The thesis examines various parameters of pre-funded pension systems with individual accounts that are in some aspects mandatory. Instead of describing such systems comparatively in detail, rationale of some of the system design choices is discussed. Main focus is on institutional design, cost containment and investment regulation. It is argued that given the mandatory nature of such systems, governments should seek to regulate them in ways that promote cost-effectiveness, while allowing for meaningful investment return on system assets. Also, where sound, adequate use should be made of existing industry and regulatory structures as a cost-containment and confidence-building measure.

Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2014 / gm2015 / Centre for Human Rights / LLM / Unrestricted

La tesi è strutturata in 3 capitoli e analizza gli investimenti e la regolamentazione nel broadband market". Il primo capitolo analizza la letteratura teorica ed empirica sul rapporto tra gli investimenti e la regolamentazione nel settore delle telecomunicazioni. Il secondo capitolo fornisce un'analisi teorica sullo "stepping-stone theory". La terza parte fornisce un'analisi sull'impatto dei diversi regimi normativi per la costruzione della Next Generation Networks. / This dissertation is composed of three papers and discusses the issue of investment and regulation in broadband market. The first paper reviews the specialized but growing branch of the literature. It surveys the relevant theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between regulation, at both retail and wholesale level, and investment in telecoms infrastructures. Theoretical analyses state that with respect to retail (incentive) regulation, the firm‘s incentive to invest is related to the level of price cap. As for access regulation, mandatory unbundling can possibly discourage firms‘ incentive to invest, but this is not the case for all circumstances because some studies have displayed an opposite (positive) effect on investment. The influence of regulators‘ limited ability to make credible commitment ex ante is not negligible either. Evidence in empirical findings exhibits a certain disunity. The majority concludes that local loop unbundling based on forward-looking cost methodology discourages both ILECs and CLECs from investing in networks, so that the stepping-stone theory is possibly not supported by the data; other findings support the non-negative effect of access regulation on investment. The second paper provides theoretical analysis on the stepping-stone theory. We dynamically model the competition between a vertically-integrated incumbent firm and a facilities-free new entrant in broadband market, where both firms are entitled with investment options: not only can the incumbent decide how much to spend in upgrading its existing network, but also the entrant can choose whether and when to invest on the construction of its own network. The analysis is conducted under three different kinds of competition: pure services-based, pure facilities-based and mixed competition. We find that the entrant's ability to provide value-added services affects the incumbent's investment choice. Our simulation results support the stepping-stone theory that access regulation provides an impetus for the entrant to invest in their own facilities after entering the market based on leased lines. It is also socially desirable because both the overall welfare and the consumer surplus are maximized in a regulated market under mixed competition. The third paper studies impacts of different regulatory regimes on the construction of Next Generation Networks (NGNs). We model the competition between a vertically-integrated incumbent firm and a facilities-free entrant firm in broadband market, where the incumbent has an investment option to upgrade its current network to the NGN. In order to analyze how policy settings affect the incumbent firm‘s investment choice, three kinds of regulatory regimes are discussed: no regulation, partial regulation (only the traditional network is regulated and the NGN is unregulated) and full regulation (both the traditional network and the NGN are regulated). We find that not only the entrant‘s ability to provide value-added services, but also the substitution factor that indexes the decrease in consumers‘ willingness to pay for the traditional service once the investment occurs, affect the incumbent‘s investment choice. Moreover, the comparison of results under different regimes shows that the incumbent invests the most under partial regulation, which sheds some light on impelling the deployment of Next Generation Networks.

After economic reform and opening-up, China constantly absorb foreign capitals. However, at the same time of economic take-off, for the need of continuously economic development and strategy, China must move towards the world in order to seek energy, technology, fund, overseas market etc.. Therefore, the model of China foreign investments and its operation under the international investment regulations is less likely to be discussed by theses. While Taiwan re-negotiate with China,it is necessary to study the model of investment and its reality which China invested in Hongkong after 1997 since Hongkong is the demonstration area under one country-two systems policy. When China still argue that it will implement one country-two systems policy under one Chine principle, this study will help us to understand how China will carry out its investment model in Taiwan in the future. Thus, the research framework of this study will be based on the above statements, and this study will also discuss relevant agreements regarding the international investment contract, technological transferring agreement etc.. This study will be served as a reference for China while making investment in Taiwan.

<p>Foreign Direct investment (FDI) has been recognized as a vital source of development for African countries, which are mainly capital importing countries. This has led to a quest for effective regulation of the activities of foreign investors in a country while considering the profit making goals of the investors as well. As there is a need to strike a balance between the need to regulate entry and activities of investors and reaping the immense benefits of FDI such as growth and development. The regulation of FDI thus becomes important. However, there is no universal multilateral agreement on Investment (MAI) that binds most states oft the world. What we have is attempts at regional levels to regulate Investment uniformly. This quest has led to debates with many developing countries (Africa Inclusive) resisting attempts to formulate a MAI. This paper will start with an introduction of the importance of FDI as well as the various attempts that have been made to regulate FID on a multilateral level. Then the paper will go on to examine two Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) Botswana-China BIT on Promotion and Protection of Investments 2000,Czech-Tunisia BIT for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investment 1997, and two Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) - Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 1990 and the investment provisions of the U.S &ndash / Morocco Free Trade Agreement 2004, to identify those trends that are common to these agreements that have been entered into by African countries. It will examine these provisions in line with the rights and obligations they create for the investors as well as the host countries.</p>

Foreign Direct investment (FDI) has been recognized as a vital source of development for African countries, which are mainly capital importing countries. This has led to a quest for effective regulation of the activities of foreign investors in a country while considering the profit making goals of the investors as well. As there is a need to strike a balance between the need to regulate entry and activities of investors and reaping the immense benefits of FDI such as growth and development. The regulation of FDI thus becomes important. However, there is no universal multilateral agreement on Investment (MAI) that binds most states oft the world. What we have is attempts at regional levels to regulate Investment uniformly. This quest has led to debates with many developing countries (Africa Inclusive) resisting attempts to formulate a MAI. This paper will start with an introduction of the importance of FDI as well as the various attempts that have been made to regulate FID on a multilateral level. Then the paper will go on to examine two Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) Botswana-China BIT on Promotion and Protection of Investments 2000,Czech-Tunisia BIT for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investment 1997, and two Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) - Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 1990 and the investment provisions of the U.S &ndash;Morocco Free Trade Agreement 2004, to identify those trends that are common to these agreements that have been entered into by African countries. It will examine these provisions in line with the rights and obligations they create for the investors as well as the host countries. / Magister Legum - LLM

<p>Foreign Direct investment (FDI) has been recognized as a vital source of development for African countries, which are mainly capital importing countries. This has led to a quest for effective regulation of the activities of foreign investors in a country while considering the profit making goals of the investors as well. As there is a need to strike a balance between the need to regulate entry and activities of investors and reaping the immense benefits of FDI such as growth and development. The regulation of FDI thus becomes important. However, there is no universal multilateral agreement on Investment (MAI) that binds most states oft the world. What we have is attempts at regional levels to regulate Investment uniformly. This quest has led to debates with many developing countries (Africa Inclusive) resisting attempts to formulate a MAI. This paper will start with an introduction of the importance of FDI as well as the various attempts that have been made to regulate FID on a multilateral level. Then the paper will go on to examine two Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) Botswana-China BIT on Promotion and Protection of Investments 2000,Czech-Tunisia BIT for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investment 1997, and two Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) - Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 1990 and the investment provisions of the U.S &ndash / Morocco Free Trade Agreement 2004, to identify those trends that are common to these agreements that have been entered into by African countries. It will examine these provisions in line with the rights and obligations they create for the investors as well as the host countries.</p>

Magister Legum - LLM