This thesis provides an in-depth and detailed examination of China-EU relations between 2001 and 2013. Specifically, it investigates the collaboration on Climate Change and Renewable Energy between China and the European Union. It departs from the conventional academic literature in the field, which has treated Sino-European relations as bilateral ties between Beijing and Brussels, as well as between China and the national capitals of the EU member states. Instead, it studies Sino-European relations by focusing on individual institutions and corporate organisations. To achieve this, this thesis investigates the foreign policy formation and execution process in Beijing. It offers a detailed examination of the relations between elements of the Chinese Communist Party, as the ultimate decision maker, the Chinese governmental institutions and the Chinese companies involved in renewable and climate sectors. It analyses the extent to which changes in foreign policy priorities and the growing numbers of players involved in Beijing’s foreign policy making process have altered China’s EU policy. It also investigates individual actors on the European side. In particular, it focuses on whether the European actors recognise changes in China’s foreign policy agenda as well as whether they have responded effectively to shifts in the institutional balance of power in Beijing. It uses Sino-European collaborations on Climate Change and Renewable Energy as case studies to answer the key research question “To what extent are China-EU relations pre-dominantly determined by the interests of a diverse range of foreign policy actors?” It thus identifies who shapes the bargaining process; on which policy each actor bargains with, and the outcomes of the relevant bargaining process. The thesis was conducted using qualitative research methods, especially a large number of in-depth interviews, many of them with members of the commercial and political elite, and drawing the secondary sources to corroborate the interview results.

This thesis explores the advocacy strategies and influence of interest groups in EU foreign policy. It examines in particular the impact of institutional factors on the strategies and lobbying outcomes. Conceptually, it contributes to the literature on interest groups and lobbying in the EU and to the study of non-state actor participation in international organisations. Conceptualising EU foreign policy as multi-level and multi-pillar, the study inquires into the relationship between policy regime (ranging from the Community method to the intergovernmental method, as these predominate in different areas of EU external relations) and the degree and type of interest group influence. To this end the thesis compares three examples of EU foreign policy: visa liberalisation towards the Eastern neighbours; sanctions towards Belarus; and CSDP missions in Georgia and Palestine. The research reveals that interest groups engage in multi-level lobbying even in those policy areas that are ruled by the intergovernmental method. Intergovernmentalism limits formal access to policymakers, but groups and policymakers build channels for informal access. To some extent contrary to the predications of established theories, this allows interest groups to exert some degree of influence even on policy dossiers in which intergovernmental arrangements prevail. In such policy domains, groups opposing change do not always succeed, despite the veto opportunities that intergovernmentalism provides. While this is a significant finding, the thesis also notes how interest group influence is most commonly exerted upon relatively technical issues and at later stages of the policy cycle. Moreover, the study emphasises that institutional structures are not the only relevant factor in explaining group influence. Group-level characteristics, including material resources, condition groups’ ability to adapt to complex decision-making in EU foreign policy. The thesis concludes that a combination of factors is required to capture the influence of interest groups over EU foreign policy.

<p> Within political discourse, tropes of ability and disability are rhetorically applied in a way that stigmatizes particular individuals or groups by associating the targets of such rhetoric with preexisting normative perspectives framing able-bodiedness as valuable, and disability as undesirable. By analyzing Brenda Connors&rsquo; diagnosis of Putin as having Asperger&rsquo;s syndrome, I argue the language used in her Pentagon funded report constitutes a form of dis/ableist polemical rhetoric. Incorporating Michel Foucault&rsquo;s scholarship concerning biopolitics, governmentality, and madness, as well as relevant critical disability studies scholarship, I outline how an instance of polemical discourse can invoke disablist and ablest discourses for polemical rhetoric. Ultimately, I argue that dis/ableist polemical rhetoric outlines the role that categories of ability and disability play in international relations and domestic political discourse, which I suggest has important theoretical implications for political communication, critical disability studies, and Foucault scholarship.</p><p>

The mercenary profession is arguably the second oldest profession in the world. The context surrounding the mercenary soldier has changed and evolved throughout time while the practice itself has remained almost the same. The mercenary still exists today and although the current international environment has changed the way the profession is viewed, a mercenary is still a soldier who accepts compensation for services rendered. The end of the Cold War proved to be a benchmark in the mercenary trade. The cessation of the rivalry between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, meant that many smaller countries had to now fend for themselves. The military and monetary aid that had flowed into allied countries from the superpowers ceased. The end of the Cold War created a space for mercenary companies to fill. Mercenarism was growing once again. There has been an increase in the literature on mercenaries since the Cold War. However, there has been little focus on the change from mercenaries to private military companies (PMCs) and their evolving role in international relations. Most of the literature focuses on case studies but lacks an in-depth exploration of the roles PMCs play. This study explores the rise of PMCs since the Cold War, focusing on the changing international environment in which non-state actors (NSAs), and PMCs in particular, have grown in prominence. The roles played by PMCs have also changed from the old stereotype of mercenary warfare to a range of activities that include actual combat as well as logistical support and peacekeeping. / Prof. D. J. Geldenhuys

This thesis investigates struggles for meanings and social understandings of Europe taking place through cultural institutions, festival sites, and art projects. I claim that culture is a social field where meanings of Europe are made. I argue that meanings of Europe that emerge in these cultural sites are not prior or given, but are a result of struggles between the actors involved. They These meanings are to different degrees particular and autonomous, depending on the proximity of a given cultural site to the political structures of the state and the EU. This research identifies that actors who construct Europe’s meaning do so according to common patterns. Europe’s meanings evoke notions of unity – it is a symbol of coming together. At the same time, what different actors mean by Europe is an articulation of their particular ideals circumstances and aspirations, rooted in their direct contexts. In other words, in culture, there is but one Europe. There is not one Europe. This is confirmed by how Europe is understood by the immediate audiences of these cultural sites. It is perceived as relevant only when translated through familiar contexts – specific, local or national – and only then it is embraced. The background of the analysis is the significance of aesthetic culture in modernity, its role in making the nation, and its social imagining. This thesis examines the ways in which culture today demonstrates a similar capacity in regard to Europe, albeit in a micro scale. The methods employed are discourse and audience reception analysis, as well as participant observation. The empirical investigation comprises of a microanalysis of sites of cultural production. The case studies selected for this analysis, drawing on studies of cultural nationalism, include an online cultural outlet, an independent film festival and a transnational cultural festival, as well as a series of state commissioned contemporary artworks, all of which claim to be European in one way or another.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a product of the Cold War through which its members organized their military forces for the purpose of collective defense against the common threat of Soviet-backed aggression. Employing the terminology of regime theory, the creation of NATO can be viewed as the introduction of an international security regime. Throughout the Cold War, NATO member states preserved their commitment to mutual defense while increasingly engaging in activities aimed at overcoming the division of Europe and promoting regional stability. The end of the Cold War has served as the catalyst for a new period of regime change as the Alliance introduced elements of a collective security regime by expanding its mandate to address new security challenges and reorganizing both its political and military organizational structures. This research involves an interpretive analysis of NATO's evolution applying ideal theoretical constructs associated with distinct approaches to regime analysis. The process of regime change is investigated over several periods throughout the history of the Alliance in an effort to understand the Alliance's changing commitment to collective security. This research involves a review of regime theory literature, consisting of an examination of primary source documentation, including official documents and treaties, as well as a review of numerous secondary sources. This review is organized around a typology of power-based, organization-based, and norm-based approaches to regime analysis. This dissertation argues that the process of regime change within NATO is best understood by examining factors associated with multiple theoretical constructs. Relevant factors provide insights into the practice of collective security among NATO member states within Europe, while accounting for the inability of the NATO allies to build on the experience gained within Europe to play a more central role in operations outside of this region. This research contributes to a greater understanding of the nature of international regimes and the process of regime change, while offering recommendations aimed at increasing NATO's viability as a source of greater security and more meaningful international cooperation.

Since the end of the Cold War, the European Union (EU) has become a prominent sender of international sanctions. Most of its sanctions regimes have been imposed to address human rights violations and democratic shortcomings in autocratic regimes. While these developments have attracted an increased attention by academics and practitioners alike, not much is known about the underlying factors that trigger the EU’s decision to impose sanctions in the very first place. Using a new database of EU democratic sanctions between 1989 and 2010, this thesis develops a theoretical model that shows that the imposition of sanctions is the result of a strategic bargaining process between a sender and a target country. I argue that sanctions are only one possible outcome of this process, and claim that the likelihood that sanctions are imposed depends, to a large extent, on the target country’s decision to comply with the sender before sanctions are imposed or, alternatively, on its determination to ignore the sender’s threat of sanctions and resist its pressure. I show that the target’s decision to comply or resist is the result of an endogenous policy formation process, which is determined by the target regime’s domestic institutional setting. Different types of institutions (regime types) impose varying degrees of constraints on the ruler’s margin of manoeuvre and shape her policy choices vis-à-vis the threat and imposition of sanctions. I demonstrate that regimes that face no domestic constraints and rely on a small winning coalition of supporters are likely to be strong and willing to resist the sender’s pressure, thereby “self-selecting” themselves into sanctions. By the same token, regimes that face many domestic constraints are vulnerable to sanctions, and face incentives to comply with the sender before sanctions are imposed. My thesis makes several contributions to the literature. First, it provides a theoretical explanation of how domestic institutions matter in the imposition of sanctions, and identifies a set of conditions under which sanctions are more likely (not) to be imposed. Second, it empirically demonstrates the presence of selection effects in the study of sanctions imposition, and shows that these are channelled through the target regime’s domestic institutions. Finally, my findings have relevant policy implications, as they suggest that sanctions are more likely to be effective against certain types of targets. I show that sanctions are more likely to succeed against politically constrained regimes at the threat stage or early during a sanctions episode, whilst they are likely to fail against highly authoritarian regimes which rule free of domestic constraints.

In February 2008, Kosovo declared independence. It was a highly controversial move that divided international opinion. While the United States and many EU members quickly recognised the new state, many other countries, including Russia and China and several EU members, did not. Even today, Kosovo remains a contested state. Although Germany recognised Kosovo quickly, it nevertheless expressed concerns over the failed international efforts to reach an agreement. This thesis analyses Germany’s decision to recognise Kosovo as independent despite the multilateral disagreement. It traces the position of Germany on Kosovo from the early 1990s until recognition in 2008. It pays particular attention to the final months of negotiations, when Germany represented the EU in the ‘Troika talks’ that also involved the US and Russia. In 2008 Germany was less committed to a Kosovan state than its close allies in the Quint – a five state group that also included the United States, Britain, France and Italy. Domestically the coalition parties had different approaches towards the status question. Also the international division on the status in the EU and the United Nations Security Council were a significant obstacle for the German leadership to accept a unilateral declaration of independence. The acceptance of this international divide came when domestic actors were persuaded that the Troika negotiations had exhausted all possibilities for a resolution. From a theoretical standpoint, Germany’s decision to recognise is examined in regards to its Civilian Power identity and specifically to intervention and multilateralism. It is argued that Germany recognised Kosovo due to its long-standing involvement in the intervention in the conflict and due to concerns that an unresolved status would bring greater instability to the Western Balkans. Germany’s recognition was therefore built on a rationale of conflict management and expectations of an increasing role of the European Union in this process.

The thesis analyses the evolution of Hong Kong as an autonomous international actor and how that has been sustained under Chinese sovereignty, in the context of the wider debate on paradiplomacy and the increasing international participation of Non-Central Governments (NCG). The opening chapter offers a review of the literature on non-state actors (NSA) and emphasises the limitations of the new literature on NCGs that emerged in the 1990s which fails to deal with the heterogeneity of NCGs, the specific characteristics that differentiate them from other NSA and their impact on the international system. The next two chapters examine the factors behind the process of HK’s emergence as an international player in the early 1960s: textile trade interests and reaction to proteccionism; HK elite bureaucracy legitimisation strategy; flexibility of the international system for what accounted the Dominions’ historical precedent and the pragmatic interests of influential states. HK’s emergence as an international financial centre, the development of a system of external representation in the 1970s and the creation of the new framework for external relations inserted in the 1984 Joint Declaration, further contributed to consolidate and expand HK’s autonomy into new areas, including political ones, at the same time they introduced a note of ambiguity in HK’s international status. Fresh insights into the negotiation of the JD international affairs chapter are offered. Chapter Four examines HK’s post-1997 implementation of the new external relations’ framework and how far external autonomy was preserved demonstrating that the level of external autonomy HK enjoys is determined not merely by the relation with the Central Government but by the interplay between this, HK’s own strategy and actions and the attitude of external players. The logic of “autonomy cum isolation” that prevails in HK-Beijing relations, deviant practices concerning “specific authorisations” and excessive govemmentalisation of external affairs are identified as the main risks for future autonomy in a context where the SAR has been able to preserve the core of its external autonomy in relation to China. Chapter Five deals with HK’s legitimacy basis and sources of influence as an international player looking at its participation in WTO. To assert its influence HK uses not one but a combination of sources of influence, namely technical expertise, economic power, and above all the performance of a systemic broker role associated with its dual identity. The final chapter discusses the research results and concludes that, unlike other NCG, HK has been able to have a direct impact on the international system, namely through the participation in the process of international rules-making in trade and financial matters. This capacity is determined by the triangle “external autonomy-legitimacy-influence” which conditions the ability of NCG to take advantage of the opportunities created by the globalisation-localisation process to enhance their international role and contribute to a better global governance.

The thesis analyses Dag Hammarskjöld’s political role as UN Secretary-General and the efforts he made to justify such a role. It is the first attempt to give a comprehensive account of the political role Hammarskjöld played from “both sides”, based on the now available sources from both national and UN archives. The thesis also deals with the problems of a political role for the UN Secretary-General. The conventional picture of Hammarskjöld as a “neutral and impartial” international civil servant is challenged and the figure that emerges is the one of an astute politician – a ”Machiavelli of Peace”. As a civil servant in Sweden, Hammarskjöld played a political role although he viewed himself as an expert and civil servant and not a politician. He argued that he could play a political role based on ”neutrality and impartiality” and he transferred this concept to the international arena as Secretary-General. Hammarskjöld managed to play an important political role because he offered a solution to the American dilemma of how to deal with the Cold War in the ThirdWorld without choosing between their Western European allies and the newly independent countries. This at the precise time when the Americans were losing control of the General Assembly due to the influx of newly independent countries that put decolonisation on the agenda. In the Congo Crisis the political role of the Secretary-General reached its zenith during the initial period where Hammarskjöld played an interventionist role. Hammarskjöld’s policies were based on clearly defined Cold War objectives – shared by the Western permanent members of the Security Council – and on a wish to enlarge the political role of the Secretary-General. The weak base for Hammarskjöld’s political role forced him to radically change his policies in the Congo to shore up his position when he was criticised for his interventionist policies.