In this thesis I attempt to show that there is no apparent good reason why one ought to embrace the sceptic’s claim that international relations lies beyond the pale of moral inquiry. The state, in the sceptic’s view, grounds its foreign policy in the national interest and not in morality. To assert otherwise is to mistake the fundamental essence of international relations--a claim resting on the assumption that “morality” and “interest” are either antithetical or epistemologically distinct objects of study. On reflection, however, one must have--at the very least--some kind of conceptual understanding about the idea “the national interest” before such a claim can be sustained. Although much has been said by many authors about the kinds of substantive policies which, in their respective views, actually serve the national interest-- e.g., policies which contribute to the maintenance or enhancement of national power--the idea of “the national interest” itself has attracted very little conceptual scrutiny. In this study, then, I attempt to shift the focus away from a concentration on the standards for determining whether this or that policy actually serves the national interest to a concentration on the idea of the national interest itself. Before this logically prior task is completed--an immense task for which my contribution can be interpreted as only a small one--there is no reason to embrace the notion that “morality” and “interest” are either antithetical or categorically distinct. This is particularly true if, through such an analysis, “the national interest” proves to be a categorically moral idea--viz., if it proves to be a proper object of study for students of moral and political philosophy.

In this thesis I attempt to show that there is no apparent good reason why one ought to embrace the sceptic’s claim that international relations lies beyond the pale of moral inquiry. The state, in the sceptic’s view, grounds its foreign policy in the national interest and not in morality. To assert otherwise is to mistake the fundamental essence of international relations--a claim resting on the assumption that “morality” and “interest” are either antithetical or epistemologically distinct objects of study. On reflection, however, one must have--at the very least--some kind of conceptual understanding about the idea “the national interest” before such a claim can be sustained. Although much has been said by many authors about the kinds of substantive policies which, in their respective views, actually serve the national interest-- e.g., policies which contribute to the maintenance or enhancement of national power--the idea of “the national interest” itself has attracted very little conceptual scrutiny. In this study, then, I attempt to shift the focus away from a concentration on the standards for determining whether this or that policy actually serves the national interest to a concentration on the idea of the national interest itself. Before this logically prior task is completed--an immense task for which my contribution can be interpreted as only a small one--there is no reason to embrace the notion that “morality” and “interest” are either antithetical or categorically distinct. This is particularly true if, through such an analysis, “the national interest” proves to be a categorically moral idea--viz., if it proves to be a proper object of study for students of moral and political philosophy. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

The exchange rate is the price of one currency against another currency or currencies of a group of countries. Real exchange rates are important because they show the external competitiveness of a country‟s economy. Thus, when the exchange rate of a country is misaligned, this will affect its trade, production and the welfare of people. This study analysed macroeconomic determinants of the real exchange rate and dynamic adjustment of the real exchange rate as a result of shocks to these determinants. The study also determined the extent of misalignment of the real exchange rate in Malawi and Zambia and identified variables that contributed to it. Such information is important to policy makers. Quarterly data were used for both countries from 1980:1-2008:4. The literature review identified those variables that determine the exchange rate and these include government consumption, foreign aid, net foreign assets, commodity prices, terms of trade, domestic credit, openness and the Balassa Samuelson effect (technological progress). To determine the long-run relationship between the exchange rate and its determinants, we employed the Johansen approach and the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM). For robustness check on the long-run and shortrun effects of determinants on the exchange rate, variance decomposition and impulse response analyses were used. Results in the study show that in Malawi for both models, an increase in LAID, LGCON and LTOT resulted in real exchange rate depreciation and increases in LDC, NFA and LNEER resulted in an appreciation. In Zambia, increases in LAID, LGCON, LOPEN and LTOT caused the real exchange rate to depreciate while increases in LDC, NFA and LCOPPER led to an appreciation. Lagged LREER and LNEER were found to have short run effects on the equilibrium exchange rate for Malawi and lagged LCOPPER and LDC for Zambia. Periods of exchange rate misalignment were found in both countries. It was also found that the coefficient of speed of adjustment in Malawi in models 1 and 2 indicate that 11% and 27% of the variation in the real exchange rate from its equilibrium adjust each quarter respectively. The speed of adjustment for Zambia in both models was 45% and 47% respectively, higher than that of Malawi. Foreign aid has proven to be important in exchange rate misalignment in both countries, though this was not really expected in the case of Zambia. Given these results, it may be of interest to policy makers to understand which variables impact most on the exchange rate and how misalignment due to these determinants can be minimised.

This thesis is a study of international relations theory and the case of the Lebanese state's relations with Syria between 1975 and 2002. It aims to answer the following questions: (1) Why has Lebanon generally "bandwagoned" with Syria, a country which has managed to intervene in and subdue it at the expense of Lebanese sovereignty. (2) How have Lebanese state officials, along with other political actors, tried to manipulate Syria for their own interests, whether to defend Lebanese sovereignty, to maintain and increase their status, or to contain and appease their rivals and opponents. (3) Parallel to the discussions generated by these two questions, which kinds of theory are relevant to or best explain Lebanese relations with Syria. Specifically this study demonstrates that the behavior of a penetrated weak state, Lebanon, toward a regional middle power, Syria, cannot usefully be explained by simple realism's state-to-state power balancing model. Rather, it is necessary to differentiate the multitude of state (office-holders) and sub-state actors. In addition, their behavior can only be explained by a combination of factors identified in a variety of theories: reaction to an external threat (simple realism) which explain a very few cases; "omni-alignments" against interrelated threats (complex realism) which result from the weaknesses of the Lebanese state and which explain much more; still powerful transstate ties (constructivism) which themselves needed to be understood in terms of the contradiction between sovereignty and identity and which have some impact; and complex interdependence and shared interests (pluralism) which generally exist between Lebanese and Syrian elites.

University of Macau / Faculty of Law