Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2009. / Thesis Advisor(s): Porch, Douglas. "June 2009." Description based on title screen as viewed on July 13, 2009. DTIC Identifiers: FID (Foreign Internal Defense), irregular warfare, conventional forces. Author(s) subject terms: Conventional Naval Forces, Irregular Warfare, Naval Expeditionary Combat Command, General Purpose Forces, Foreign Internal Defense, Insurgency, Counter Drug Operations, Counter-insurgency Operations, Maritime Security Operations, Riverine, Colombia, Naval Mission, Overseas Contingency Operations. Includes bibliographical references (p. 51-57). Also available in print.

Thesis (M.S.)--School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 2008. / "June 2008." Vita. Includes bibliographical references (l. 86-94). Also available via the Internet.

Thesis (M.S. in Information Operations)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2006. / Thesis Advisor(s): Hy Rothstein. "June 2006." Includes bibliographical references (p. 75-77). Also available in print.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Leicester in association with University of Hong Kong, 1995. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available in print.

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Combating Terrorism: Policy and Strategy))--Naval Postgraduate School, 2008. / Cover title. "March 2008." AD-A479 914. Includes bibliographical references. Electronic version available on the Public STINET.

Colombia's four decades-old insurgency has been largely forgotten by the United States. With U.S. attention diverted towards Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Middle East, Colombia has undertaken a new strategy to deal with problems of the insurgents, paramilitaries, and narco-terrorists which have plagued the country since 1948. The current administration of Colombian President Alvaro Uribe has shifted strategy from one of negotiation and concessions to an active campaign to restore security and state control throughout Colombia. Under the Democratic Security and Defense Policy, the Uribe administration has made great strides against the insurgents and their supporters. This thesis analyzes President Uribe's efforts to end the insurgency and those of his predecessor Andres Pastrana. It also analyzes U.S. aid in the form of Plan Colombia which is largely tied to counternarcotics efforts. The highest U.S. priority is to stem the flow of illegal narcotics from Colombia into the U.S. Colombia's priority is to restore security and state control first, thereby providing a stable foundation to battle the narcotraffickers. Uribe has shown there is hope for Colombia to end the insurgency through his efforts. The U.S. should shift its priorities to mirror Colombia's and thereby earn a valuable, peaceful, and stable partner in the Western hemisphere.

This analysis examines the information dimension of the ongoing Maoist insurgency and counterinsurgency in Nepal. The paper follows two lines of research: first, it presents an analytic framework that properly conceives the challenge of counterinsurgency and calibrates government actions through the use of information systems and operations; then, it applies this framework to the contemporary crisis in Nepal to postulate effective counterinsurgency strategies for the Nepalese government and its supporters. The paper analyzes the environment, structure, and dynamics of the insurgent and counterinsurgent systems in Nepal to determine the extent to which information is or could be employed in the fight. Based on the conditions identified in the research, the paper proposes information-based strategies and tactics that favorably affect conflict dynamics on behalf of the Nepalese government. Finally, the paper offers constructive and appropriate ways for the United States to support Nepalese information operations efforts in the counterinsurgency. This research focuses primarily on the use of information in insurgencies, but it also realizes that information strategies must be balanced and blended with other important dimensions of insurgent conflict. Thus, the insights gained here are intended to support further analysis of the larger set of dynamics that shape the conflict in Nepal.

This thesis analyzes facets of US involvement in El Salvador, Colombia, Afghanistan, and Iraq to demonstrate the value of using joint military training between host nation and US military personnel as a vehicle to establish intelligence sharing programs. Military-to-military relations already facilitate the distribution of logistical assistance, the exchange of technical expertise, and the teaching of advanced military capabilities. However, military-to-military relations are more than just a means to provide financial and technological aid. Within this thesis, military relations are presented as a way to develop the trust necessary to operate in areas of current and future US national interest, at a time when increased bilateral cooperation and intelligence sharing between the United States and coalition governments is desperately needed. Guidelines extrapolated from an analysis of political, military, cultural, and intelligence sharing characteristics in each one of these countries are presented to help the US and host nation personnel develop better intelligence capabilities through the training of host nation military forces; in effect, locally train an army of intelligence analysts. Based on current American intelligence shortfalls and elusive transnational enemies, the use of military-to-military relations is proposed as a way to enhance US intelligence capabilities and empower coalition partners against mutual threats.

Approved for public release, distribution unlimited / This thesis investigates why Iraq's Sunnis resorted to violent collective action, rather than non-violent political action, following Saddam's overthrow. Using social movement theory, I argue that decreasing political opportunity, existing mobilizing structures with violent repertoires, and effective framing of the opposition as kufr (non-Muslim) explain the emergence of Iraq's Sunni insurgency. I posit that Sunnis felt a profound grievance in the decreased political opportunity following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Furthermore, mobilization nearly always utilizes existing networks and adapts the characteristics of the physical spaces and organizational structures from which the movement emerges. I argue that the disbanded military and militant Islamist networks comprised the bulk of the first insurgent groups, and that these groups used their existing repertoires to shape Iraq's political environment. I then trace the frames used throughout the conflict, illustrating that the common theme is opposition to rule by kufr - whether it be Coalition nations or Iraqi Shi'a - and this provides a concrete target for the insurgency. Examined collectively, these three factors provide a sufficient explanation for the Sunni insurgents' turn to violence to address their political grievances. This argument stands in constrast to the clash of civilization and "Cosmic War" arguments, which offer insufficient explanations.

Past, current and future military endeavors will invariably involve conflict at the sub-state level. A recurring problem in the study of insurgent conflict is a lack of data that has the breadth, depth, and historical accuracy to provide insight as to why, at the individual level, people participate in insurgency. Accessibility to street gangs provides a comprehensive source of data not seen in insurgencies. Street gangs provide a "ground truth", to the interaction between the state and organized substate group in a competition for control. The individuals who fuel both sides of this competition for control are basing decisions to participate in insurgency on a framework founded in rational actor theory, but modified by their perspective of the world. Groups who wish to recruit individuals into their insurgency apply incentives and disincentives selectively to individuals to compel membership. As a group gains more members it can apply more incentives, increasing the rate or future recruitment and level of control over a community. A comprehensive and effective strategy cannot be developed to counter these insurgent forces without answering the fundamental questions behind individual participation first. This thesis examines insurgency from the individual level and proposes concepts that must accompany any attempt to combat rebel groups. / US Army (USA) author.