Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2005. / Thesis Advisor(s): Anne Marie Baylouny, James Russell. Includes bibliographical references (p. 79-86). Also available online.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2008. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 411-435).

This thesis aims to understand the political sociology of Maoist insurgency in India using a combination of disaggregated statistics and qualitative data. The vast majority of insurgent leaders are from dominant or upper caste, middle class backgrounds. Their participation in the insurgency can be understood in terms of ideology and short-term processes of mobilization. The Maoist insurgents provide a unified organizational structure for two separate sections of society. On the one hand, are untouchable or dalit landless laborers who suffer economic exploitation at the hands of higher caste landowners. On the hand are tribal or adivasi landowning cultivators whose relative autonomy has come under increasing pressure over the past two centuries as the state has established control over natural resources in their area. Their support for the insurgents does not just manifest itself from exploited untouchables’ and oppressed tribals’ positions in the social structure as structural theories would assume. Rather, the insurgents provide them with collective incentives in order to encourage their support. The actors at the macro and micro levels have very different reasons for participating in the insurgency. The insurgent leaders aim to capture state power through a Protracted People’s War, while the objectives of supporters at the micro-level tend to be more concerned with local and short-term issues. The insurgency should be conceptualised as a state building enterprise in which the interests of supporters at all levels are served by seizing local political power and the building of a base area. The thesis demonstrates that the insurgency is expanding most rapidly in the central Indian tribal belt. I use a case study to show that not all tribal communities support the insurgents. Some oppose them, either because their interests have been harmed by the presence of the insurgents, or as a result of a variety of endogenous mechanisms. This indicates that insurgency is a more dynamic and complex process than structural and rational actor theories allow for. The thesis finishes by placing the subject of indigenous communities and insurgency in the global context. It demonstrates that, while so-called indigenous communities listed by the Minorities at Risk project amount to 4.8% of the world’s population, they were involved in 43% of the intra-state conflict years listed by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Armed Conflict Dataset between 1946 and 2010.

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Jan 12, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Feb 11, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.

This study explores the foundations of US counterinsurgency policy and doctrine in order to better understand the main historical influences on that policy and doctrine and how those influences have informed the current US approach to counterinsurgency. The results of this study indicate the US experience in counterinsurgency during the Greek Civil War and the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines had a significant influence on the development of US counterinsurgency policy and doctrine following World War II through the Kennedy presidency. In addition, despite a major diversion from the lessons of Greece and the Philippines during the Vietnam War, the lessons were re-institutionalized in US counterinsurgency policy and doctrine following the war and continue to have significant influence today, though in a highly sanitized and, therefore, misleading form. As a result, a major disconnect has developed between the “rhetoric and reality” of US counterinsurgency policy. This disconnect has resulted from the fact that many references that provide a more complete and accurate picture of the actual policies and actions taken to successfully defeat the insurgencies have remained out of the reach of non-government researchers and the general public. Accordingly, many subsequent studies of counterinsurgency overlook, or only provide a cursory treatment of, aspects that may have had a critical impact on the success of past US counterinsurgency operations. One such aspect is the role of US direct intervention in the internal affairs of a supported country. Another is the role of covert action operations in support of counterinsurgency operations. As a result, the counterinsurgency policies and doctrines that have been developed over the years are largely based on false assumptions, a flawed understanding of the facts, and a misunderstanding of the contexts concerning the cases because of misleading, or at least seriously incomplete, portrayals of the counterinsurgency operations.