In this study, a process in which a headquarters was changing its way and extent of control exertion on a foreign subsidiary was investigated from an agency theoretical perspective. Two particular characteristics of principal-agent relationships were particularly scrutinized; information asymmetry and aligning interests. These issues were investigated in-depth through interviews, direct observations and document analysis, in order to examine whether they were identified by the headquarters as major problems and accordingly triggered the change initiative. The agency theoretical perspective was subsequently related to theories on organizational interest alignment, in order to examine whether the agency theoretical prescriptions on appropriate control mechanisms seemed appropriate with respect to individuals’ motivation to align their interests’ with organizational goals. The findings suggested that hedonic intrinsic motivation, which is achieved through enjoyable, self-decided and competence-enhancing work tasks, played a more important role than extrinsic rewards, which is contrary to agency theory which emphasizes extrinsic incentives.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:26:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Fabio Neves da Rocha.pdf: 862999 bytes, checksum: 8c313edb7eac38b896702bed84f64f7d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-08-13 / Fundo Mackenzie de Pesquisa / The increasing adoption of enterprise software in Brazil has led domestic market to a higher level of maturity on the usage and exploitation of such technology, first among large corporations, and most recently among medium and small companies as well. It has attracted much attention in the practitioner literature, especially about the capacity of software houses and consulting firms to cooperate in such a way that makes them capable for bringing software innovation to the market. In this sense, this research aimed to identify the mechanisms of alignment of divergent interests among large global consulting firms and global software houses for the introduction of new technologies. It was designed as a qualitative, exploratory and descriptive research, given the gap in the literature on the abovementioned topic, and used the multiple case studies methodology, bringing two cases chosen by convenience that involve six different companies, each of them having one consulting firm, one software house and one customer. The data gathering was based on structured interviews and documents both publicly accessible and accessed upon authorization, having a categorical thematic analysis using predefined categories, along with a cross-case analysis. The research has brought to light 11 mechanisms, both formal and informal, that promote the alignment between software houses and consulting firms in their adaptation processes. In addition to the contributions that complement the existing literature, it has found some elements that contradict it, such as the use of hierarchical escalation, in opposition to mediation or arbitration; or the diversity of the corporate strategy among partners in a co-innovation venture, what was meant to have only product leadership kind of constituents. The research s raw material has just scratched the surface of the complex and dynamic universe of the abovementioned actors. At the end of the paper, there are some reflections that cast possibilities for both exploitation of the material in statu quo, or its expansion in order to broadly understand the strategic alliances relationship among firms of the enterprise application software segment. The collaborative innovation mechanisms, for instance, deserve study under the product development strategy pointof- view, in order to provide practitioners with substance for their R&D planning and policies. The interdependence between software houses and consulting firms is presented as a key factor for longevity and stability of alliances, which on one hand brings a major contribution to the literature in the search for a consistent explanation xii about the durable existence of hybrid organization forms in the markets, and on the other hand gives rise to the need for detailed analysis of the interdependence degree, in order to support the planning and management of the most appropriate governance forms in the process of adaptation. Starting from a better understanding of the mechanisms of interest alignment in contractual strategic alliances in particular on the relationship between software houses and consulting firms a new research agenda can be set for the discovery of the alliance relationship dimensions among the firms in the software industry. / A crescente adoção de softwares empresariais no Brasil tem levado o mercado nacional a um nível mais elevado de maturidade no uso e exploração de tais tecnologias, inicialmente entre as grandes corporações, e mais recentemente também pelas médias e pequenas empresas. Tal adoção tem atraído muita atenção da literatura profissional, especialmente sobre a capacidade de alinhamento de interesses divergentes entre as empresas desenvolvedoras de software e as de consultoria de tal forma a torna-las capazes de trazer inovação tecnológica para o mercado. Nesse sentido, a pesquisa objetivou identificar os mecanismos de alinhamento de interesses divergentes entre as grandes empresas de consultoria globais e desenvolvedoras globais de software para a introdução de novas tecnologias. Para tanto, ela foi desenhada como qualitativa exploratória descritiva, dada a lacuna que existe sobre esse tema na literatura, e utilizou a metodologia de estudo de casos múltiplos, trazendo dois casos, escolhidos por conveniência, envolvendo seis empresas distintas. Cada caso conta com uma consultoria, uma desenvolvedora de software e um cliente. A coleta de dados se baseou em entrevistas estruturadas e documentos de acesso público e de acesso autorizado, e sua análise foi feita de forma temática categorial com o uso de categorias definidas a priori e com o cruzamento dos casos. O trabalho trouxe à tona 11 mecanismos de ajustes de interesse que existem na relação de alianças entre empresas desenvolvedoras de software e as consultorias de implementação, tanto formais quanto informais, que são usados nos seus processos de adaptação. O caminho de identificação dos mecanismos acabou por encontrar, também, contrapontos com a teoria existente, como o uso da escalação hierárquica em conflitos ao invés de mediação ou arbitragem, e sobre o perfil dos participantes de alianças para inovação, nas quais os processos observados contam tanto com empresas que têm estratégia corporativa de liderança em produto, quanto com empresas de estratégia orientada ao cliente, em oposição à teoria que sugere a prevalência das empresas com estratégia de liderança em produto. A matéria-prima angariada para essa pesquisa apenas resvalou na superfície do universo complexo e dinâmico desses atores. Foram colocadas algumas reflexões finais que lançam possibilidades tanto para a exploração dela in statu quo, ou de sua ampliação, para o entendimento mais abrangente do relacionamento de alianças estratégicas entre empresas do segmento de softwares empresariais. Os mecanismos de inovação x colaborativa, por exemplo, merecem estudo sob o ponto de vista da estratégia de desenvolvimento de produtos, de forma a auxiliar os executivos no planejamento e políticas de P&D. A interdependência que existe entre desenvolvedoras de software e consultorias se apresenta como fator chave da longevidade e estabilidade das alianças, o que por um lado traz um a contribuição importante para a literatura, na busca por uma explicação consistente sobre a existência duradoura das formas organizacionais híbridas nos mercados, e por outro faz emergir a necessidade da análise detalhada dos graus de interdependência existentes, a fim de subsidiar o planejamento e a gestão das formas de governança mais adequadas no processo de adaptação dos parceiros. A partir de uma melhor compreensão dos mecanismos de alinhamento de interesses nas alianças estratégicas contratuais em específico sobre a relação entre as empresas desenvolvedoras de software e as consultorias nessa indústria poderá ser aberta uma nova agenda de pesquisa sobre as dimensões do relacionamento entre as empresas na indústria de software.

Recent research has suggested that interest alignment, i.e., the degree to which members of an organization are motivated to behave in line with organizational goals, is a source of competitive advantage that can generate rents for the firm (Gottschlag and Zollo, 2007). Drawing on agency theory, this dissertation tests whether the interest alignment premise manifests itself differently in the strategic behavior of family-controlled firms when compared to their nonfamily peers. In particular, for firms in the S&P 500, I evaluate the results of two important strategic policies; mergers and acquisitions, as well as CEO compensation practices. In studying acquisitions made by family and nonfamily firms in the S&P 500 index from 1992-2006, I find that family firms are more careful when embarking on actions leading to mergers than non-family firms, as evidenced by their selection of smaller targets and targets who are in related businesses. I also find that there is a preponderance of cash purchases by family firms that does not vary with market movements and that completion times for merger transactions are shorter than for non family firms. The care and concern with which family-controlled firms choose their "mates" translates into higher stock returns when compared with non-family firms. Overall, I believe that family-controlled firms derive value from their merger and acquisition strategy. With regard to CEO compensation practices, I find that family firms provide strong incentives to the CEO for superior performance but pay significantly lower than nonfamily firms in terms of both salary and stock-based pay. The pay-for-performance sensitivity between annual stock returns and total compensation is significantly greater for family firms in general, and for family CEOs when compared with compensation of CEOs in nonfamily firms. The pay-for-performance sensitivity is in turn positively related to firm performance, suggesting that firms with greater pay-for-performance sensitivity (family controlled firms) also perform better. The analyses in my thesis thus illustrate that family-controlled firms and non-family firms in the S&P 500 differ in their strategic decision-making. It would be fair to say that family firms have longer investment horizons and give deliberate thought to expending resources whether for acquisitions or for CEO pay, and may suffer lower agency costs than nonfamily firms due to family governance (and public monitoring) which may lead to their relative superior performance. This dissertation finds that each acquisition made by a family controlled firm generates an extra return of 0.50% when compared with a nonfamily firm, and family controlled firms earn 0.50% every year directly attributable to pay-for-performance sensitivity. The study thus underlines and reiterates the importance of instilling the long-term view in the management of all firms, lowering agency costs, and aligning the interests of managers with those of stockholders for superior financial performance / Ph. D.