Luk Ching Kit. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 132-134). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Chapter Chapter 1 --- Internalism and Externalism --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- An Internalist's Tale and the Theme of this Thesis --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- Varieties of Internalism and Externalism --- p.2 / Chapter A. --- Varieties of internalism --- p.3 / Chapter B. --- Varieties of Externalism --- p.5 / Chapter 1.3 --- The Nature of Internalism-Externalism Debate --- p.8 / Chapter 1.4 --- Looking Forward --- p.12 / Chapter Chapter 2 --- The Rejection of Humean Internalism --- p.14 / Chapter 2.1 --- Humean Internalism and the Humean conception of Normative Reasons --- p.14 / Chapter 2.2 --- Hume's Theory on the Role of Reason and the Justification of Normative Reasons --- p.16 / Chapter 2.3 --- "Williams's Attack on Desire-independent Normative Reasons, Two Arguments for Williams and Their Weaknesses" --- p.22 / Chapter 2.4 --- Two Anti-Humean Arguments on the Justification of Normative Reasons --- p.30 / Chapter A. --- Nagel on Desires and the Justifications of Normative Reasons --- p.30 / Chapter B. --- Scanlon on the Role of Desires in the Justification of Normative Reasons and My Modifications --- p.34 / Chapter 2.5 --- The Strength of Desires and the Mechanism of Decision Making in the Humean and Anti-Humean models --- p.42 / Chapter 2.6 --- The Rejection of Humean Internalism and a Remark --- p.45 / Chapter Chapter 3 --- The Rejection of Pure Ascription Internalism --- p.48 / Chapter 3.1 --- PAI and the Nagelian Motivation Theory --- p.49 / Chapter 3.2 --- The Humean Motivation Theory and the Assessment of the Nagelian Motivation Theory --- p.52 / Chapter 3.3 --- Argument for the Humean Motivation Theory 一 The Direction of Fit --- p.59 / Chapter A. --- "Brief Analysis of Intentional Action, Willing, Goal, Intention and Motivating Reason" --- p.60 / Chapter B. --- Direction of Fit and the Humean Motivation Theory --- p.62 / Chapter 3.4 --- Four Arguments against the Humean Motivation Theory --- p.64 / Chapter A. --- Special Nature of Moral Beliefs --- p.65 / Chapter B. --- The Non-teleological Nature of Moral Actions --- p.70 / Chapter C. --- Argument of Intellectualized Motivation --- p.73 / Chapter D. --- Argument of Irrationality --- p.78 / Chapter 3.5 --- The Rejection of Pure Ascription Internalism --- p.84 / Chapter Chapter 4 --- The Rejection of Rational Internalism --- p.86 / Chapter 4.1 --- Rational Internalism --- p.86 / Chapter 4.2 --- Argument of Incoherence --- p.88 / Chapter A. --- Exposition --- p.88 / Chapter B. --- Criticism --- p.92 / Chapter 4.3 --- Proper-grasp Argument --- p.105 / Chapter 4.4 --- Virtuous Person Argument --- p.110 / Chapter 4.5 --- The Rejection of Rational Internalism --- p.117 / Chapter Chapter 5 --- After the Rejection of Rational Internalism --- p.119 / Chapter 5.1 --- Two Problems of Rational Internalism --- p.120 / Chapter 5.2 --- Rejection of Rational Internalism and Appropriateness of Blame --- p.124 / Chapter 5.3 --- Weak Externalism and Morality --- p.129 / Bibliography --- p.132

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2007. / The entire dissertation/thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file (which also appears in the research.pdf); a non-technical general description, or public abstract, appears in the public.pdf file. Title from title screen of research.pdf file (viewed on November 26, 2007) Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

This thesis engages with epistemology???s value problem. That is, is knowledge epistemically preferable to true belief? If so, how is that the case? The issue under discussion is whether epistemic justification can account for a value discrepancy between true belief and knowledge. First of all, the contours of the justificatory landscape are presented???in particular, the division between externalist and internalist styles. The thesis then considers whether solely truth-directed justification (which includes externalism) can possibly account for a value unique to knowledge. The preliminary conclusion is that solely truth-directed justification cannot solve the value problem. A discussion of internalism then ensues. The discussion does not focus explicitly on which benefits internalism may offer in terms of value; instead, the focus is on whether internalism qua internalism can solve the value problem. It is concluded that, if internalism is the sole provider of the value of knowledge (above that of true belief), then epistemology must forgo the belief that knowledge is preferable to a Gettiered belief. I do not accept such a concession; therefore, I reject the thesis that internalism exclusively solves the value problem. Throughout the thesis, the importance of externalism to epistemology becomes apparent. This feature invites a reconsideration of the value of externalism (in particular, of reliabilism). The thesis closes by reconsidering the value of reliabilism and concludes that the value problem can be solved, but only by an appeal to externalist justification.

This thesis engages with epistemology???s value problem. That is, is knowledge epistemically preferable to true belief? If so, how is that the case? The issue under discussion is whether epistemic justification can account for a value discrepancy between true belief and knowledge. First of all, the contours of the justificatory landscape are presented???in particular, the division between externalist and internalist styles. The thesis then considers whether solely truth-directed justification (which includes externalism) can possibly account for a value unique to knowledge. The preliminary conclusion is that solely truth-directed justification cannot solve the value problem. A discussion of internalism then ensues. The discussion does not focus explicitly on which benefits internalism may offer in terms of value; instead, the focus is on whether internalism qua internalism can solve the value problem. It is concluded that, if internalism is the sole provider of the value of knowledge (above that of true belief), then epistemology must forgo the belief that knowledge is preferable to a Gettiered belief. I do not accept such a concession; therefore, I reject the thesis that internalism exclusively solves the value problem. Throughout the thesis, the importance of externalism to epistemology becomes apparent. This feature invites a reconsideration of the value of externalism (in particular, of reliabilism). The thesis closes by reconsidering the value of reliabilism and concludes that the value problem can be solved, but only by an appeal to externalist justification.

Thesis (Revise). / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (doctoral)--Freiburg im Breisgau, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [245]-253) and indexes.

Undergraduate honors paper--Mount Holyoke College, 2007. Dept. of Philosophy. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 106-107).