<p>The main aim of the research was to determine the viability of retaliation as a trade remedy under the Dispute Settlement Understanding. It was to establish whether retaliation as a remedy is beneficial to the entire WTO membership and system. The specific objectives were: to examine the feasibility of damages as an alternative remedy to retaliation / to determine whether there is a need to revise the Dispute Settlement Understanding, for it to adopt a more development friendly approach to dispute resolution / to make recommendations regarding the improvement of the Dispute Settlement Understanding.</p>

<p>The main aim of the research was to determine the viability of retaliation as a trade remedy under the Dispute Settlement Understanding. It was to establish whether retaliation as a remedy is beneficial to the entire WTO membership and system. The specific objectives were: to examine the feasibility of damages as an alternative remedy to retaliation / to determine whether there is a need to revise the Dispute Settlement Understanding, for it to adopt a more development friendly approach to dispute resolution / to make recommendations regarding the improvement of the Dispute Settlement Understanding.</p>

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 1997. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 1997. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Michigan, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 338-365).

The Multifibre Agreement ("MFA") regulated textile trade until 1 January 2005. It was predominantly focused on curtailing textile exports from developing countries, like South Africa and China. With the end of the MFA, a textile crisis occurred in South Africa due to the domination of the domestic market by more affordable Chinese textile products. This case study is applied to illustrate the inadequacy of domestic legislation to provide for the resolution of an international trade dispute that affects an industry. No legislation refers to the resolution of the trade dispute by entering into a Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU"), or recourse to the neutral dispute settlement body of the World Trade Organisation ("WTO"). Due to the absence of legislation that directly addresses either forum, all the power is vested• in the government to determine the appropriate course of action. Applications brought by textile industry representative bodies like TEXFED, CLOTRADE and SACTWU were inadequately investigated due to the limited powers of the independent investigative body, ITAC, and were ultimately abandoned. The government entered into a MOU with the Chinese government and in doing so violated international agreements, rights and obligations. An analysis of the inadequacy of the MOU that was entered into and the suitability of the WTO as dispute settlement body is conducted. It is concluded that the current legislation is inadequate in that it doesn't provide for recourse to the WTO and in that it doesn't clearly set out the obligations on government and the independent powers of an independent body. / LLM (Import and Export Law), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2012

The Multifibre Agreement ("MFA") regulated textile trade until 1 January 2005. It was predominantly focused on curtailing textile exports from developing countries, like South Africa and China. With the end of the MFA, a textile crisis occurred in South Africa due to the domination of the domestic market by more affordable Chinese textile products. This case study is applied to illustrate the inadequacy of domestic legislation to provide for the resolution of an international trade dispute that affects an industry. No legislation refers to the resolution of the trade dispute by entering into a Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU"), or recourse to the neutral dispute settlement body of the World Trade Organisation ("WTO"). Due to the absence of legislation that directly addresses either forum, all the power is vested• in the government to determine the appropriate course of action. Applications brought by textile industry representative bodies like TEXFED, CLOTRADE and SACTWU were inadequately investigated due to the limited powers of the independent investigative body, ITAC, and were ultimately abandoned. The government entered into a MOU with the Chinese government and in doing so violated international agreements, rights and obligations. An analysis of the inadequacy of the MOU that was entered into and the suitability of the WTO as dispute settlement body is conducted. It is concluded that the current legislation is inadequate in that it doesn't provide for recourse to the WTO and in that it doesn't clearly set out the obligations on government and the independent powers of an independent body. / LLM (Import and Export Law), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2012

Le but de la recherche est d'identifier la stratégie de l'Union européenne dans le cadre du règlement des différends à l'OMC et de déterminer le rôle que jouent les différends commerciaux internationaux au niveau interne communautaire. La spécificité de la participation de l'UE par rapport aux autres Etats membres de l'OMC et les raisons de sa participation sont étudiées plus particulièrement dans le cadre d'une réflexion sur la manière dont les litiges internationaux s'inscrivent dans sa politique externe. Nous analysons en outre l'apport des litiges de l'Union européenne dans le développement du droit international. Le travail est articulé autour de deux axes qui contribuent à l'étude de la cohérence de la stratégie de l'UE au sein de l'ORD. Les politiques de l'Union européenne sont fréquemment mises en cause devant l'Organe de règlement des différends de l'OMC. L'UE utilise les litiges commerciaux internationaux comme un instrument de sa politique commercial, notamment dans le but de promouvoir à l'international ses valeurs non-commerciales et les intérêts primordiaux, ainsi que pour défendre son acquis historique selon les lignes directrices de ses politiques. Ces ambitions de l'Union expliquent la particularité de ses litiges commerciaux internationaux. La première partie analyse la nature spécifique des litiges commerciaux internationaux de l'UE et vise à répondre à la question de savoir par quels moyens l'UE essaye d'imposer son expérience de libéralisation des échanges au niveau international (Partie I). Dans la seconde partie nous procédons à l'analyse du choix des modalités de règlement de différends par l'Union en fonction de différents critères. Ainsi, le mode de règlement d'un différend dépend des parties impliquées dans le conflit et des enjeux en cause. En outre, nous examinons si les conditions institutionnelles de sa participation au règlement des différends commerciaux et les mécanismes spéciaux de la PCC existant au sein de l'UE sont compatibles avec les exigences du droit de l'OMC, et s'ils sont par conséquent « rentables » pour la défense efficace des intérêts de l'UE tant commerciaux que non commerciaux (Partie II). / The main purpose of the research is to identify the European Union's strategy in the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO and to determine the role that international trade disputes play on the European level. Particularly, the EU participation specificity, compared to other Members of the WTO and the reasons for its involvement, are examined in the frame of an analysis on the manner in which international disputes inscribe into its external policy. We also analyze the EU disputes contribution to the development of international law. The research articulates around two main parts which contribute to the study of coherence of the EU strategy in the DSB. EU policies are frequently attacked in front of the DSB. The EU uses recourse to international trade disputes as an instrument to promote to the international level its non trade values and essential interests and to defend its historical acquis according to main directions of its policies. These EU ambitions explain the specificity of its international trade disputes. The first part of the research analyses the particular nature of international trade disputes of the EU and intends to answer the question to know by what means the EU tries to impose its own experience of trade liberalization onto international level (Part I). In the second part we are analyzing the EU choice of modes of dispute settlement depending on different criteria. So, the dispute settlement means depends on the parties to the conflict and the stakes of the dispute. We also examine if institutional conditions for its participation to settlement of international trade disputes and special mechanisms of Common Commercial Policy existing in the EU are compliant with WTO law requirements, and if they are consequently profitable for efficient defense of the EU trade and non trade interests (Part II).

Le but de la recherche est d'identifier la stratégie de l'Union européenne dans le cadre du règlement des différends à l'OMC et de déterminer le rôle que jouent les différends commerciaux internationaux au niveau interne communautaire. La spécificité de la participation de l'UE par rapport aux autres Etats membres de l'OMC et les raisons de sa participation sont étudiées plus particulièrement dans le cadre d'une réflexion sur la manière dont les litiges internationaux s'inscrivent dans sa politique externe. Nous analysons en outre l'apport des litiges de l'Union européenne dans le développement du droit international. Le travail est articulé autour de deux axes qui contribuent à l'étude de la cohérence de la stratégie de l'UE au sein de l'ORD.Les politiques de l'Union européenne sont fréquemment mises en cause devant l'Organe de règlement des différends de l'OMC. L'UE utilise les litiges commerciaux internationaux comme un instrument de sa politique commercial, notamment dans le but de promouvoir à l'international ses valeurs non-commerciales et les intérêts primordiaux, ainsi que pour défendre son acquis historique selon les lignes directrices de ses politiques. Ces ambitions de l'Union expliquent la particularité de ses litiges commerciaux internationaux. La première partie analyse la nature spécifique des litiges commerciaux internationaux de l'UE et vise à répondre à la question de savoir par quels moyens l'UE essaye d'imposer son expérience de libéralisation des échanges au niveau international (Partie I).Dans la seconde partie nous procédons à l'analyse du choix des modalités de règlement de différends par l'Union en fonction de différents critères. Ainsi, le mode de règlement d'un différend dépend des parties impliquées dans le conflit et des enjeux en cause. En outre, nous examinons si les conditions institutionnelles de sa participation au règlement des différends commerciaux et les mécanismes spéciaux de la PCC existant au sein de l'UE sont compatibles avec les exigences du droit de l'OMC, et s'ils sont par conséquent « rentables » pour la défense efficace des intérêts de l'UE tant commerciaux que non commerciaux (Partie II). / The main purpose of the research is to identify the European Union's strategy in the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO and to determine the role that international trade disputes play on the European level. Particularly, the EU participation specificity, compared to other Members of the WTO and the reasons for its involvement, are examined in the frame of an analysis on the manner in which international disputes inscribe into its external policy. We also analyze the EU disputes contribution to the development of international law. The research articulates around two main parts which contribute to the study of coherence of the EU strategy in the DSB.EU policies are frequently attacked in front of the DSB. The EU uses recourse to international trade disputes as an instrument to promote to the international level its non trade values and essential interests and to defend its historical acquis according to main directions of its policies. These EU ambitions explain the specificity of its international trade disputes. The first part of the research analyses the particular nature of international trade disputes of the EU and intends to answer the question to know by what means the EU tries to impose its own experience of trade liberalization onto international level (Part I).In the second part we are analyzing the EU choice of modes of dispute settlement depending on different criteria. So, the dispute settlement means depends on the parties to the conflict and the stakes of the dispute. We also examine if institutional conditions for its participation to settlement of international trade disputes and special mechanisms of Common Commercial Policy existing in the EU are compliant with WTO law requirements, and if they are consequently profitable for efficient defense of the EU trade and non trade interests (Part II).