'!he subject of this stuiy is the small am nalium-sized IlI.ll.tinational manufacturirg ent:ezprise. It examines am c:::cup:rres the nDtives am process of direct investment in foreign manufacturirg facilities of a sample of sixty-two British am GentIan c:x:upmies. A cx:.ITprehensive approach to the analysis has been chosen which, because of the nature of smaller c:x:upmies facilitates urDerst:an:iin:. '!he study falls into three broad parts. In part one (sections 1-5), theories of international trade am theories of the finn are examined for the contribution they make to an urDerst:an:iin: of direct investment am inferences are drawn for the researc:::h stratay. Part two (section 6), c:::cup:rres the structure of nDtives of the sample c:x:upmies am the degree of their fulfilment. In the final part (section7), the process of settirg up manufacturirg subsidiaries is examined in the light of a three-P'lase framework of decision, start-up am managin] stages. Wherever awropriate or possible, reference is made to existin] empirical evidence. '!he conclusion is reached that direct investment by smaller c:x:upmies is increasirxJ in seep! am pace. Market mtives predaninate in all cases. British c:x:upmies invest in search of J'leiI markets, whereas Geman finns are mre concerned with securirg existirg market positions. FUrther llDti ves vary aoc:x>rdin::J to ci.rcumst:aJx:es, perceptions am inlividual factors. In their nDSt recent investments finns prefer full a..mership am control. '!he quality am potential of management is a critical factor for success.

This bachelor thesis examines the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Mexico and the countries that resembles the European Union(EU) prior to the expansion in 2004, hereafter(EU15). The purpose is to analyze the effects of the FTA between the trading parties and investigate whether the FTA has resulted in positive effects on export volumes. The model includes 16 countries and is estimated with panel data between the years 1997-2016. We apply a gravity model as econometric framework and perform two regressions, one with fixed effects and one with random effects. Our results suggest that export volumes from Mexico to the EU on an aggregated level have increased for Mexico and the EU has increased. However, in contrast to previous estimates, our results show that the FTA have generated negative effects on trade creation between the trading parties.

The central aim of this dissertation is to make an unambiguous international trade policy recommendation for developing countries grounded on rigorous economic theory. As is generally known, trade models featuring increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition have challenged the mainstream case for free trade which is built upon unrealistic assumptions like constant return to scale and perfect competition. In this context, the core contribution of this dissertation is the restatement of the original free-trade case made by the classical political economists Adam Smith and David Ricardo. This restatement is based on the accurate interpretation of Ricardo's famous numerical example in chapter 7 of the Principles. The classical case for free trade formulated by Smith and Ricardo neither relies on unrealistic assumptions nor the laissez-faire doctrine. On the contrary, it stipulates that free trade should always be accompanied by public policies that expand the provision of public education, job training, health care and infrastructure. Moreover, a widespread policy change towards free trade should always be implemented gradually, in order to take care of those groups who might be affected in the short run by the increased level of international competition and technological progress. The main conclusion of the dissertation is that free trade - as conceived by classical political economy - is the most suitable international trade policy for developed as well developing countries for achieving sustainable economic growth and development. (author's abstract)

This thesis examines whether there is an effect of the Mercosur free trade agreement on export and import between member countries. The study uses an extended gravity model framework on a panel data between the years 1975 to 2017 for 34 countries, including the member countries. Two different regressions were run using OLS and country fixed effect. A Linder effect was also added to the regressions to further understand the impact on trade. The results show a significantly positive effect of the FTA on imports. The FTA yielded insignificant and significantly negative result for OLS and FEM respectively on exports.

The thesis is concerned with one of the building blocks of the classical theory of international trade, known as the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model. It consists of two parts -- in the first one, the model is briefly introduced and related theorems - theoretical extensions of the model - are presented. This introduction is then followed by a discussion on the empirical performance of the model. In the second part, the factor price equalization theorem, closely related to the original H-O model, is both theoretically and empirically analysed.

O objetivo desta tese é analisar a economia política dos acordos preferenciais de comércio (APC) a partir de um jogo político seqüencial não-cooperativo de Stackelberg entre uma grande economia e uma pequena economia, onde a disputa política entre grupos lobistas rivais define as preferências unilaterais dos governos no primeiro estágio e o equilíbrio coalitionproof de Stackelberg define o formato do acordo de livre comércio no segundo estágio. Então se modifica a estrutura inicial do jogo político bilateral para um processo de barganha entre n países. Finalmente, aplica-se o modelo teórico ao caso particular da ALCA. / The purpose of this paper is to analyse the political economy of preferential trade agreements (PTA) based on a sequential non-cooperative Stackelberg political game between a large economy and a small economy, in which the political dispute of rival lobby groups defines the unilateral stance of both governments in the first stage and the Stackelberg coalition-proof equilibrium defines the format of the free trade agreement in the second stage. Then the initial bilateral political game hypothesis is relaxed to accomplish a more complex bargaining game with n economies. Finally the theoretical framework is applied to FTAA.

O objetivo desta tese é analisar a economia política dos acordos preferenciais de comércio (APC) a partir de um jogo político seqüencial não-cooperativo de Stackelberg entre uma grande economia e uma pequena economia, onde a disputa política entre grupos lobistas rivais define as preferências unilaterais dos governos no primeiro estágio e o equilíbrio coalitionproof de Stackelberg define o formato do acordo de livre comércio no segundo estágio. Então se modifica a estrutura inicial do jogo político bilateral para um processo de barganha entre n países. Finalmente, aplica-se o modelo teórico ao caso particular da ALCA. / The purpose of this paper is to analyse the political economy of preferential trade agreements (PTA) based on a sequential non-cooperative Stackelberg political game between a large economy and a small economy, in which the political dispute of rival lobby groups defines the unilateral stance of both governments in the first stage and the Stackelberg coalition-proof equilibrium defines the format of the free trade agreement in the second stage. Then the initial bilateral political game hypothesis is relaxed to accomplish a more complex bargaining game with n economies. Finally the theoretical framework is applied to FTAA.