grave problema das desigualdades regionais. Como consequência, a meta central desta dissertação é examinar as medidas que os Estados estão delineando para tentar solucionar as possíveis falhas institucionais do modelo; além da proposição de propostas de modelos alternativos para tributar e partilhar a arrecadação advinda das operações interestaduais de circulação de mercadorias. Nesse contexto, leva-se em consideração a autonomia legislativa estadual e a preservação da neutralidade econômica como forma desaceleração do fenômeno da guerra fiscal . Os resultados descritos em detalhes dão forma até a problemas não previstos no ambiente institucional vigente, quando da construção da Constituição de 1988, conforme atesta essa dissertação.

There is little solid research that explores counterinsurgency practices against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), not only from the standpoint of what is being done, but, rather, what should be done based on past COIN successes. Notable works on counterinsurgency in Colombia include the research of Tom Marks, who focused on operational strategy and tactics; Kevin Self, who professes the importance of controlling territory in defeating the FARC, by addressing the social and institutional ills within Colombia itself; and Dennis Rempe, who notes US involvement in shaping Colombia's COIN strategy. Using a comparative case study model, this thesis provides an analysis of Colombia?s counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies and tactics through the lens of successful and unsuccessful COIN operations in Iraq, Algeria, Malaya, South Vietnam, Thailand, Algeria and El Salvador over the course of the 20th and early 21st centuries. After all, no matter how successful a COIN force is militarily, their accomplishments will ultimately be fruitless if the conditions which fuel insurgency remains present. This paper begins by providing the historical context for the conditions which shaped the Colombian social order, which led to the revolutionary movement. It then follows the growth of the FARC, examining that organization?s strengths and weaknesses. The FARC is contrasted by outlining recent COIN transformation efforts within the Colombian government, to include little acknowledged failures and successes, strengths and weaknesses. An important focus is placed on Colombian President Alvaro Uribe Velez? Democratic Security Policy as the model for Colombia?s current COIN efforts. After next examining various ongoing factors contributing to the Colombian insurgency?to include institutional failures, illicit funding and the problem of paramilitary groups?this thesis examines past COIN efforts by other governments. Finally, after applying lessons learned from thee past COIN efforts?cross-referencing historically successful and unsuccessful tactics with tactics used and not used by Bogota in its fight against the FARC?I provide recommendations to the government of Colombia (GOC) on how to improve its COIN efforts. Although it is important to look at this problem set from an external standpoint, we must still factor in internal factors that have limited Colombia?s ability to emerge victorious, such as allowing porous borders, airspace and coastlines; placing a priority on killing or capturing the enemy and not on engaging the population; and the primacy of military direction of counterinsurgency; disregard of basic human rights; an insufficient judiciary structure; failure to halt financial support mechanisms; and the lack of an outlet for political inclusion . From this vantage point, we will be able to see that these elements?when properly implemented?have proven successful over time and may enhance GOC success and ultimately result in victory over the insurgency that has plagued their country for 40+ years