This study examines the possible impact of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) on economic development in Africa. Launched in October of 2013, the initiative was established to alleviate trade and investment bottlenecks between the more than 65 countries that are signed on to it as member states. In 2017, it became the centrepiece of China's foreign economic policy and the filter through which all of its commercial ties with external actors would be pursued, framed, or determined. It is expected that when fully operationalized, the initiative will restructure China's ties with other countries. The study analyses the possible repercussions of that restructuring, focusing on its relationship with Africa. Since consolidating their commercial relationship in the early 1990s, China has played a vital role in developing Africa's economy. With the operationalisation of the BRI, its capacity or interest to maintain that role will be modified. Depending on the changes that emerge, and given its deep economic reliance on Beijing, Africa must prepare for both positive and negative implications for its economies. The study examines these implications. It notes, among others, the upgrades Africa stands to gain to its industrial structure and business environment. It also highlights potential losses, including the hit that Africa's revenue earnings might take and the heightened competition that local industries will be exposed to because of the liberalisation that the BRI pursues. Ultimately, the study advises that what outcomes arise – be they positive or negative – will depend on how well or sufficiently the continent positions itself to moderate the negative impact of the BRI on its economies. In the concluding chapter, the study makes recommendations on how Africa might facilitate or magnify projected benefits stemming from the BRI.

What role does regional organisation play when peace and security is at stake in the region? Although several literatures on the Lesotho conflict of 1998 have been written, the intervention by Southern African Development Community does not answer the question if the intervention was carried out in compliance with the SADC Treaty and Protocols on Peace and Security. The effectiveness of a regional organisation in resolving conflicts, strengthens regionalism and create environment conducive for economic growth and political stability. While the Lesotho conflict in 1998 was resolved through the use of armed forces, it posed challenges for an empirical approach, in that regard the qualitative approach was followed to obtain information from the existing literature, journals and magazines on the conflict resolution and management. The Lesotho conflict of 1998 serves as a good case study to illustrate the role of SADC on peace and security and the impact on regional integration. In order to comprehend and make efficient analysis of the impact of the SADC interventions in the Lesotho conflict 1998, the theories and approaches that define the characteristics of actors and behavioural patterns leading to the integration while some might provide strategies for conflict resolution were considered. The discussion on normative and institutional framework of SADC on peace and security, serves as a platform to analyse the SADC's Organ on Politics, Defence, Security and Cooperation. The study further analyses the nature and the root causes of conflict and the role players such as the military forces from member states in conflict resolution and management. The study concludes that SADC's intervention in Lesotho conflict 1998 was without full mandate of member states as the decision was not recommended from the cluster Ministerial Committee to be approved by the Summit or the Organ on Troika. The armed forces that intervened were from South Africa and Botswana whose interest did not represent the region as whole. However, it is argued that when the state's peace and security is at stake, the choices are limited and therefore it could be justified to take any action to resolve the conflict without necessarily following all the procedures, and that simply justify the intervention by the South Africa National Defence Force in resolving the Lesotho conflict in 1998.

Includes bibliographical references (leaves 72-81). / The study analyses the role of NGOs in rural community development in Africa, with a focus on Gwembe district in Zambia. The 1990s were a turning point in the development practices in Africa. This era saw the emergence of NGOs as a preferred mode of channeling development assistance by the donor community. NGOs were efficient, accountable, and closer to the people. They were able to make the communities own the development process. The state and its bureaucracy was vilified, demonised and condemned as incapable of service delivery to the rural poor. The study used World Vision International Zambia operations and interventions in the Gwembe District. It endeavored to assess the extent to which NGOs have lived up to the development promises of the 1990s. Key to the study was the investigation into whether the communities own the development projects. The study reviewed literature on the emergence of NGOs as important player in development in third world countries. In this review the study learned that the strengths of the NGOs was in that they were community focused, participatory, democratic, community oriented, cost effective and better at reaching the poorest. The major weaknesses of NGOs in Africa come from the fact they are dependent on donor money for their survival. They are a parasite to the poor. They do not care about the causes they champion. They produce low quality returns; they are engulfed in self-obfuscation, spin control and outright lying to justify their works. The NGOs are elite driven and do not care about the poor.

In the post-independence period, Angola's political economy has been shaped by the petroleum industry. After gaining independence in 1975, Angola turned authoritarian and subsequently, Sonangol, a state-owned oil company, was created. Once established, authoritarianism in Angola persisted for a long period, with oil playing a major role. This study investigates how the state's ownership of Sonangol has reinforced authoritarianism in Angola. Theoretically, it builds on the ideas of the resource curse hypothesis, which refers to the adverse effects of abundant non-renewable resources on a country's socio-economic and political outcomes. In addition to these findings of an adverse impact of non-renewable resources, this study argues that the type of resource ownership matters. Specifically, state ownership adversely affects political regimes. The rentier state model and the centralized political economy model of the resource curse are applied to investigate how the interaction between state ownership and petroleum revenue has reinforced authoritarian persistence in Angola. Building on Ross' quantitative cross-national findings of this interaction, this study uses process tracing research method to provide an in-depth investigation of Angola. There are two central findings. First, state ownership (with control) in the oil sector enabled the Angolan state to capture petroleum rents directly. This direct access to rents granted the state autonomy from having to formulate its goals under the scrutiny of its citizens, and thus undermined the statesociety bargaining dynamic. Second, the incumbent's discretionary power over the distribution of petroleum rents as patronage increased the value of staying in power and provided sufficient incentives for authoritarian practices to persist.

The invention of the steamship had a widespread effect on both the world of trade and military conflict. However, current scholarship does not give sufficient credit to how important this piece of technology was. While not the sole cause of victory in colonial warfare, nor a guarantee of victory, the steamship was an indispensable tool in the expansion of colonialism in the 19th century. Allowing for the tactics of gunboat diplomacy, lightning fast wars, and vast improvements in logistics, the path of European colonialism was shaped by the steamship. In the Anglo-Burmese Wars, First Anglo-Sino War, and the Perry Expedition steamships were used to great effect in gaining favorable concessions and terms of trade for Europeans. Specifically, steamships allowed European forces to penetrate far further inland than was previously possible. Without such penetration, the large, centralized capitals of Ava, Peking, and Edo could not be threatened. Facing political challenges at home, the humiliation and danger of submission to foreign will had to be balanced by sufficient threat to these governments' very seats of power. Connected to this was improvements in logistics and the health of troops would see the cost of conducting these wars to a point of cost-effectiveness necessary. These conflicts were largely undertaken in an attempt to create new sources of revenue for European countries, and the steamship was invaluable in reducing the cost of waging war to an acceptable level. Lack of political unity and centrally located governments on the Asian side increased the efficacy of steamships. While not an immutable guarantee of victory, the steamship molded the type of imperialism seen and thus the world we know today. / A Thesis submitted to the Program in Asian Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts. / Fall Semester, 2012. / October 25, 2012. / First Anglo-Burmese War, First Anglo-Sino War, Perry Expedition, Second Anglo-Burmese War, Steamships, Technology in colonialism / Includes bibliographical references. / Jonathan Grant, Professor Directing Thesis; Claudia Liebeskind, Committee Member; Charles Upchurch, Committee Member.

Resolving ethnic conflicts is no easy task. In the 1990s, civil wars engulfed Somalia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Cambodia, Yugoslavia...the list goes on. In the Balkans, the disintegration of Josip Tito's pan-Slavic dream destabilized the security of the region and relations between the people living in the Yugoslav republics. Minorities stranded on the other side of the border following the secession of the former Yugoslav republics were skeptical of the new governments in their internal policies fueled by nationalistic overtones. This caused a backlash of self-determined autonomy of minorities within the newly seceded republics The paper provides a theoretical application of crisis bargaining to explain the wars in Yugoslavia caused by the commitment issues among the dyadic couple. Crisis bargaining between civil war combatants is hindered by incredible commitments, issues of uncertainty and lack of third-party guarantees to safeguard ceasefires and military disengagement. Parties to a civil conflict are therefore unable to successfully commit to peaceful negotiations during periods of heightened vulnerability. Commitment issues arise during such periods which cause prolonged fighting for better position at the bargaining table, and are most likely to prevail in the absence of credible guarantees and honest communication. / A Thesis submitted to the International Affairs Program in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master in Science. / Fall Semester, 2012. / November 6, 2012. / bargaining, civil war negotiations, commitment problem, credible commitments, third-party guarantees, Yugoslavia / Includes bibliographical references. / Mark Souva, Professor Directing Thesis; Will H. Moore, Committee Member; Megan Shannon, Committee Member.

Progressive Arab nationalism was built upon a concept of emancipation. Emancipating states from imperialism, peasants from feudalism and creating truly independent and sovereign states. From 1952 to 1958, Arab nationalists aimed to free themselves from Western imperialism created by the presence of Western institutions, regimes and organizations in their lands that were used to project power and protect economic interests. The geographies and politics of Arab states were created as a method for Western powers to maintain their interests in the region. One such case was the concentration of ownership of land within a feudal class that served the world market. Progressive Arab nationalist institutions such as governments, political parties, newspa-pers, radio programs, schools and social movements were the motor of social change in the tradi-tional Arab monarchies. These institutions represented civil society the domain of the new Arab "effendiyya." Starting during the 1930s, Arab civil society fought a war of position against the hegemonic power of the traditional Arab monarchies and ultimately succeeded in establishing progressive Arab nationalist hegemony in Egypt, Jordan and Iraq / A Thesis submitted to the Program in International Affairs in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts. / Spring Semester, 2012. / April 2, 2012. / Arab Nationalism, British Empire, Effendiyya, Gamal Abdul Nasser, Land Reform / Includes bibliographical references. / Peter Garretson, Professor Directing Thesis; Michael Creswell, Committee Member; Mark Souva, Committee Member.

Was aviation a true Soviet success story or did it remain dependent on imported technology in order to advance? Aircraft and aviators were frequently occurring images in Soviet culture. What purpose did this significant social role serve, and how did it evolve over time? What was the relationship between the state of Soviet aviation technology and the message conveyed through its public representations? In this study, aviation serves as a thematic guide that enables the political objectives, material realities, and public perceptions of technological progress in the Soviet Union to be seen in a new light. Employing an innovative approach that blends a thoughtful examination of the development and structure of the Soviet aviation industry with analysis of the public representations of aviation as seen through Soviet cinema, this research reveals a dynamic story of the changing views on the role of technology in social progress. Under Stalin, new aircraft and the heroic pilots who had mastered the skies were heralded as beacons of progress and proof of the legitimacy of Soviet governance. In the early days of the Cold War, Soviet aviation technology made massive strides, achieving near parity with the west while beginning to make meaningful contributions to the state of the art in aerospace. However, Khrushchev's reorientation of industry toward rocketry depleted the resources available to Soviet aircraft designers. As aviation technology faded from preeminence, Soviet society reevaluated the cultural representations of the aviator. This once heroic figure was now constrained by an inescapable fate. Aviation and the promise of the aviator were brought down to Earth. / A Thesis submitted to the Program in Russian and East European Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts. / Summer Semester, 2013. / May 28, 2013. / Aerospace, Aviation, Soviet cinema, Soviet Union, Technology / Includes bibliographical references. / Ronald E. Doel, Professor Directing Thesis; Jonathan A. Grant, Committee Member; Robert L. Romanchuk, Committee Member.

Only a fraction of armed forces in Vietnam made the "other war" – the war for hearts and minds – their primary struggle. These were the U.S. Marines comprising the Combined Action Platoons, who lived and worked in individual hamlets, trained local security forces, made civic improvements, and sought to secure the war's objectives on the lowest community level. The program's scope and achievements were limited; while 85,000 Marines occupied Vietnam at the conflict's apogee, CAP Marines never numbered more than 2,500. However, in an age of renewed interest in "small wars" and pacification, the CAP program is a remarkable subject of study. This study re-examines the CAP program with two basic goals. First, it argues that the program represented a departure from the U.S. government's conventional wisdom regarding pacification and counterinsurgency operations, and this departure was consistent with the Marines' institutional traditions of flexibility, non-conformity and strategic innovation. The Marine Corps' identity as an army-navy hybrid gave it a starring role in America's so-called "small wars" of pacification abroad; its diminutive size allowed members to put a premium on open thought and political involvement that is rare in most military institutions. Grounded in these Marine traditions, the CAP program originated as an act of insubordination – as military innovation almost always does. Second, this study examines the CAP program's potential exportability, its resemblance to modern counterparts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and its grand strategic implications. The Marines' experience in Vietnam suggests that while the CAP concept marks a significant advance in counterinsurgent theory, it still assumes a long, expensive occupation that carries numerous caveats as well as large – and largely predictable – risks. These risks limit the usefulness of combined action to selected political and geographical ground states: it is useful in an Afghanistan, but probably not in an Iraq. An empirically honest understanding of pacification and its hazards can help policymakers distinguish between justifiable future missions and imprudent, costly gambles. They will recognize the difference, as B. H. Liddell Hart put it, "between grand strategy and grandiose stupidity." / A Thesis Submitted to the Department of International Affairs in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Masters of Arts. / Spring Semester, 2007. / April 4, 2007. / Counterinsurgency, Insurgent, Vietnam, Military, Pacification, Corps, Marines, Strategy / Includes bibliographical references. / Michael Creswell, Professor Directing Thesis; Max Paul Friedman, Committee Member; Mark Souva, Committee Member.

This thesis discusses an area of key interest in modern-day Iraq – the Kurdish military, or peshmerga. Translated as "those who face death", the peshmerga have become a staple of Kurdish culture in the last 100 years. Officially organized by Mustafa Barzani in 1943, the peshmerga have come to represent the Kurdish nationalist movement, specifically in Iraq. Unfortunately, there have been few detailed works at length on the peshmerga and their link to the Kurdish struggle. Throughout this paper this link is shown in conjunction with the development and organization of Kurdish military forces. This thesis focuses on the peshmerga from the 19th century to 2003. As mentioned, the peshmerga began as an organized force in 1943. Prior to this date, Kurdish fighters had participated in many regional uprisings against the governments of Iraq, Iran, and Turkey. Many of these rebellions were tribal or religiously organized and had little to do with creating an autonomous or independent Kurdish state. After his own regional rebellion in the late 1930s, Mustafa Barzani and his brother, Shaykh Ahmad Barzani, were sentenced to exile by the Iraqi government. Attempting to marginalize Barzani rebelliousness, the Iraqi regime moved the Barzanis to various Iraqi cities. During their exile, the Barzanis, especially Mustafa Barzani, were exposed to the nationalist ideas of urban Kurdish intellectuals. After his return in 1943, Mustafa Barzani realized a push against the Iraqi government would have a better chance of succeeding if coupled with a military force guided by strict rules and regulations. After their creation, the peshmerga played key roles in both the Kurdish Republic of 1947 in Mahabad, Iran and the Kurdish-Iraqi War of the 1960s. Between these two eras, however, was a 12-year exile for many of the peshmerga, including Mustafa Barzani, in the Soviet Union. This paper uses 1958, the year of peshmerga return, as a way to divide the developmental years of the peshmerga from its role as a cohesive military force in modern-day Iraq. Although other political bodies emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, Barzani and his peshmerga remained the internal and international face of Kurdish nationalism. After his death in 1979, the peshmerga continued to fight for Kurdish nationalism, albeit under the banner of Barzani's Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the newer Party for a United Kurdistan (PUK), led by former Barzani follower Jalal Talabani. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, peshmerga for both parties were forced to choose between alliances with each other, with regional powers, or with world powers such as the United States. Treaties, agreements, and alliances were made and broken as many of the outside governments used the Kurdish military groups as means to their own ends. In 2003 the peshmerga were able to play a key role in the overthrow of the Saddam Hussayn regime. Through their cooperation with U.S. military forces, years of Kurdish struggle were rewarded and they were included in the new inclusive Iraqi government. Although this thesis ends with the conclusion of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, a brief epilogue discusses the future of the peshmerga and the role it and its leaders are having in the new Iraqi government. / A Thesis Submitted to the Department of International Affairs in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts. / Fall Semester, 2005. / October 28, 2005. / Barzani, Ottoman, Peshmerga, Iraq, Kurds, Military / Includes bibliographical references. / Peter Garretson, Professor Directing Thesis; Burton Atkins, Committee Member; Jonathan Grant, Committee Member.