Thesis (Ed.D.)--Teachers College, Columbia University, 1975. / Typescript; issued also on microfilm. Includes tables. Sponsor: James A. Kelly. Dissertation Committee: Guilbert Hentschke. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 137-144).

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Inaug.-Diss.--Heidelberg. / Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Bibliography: p. 68-95 (4th group).

Suppose we are confronted with an environment which consists of large common costs and uncertain supplies. Furthermore, suppose the resources in this environment are being supplied by a public enterprise monopoly which is interested in maintaining economic efficiency while recovering costs incurred by the project. Then the above problem becomes one of institutional design. Even if conditions existed in which traditional marginal cost pricing provided the proper signals for efficiency, additional charges will be necessary to recover costs due to the large common costs in this environment. Ideas and suggestions about decentralized methods of covering common costs lead naturally to questions about decentralized methods for solving the public goods provision problem. This paper reports in part on an experimental investigation of four methods for allocating public goods. The two basic processes studied are direct contribution and a public goods auction process. Both of these processes are studied with and without an additional unanimity feature. The results suggest that the auction process outperforms direct contribution. The effect of unanimity is to decrease the efficiency of both processes. Strategic aspects of the voting rule (unanimity) are evident in the results. To assist in the contingency planning for environments with uncertain supplies, different contract forms are considered. In particular, priority and contingent contracting are investigated along with specific mechanisms to allocate such contracts. An experimental environment is developed to investigate the various contract forms and mechanisms. The experiment considers two contract forms (contingent and priority) and four allocation mechanisms (Random, English auction, English auction with queue, and Iterative Groves). The experimental results show that bidding for priority results in higher efficiency than pre-assignments. Furthermore, allowing individuals to signal coalitional bids has a positive effect on efficiency and revenue generated.

Thesis (MBA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2010. / Although Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) are not a new phenomenon, they have gained international prominence since 2005 due to their rapid and much publicised growth, as well as government ownership. The objective of this study is to investigate SWFs from the perspective of developing countries and to compare the developing country experience of SWF investment with that of the developed economies of the West. The question that this research report aims to address is whether SWF investment behaviour is more aggressive in developing economies than in advanced economies by being more likely to invest in sensitive sectors of, and to take significant stakes in companies within these sectors in, developing economies? Before this analysis is made, a comprehensive literature study is done consisting of two parts. The first provides an overview of the reasons behind the rise of SWFs and the West‘s discomfort with the phenomenon, focussing on the emergence of state capitalism as a competing socio-political model to free-market democracy. The second part of the literature review gives a broad overview of what constitutes a SWF, its main characteristics and what concerns about SWFs have transpired to date. The researcher uses a narrow definition to differentiate SWFs from other sovereign investor classes, and defines a SWF as a fund: i) owned directly by a sovereign government; ii) managed independently of other state financial institutions; iii) that does not have predominant explicit pension obligations; iv) that invests in a diverse set of financial asset classes in pursuit of commercial returns; and, v) that has made a significant proportion of its publicly-reported investments internationally. The concerns raised in the literature about SWFs as well as the response from the international community and individual recipient countries to these concerns are discussed. In particular, the researcher focuses on the fears expressed by recipient countries that SWFs may invest for non-commercial reasons. To answer the questions raised about SWFs, the researcher assesses the behaviours displayed by these funds by means of an analysis of the transnational transaction data contained in the SWF Institute‘s SWF Transaction Database for the period 1 January 2000 to 31 December 2009. The research results show that SWFs do not appear to target sensitive industries in developing economies more than they would in advanced economies, but it appears that they are willing to gain greater influence and control of the running of the organisations in which they invest if those organisations are based in the developing world.

by Wong Sai Tat, Patrick, Leung Chi Keung, Edmond. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1988. / Bibliography: leaf 87.

This dissertation examines the factors influencing a state’s decision to adopt a local government investment pool (LGIP), the institutional arrangements used in managing them, and the effect of the institutional types on LGIP performance. The dissertation extends the policy adoption theory with insights from investment theory to demonstrate that management credibility influences the likelihood of a state’s LGIP adoption. The study finds that the quality of financial management, the quality of professional leadership, proximate state neighbors who have previously adopted an LGIP, and economic factors determine a state’s proclivity to policy adoption. The dissertation also describes the institutional arrangements used in managing LGIPs and develops typologies based on their institutional arrangements. The dissertation compares LGIPs depending on the risk aversion of their institutional arrangements. The research extends the risk-return tradeoff in investment theory to LGIP institutional arrangements. The empirical findings show that LGIP institutional arrangement that has greater risk report higher performance. The dissertation also finds that competition in the LGIP market due to multiple vendors, and periods of economic recession account for higher performance because of higher risk-taking behaviors associated with them. This dissertation promotes public funds investment laws that emphasize prudent management of government finances and guides managers of the public purse on the types of institutional choices that optimize returns with minimal risk.

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Linking education, science and technology with national development is a subject of increasing concern in many developing countries. In this dissertation, we have studied empirically the contribution, or lack of it, which public investment in education, science and technology has made to the attainment of development objectives in Cameroon since 1960. Using a small computable macroeconometric model of Cameroon incorporating some major relevant quantitative aspects of the knowledge sector, we have investigated the effects on that sector and on the overall economic system of increased education- and research-service resources. We have also analyzed some of the major qualitative factors that are important in this sector. / Our results suggest that, given existing patterns of education, science and technology in Cameroon, the contribution of public investment in this sector may be small compared to the potential contribution suggested in the literature. The implications of these results are examined for policy-making and planning at the national level.