Today, Information Operations (IO) is an area of emerging importance in military science. IO however is not new. Many of the elements of IO have existed for hundreds, and in the case of specific elements like military deception (MILDEC), for thousands of years. IO becomes more important in dealing with the conflicts we face today, particularly as modern wars transition away from the large force on force encounters of the past. This thesis focuses on the specific British IO lessons learned during the Malayan Emergency. The thesis will also examine the IO implications of British organizational and cultural adaptation to counter the insurgents. Finally, it will also examine the most recent list of relevant Joint Doctrine, which drives how the individual services train, equip and resource forces for counter insurgency. / US Air Force (USAF) author.

Thesis (M.S. in Joint Information Operations)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009. / Thesis Advisor(s): McNab, Robert. Second Reader: Lee, Doowan. "December 2009." Description based on title screen as viewed on January 26, 2009. Author(s) subject terms: Low-intensity and post-conflict reconstruction, the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), insurgency, popular support. Includes bibliographical references (p. 127-129). Also available in print.

Thesis (M.S. in Information Operations)--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2007. / "March 2007." Includes bibliographical references (p. 155-172). Also available via the Internet.

The Malayan Emergency is often considered the defining paradigm for a successful counter-insurgency campaign. The effective collection and management of intelligence by Special Branch dominates this paradigm. However, the intelligence architecture during Emergency was much more complicated than the simple Special Branch-Army nexus upon which existing studies focus. Other components of the intelligence included the Malayan Security Service (MSS), Security Intelligence Far East (SIFE), the Joint Intelligence Committee / Far East (JIC/FE), the Royal Air Force (RAF), the Army, and the mainstream police. Each component adapted to the challenge of insurgency in different ways – the civilian elements faring far worse than the military. Britain struggled to adapt to the post-war intelligence challenges in the Far East. Key intelligence components and capabilities were constituted in haste with overlapping and ambiguous remits. Consequently, there was bitter infighting at a number of levels, particularly between the various civilian intelligence agencies. In contrast, the Army and RAF demonstrated an instinctive ability to work in a ‘joint’ environment from the very beginning of the Emergency. In particular, the RAF took a leading role in creating a joint theatre-level intelligence apparatus which included establishment of a Joint Operations Room in Kuala Lumpur and the Joint Intelligence Photographic Intelligence Committee / Far East. However, the military were unable to provide the comprehensive human intelligence or strategic leadership necessary to make the broader apparatus effective. This could only come once the apparatus led by the civil agencies – chiefly the uniformed police as well as Special Branch – had learnt to adapt to the demands of waging a counter-insurgency campaign. Given that the British intelligence organisations had learnt to function in a joint manner during the Second World War, it is remarkable how much had apparently been forgotten in the three years preceding the outbreak of the Communist 1 AIR 20/7777, Report on the Emergency in Malaya, from April 1950 to November 1951, by Sir Harold Briggs. insurgency in Malaya and how long it took to create an effective method of coordinating intelligence during subsequent Emergency.

U.S. air bases in Iraq have been attacked over 1,000 times in just the first two years of the conflict. This prompted the U.S. Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations to declare in October 2004 that air base defense was one of the five critical problems without a solution currently facing the U.S. Air Force. Yet a solution exists, but not in current air base defense doctrine where the threat to air bases is presented as a conventional force or saboteur. Instead, the history of air base attacks reveals a different but consistent enemy over the last 50 years: the insurgent. Unlike conventional forces which seek decisive military victory and the destruction of the adversary's military resources, the insurgent seeks primarily and ultimately a political victory. To do this, among other efforts; the insurgent must wage an "information war" in order to expand the growth and power of the insurgent organization, often through acts of symbolic violence against targets of strategic value. As such, the air base is a leading target of choice for insurgents. Air bases are key operational and strategic terrain to the United States military - arguably the most critical terrain in the current American way of war. With each air base attack, no matter which specific tactic used, the insurgent attempts to strengthen their hold over their own center of gravity - the local population - while attacking the U.S. center of gravity - the political will of the American public. Only a base defense doctrine that targets the insurgents' center of gravity in the physical, informational, and moral spectrum will succeed at disrupting insurgent operations and protect the air base, the local population, and the U.S. center of gravity. Counterinsurgency provides a foundation for this proposed doctrine.

Within today's irregular warfare environment, negotiations with insurgents are difficult because, in part, insurgents are often characterized as terrorists. Early in the Iraqi conflict, there was a perceived notion that the insurgent and terrorist were morphing into one entity. This perceived morphing has, arguably, influenced some US policy makers and senior military leaders to be very reluctant to negotiate with Iraqi Insurgents. Acknowledging such a reluctance, this thesis will focus on the role of negotiation in countering insurgencies. During the examination of historical cases of negotiations with insurgents, this thesis identifies commonalities within the case studies and tests the thesis' hypotheses. The conceptual framework utilizes several publications and articles to determine the feasibility and suitability of the information collected from case studies, to determine the role negotiations can play in countering an insurgency. The commonalities gathered from the historical case studies and analysis of the conceptual framework serves as the foundation to construct a notional negotiation strategy to counter the insurgency in Iraq. In conjunction with the information gathered from the historical case studies and literary surveys, this thesis applies a theoretical model and defined terms to act as steering mechanisms when developing a notional negotiation strategy. / US Army (USA) author.

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009. / Thesis Advisor(s): Lee, Doowan. Second Reader: Giordano, Frank. "December 2009." Description based on title screen as viewed on January 27, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Repression tactics, population alignment, movements, game theory, agent-based models, Anbar Awakening, counterinsurgency (COIN). Includes bibliographical references (p. 123-128). Also available in print.

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009. / Thesis Advisor(s): Berger, Marcos (Mark T.). Second Reader: Porch, Douglas. "December 2009." Description based on title screen as viewed on January 26, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, FARC (Spanish Acronym), Auto Defense Forces of Colombia, AUC (Spanish Acronym), Government of Colombia, GOC, U.S. policy, illicit drugs, demobilization, Colombian Military, Colombian National Police, Colombian Political system. Includes bibliographical references (p. 69-79). Also available in print.

Thesis (M.S. in Operation Research and M.S. in Applied Mathematics)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2008. / Thesis Advisor(s): Jacobs, Patricia ; Zhou, Hong. "June 2008." Description based on title screen as viewed on August 25, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 61-64). Also available in print.

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2008. / Thesis Advisor(s): Gregg, Heather. "December 2008." Description based on title screen as viewed on January 30, 2009. Includes bibliographical references (p. 71-74). Also available in print.