Po-yan Chiu. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 83-86). / Abstract also in Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Acknowledgements --- p.iv / List of Figures --- p.vi / Chapter Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter Chapter 2. --- Literature Review --- p.7 / Chapter 2.1 --- Monopolistic Competition and Policy Intervention --- p.7 / Chapter 2.2 --- Policy Interventions in Monetary Economies --- p.17 / Chapter Chapter 3. --- The Model --- p.19 / Chapter 3.1 --- Commodities --- p.19 / Chapter 3.2 --- Demands --- p.20 / Chapter 3.3 --- Equilibrium --- p.21 / Chapter 3.4 --- Open Economy --- p.24 / Chapter Chapter 4. --- Optimal Production Taxation --- p.28 / Chapter Chapter 5. --- Welfare Effect of Trade and the Optimal Tariff --- p.34 / Chapter 5.1 --- Welfare Effect of Trade --- p.34 / Chapter 5.2 --- Optimal Import Tariff --- p.38 / Chapter Chapter 6. --- Consumption Tax --- p.52 / Chapter 6.1 --- Closed Economy --- p.53 / Chapter 6.2 --- Open Economy --- p.55 / Chapter 6.3 --- Welfare Effects of Trade under Different Policies --- p.56 / Chapter Chapter 7. --- Concluding Remarks --- p.62 / Appendix --- p.65 / References --- p.83

In international economics literature, different variants of the Nash equilibrium have been used to formulate strategic and retaliative behavior. However, the negotiation process underlying the Nash equilibrium does not capture the notion of retaliation properly. We use the "contingent threat situation" (Greenberg, 1990) to reformulate three different international economic environments. / First, a two-country, two-commodity model of trade is considered to reformulate the tariff retaliations. It is known that tariff retaliations lead to a Nash equilibrium outcome, a non-free trade outcome. We show, in the framework of the "theory of social situations", that the free trade equilibrium is supported by a "stable standard of behavior". / Second, the basic two-country, single commodity model is employed to formulate the interactive and retaliatory policies regarding the choice between foreign investment and immigration. Considering three different strategic environments, we investigate the outcomes supported by "stable standards of behavior" under these strategic scenarios. We also provide a critical examination of Jones-Coelho-Easton's proposition (Jones, Coelho, and Easton, 1986). / Third, a simple model of international debt is formulated using a strategic form game. In the game, a country in financial crisis and on the verge of default is requesting a new loan, and a bank, with exposure to the foreign country's debt, contemplates whether it should issue the new loan. We show that "issue a new loan" and "not default", a Pareto optimum pair of strategies, is stable. Interestingly, we get this result by using a non-cooperative negotiation process, offered by the "individual contingent threat situation".

In the past two decades, as regional free trade agreements prevailed between states and governments, there is an imperative need for the concerned trade control authorities to minimise non-tariff trade barriers. Trade facilitation policy becomes one of the essential tools to enhance the competitive strength of a state in the global market. As the common yardstick adopted to assess policy effectiveness, the global trade efficiency indicators seem to reflect that state-level trade facilitation policies may not be generating the expected results. Not only the validity of such indicators have been challenged by some scholars, their application in port-level studies are also questionable. This project develops an evaluation framework that consists of a qualitative and a quantitative assessment tool to evaluate port-based trade facilitation policies. The qualitative analytical instrument examines how trade facilitation measures affect port-based supply chain. The quantitative survey tool measures the extent of these policies may impact on the supply chain activities of port-related firm, infrastructure, and institutional stakeholders. The evaluation framework is applied to investigate the effects of trade facilitation policies on hub ports of the Pearl River Delta (PRD) region. Such framework not only provides an instrument to measure policy impact, but also illustrates how a trade facilitation programme may affect the competitiveness of port supply chain. The qualitative tool by adopting multiple supply chain perspectives, contributes a consistent and comprehensive assessment method for trade facilitation studies to extend the research scope to port level. The quantitative instrument provides a mechanism that could facilitate an accurate measurement of the trade facilitation policy impacts not only in a single port but also in a networked ports' environment.

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