Thesis (MBA)--Stellenbosch University, 2005. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Foreign direct investment is generally welcomed and sought after by developing countries such as South Africa and seen as an important vehicle to raise capital and promote growth. This h as also been recognised by the South A frican government that indicated that foreign direct investment (FDI) has been identified as a requirement in their fight against poverty and to fuel development. South Africa, unfortunately has not been able to attract significant and sustainable amounts of FDI and has been identified by Unctad World Investment Report (2004: 14) as a country that is performing under its potential in attracting FDI. Other countries in Africa like Nigeria seem to be able to consistently attract more FDI while they are less competitive and politically less stable than South Africa. This study seeks to explore the reasons for this disparity in FDI flows with special reference toN igeria a nd South Africa, to assess t he difference inc ompetitiveness between the two countries, to asses the impact of this on FDI flows and to analyse and compare the reasons for FDI in South Africa and Nigeria utilising certain Unctad and WAIPA criteria. The conclusion is that multinational companies are profit seeking and that they will take on considerable risk (such as political instability for example) if the returns are high enough. Nigeria is attracting mostly resource-seeking FDI to its rich oil sector through multinational oil companies that have the technology and capability to extract the oil economically. This is happening regardless of the fact that the country's infrastructure and institutions are weak, widespread violence and political instability is at the order of the day, Nigeria has a small economy (and hence a small market) and is plagued by high levels of corruption. South Africa in contrast, while also having natural resources has attracted mainly market-seeking FDI. The South African markets however are not particularly big when compared to other first world countries and these FDI flows are not sustainable. South Africa would need to concentrate on becoming more efficient if it wants to attract more FDI but will be competing with other countries like Malaysia, India and Eastern Europe in the process that proves to be a challenge currently. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Ontwikkelende lande soos Suid-Afrika verwelkom en soek oor die algemeen direkte buitelandse belegging en dit word beskou as 'n belangrike manier om kapitaal te bekom en groei te bevorder. Hierdie beskouing word ook gehandhaaf deur die Suid- Afrikaanse regering wat aangedui het dat direkte buitelandse belegging identifiseer is as 'n vereiste vir die stryd teen armoede en om ontwikkeling te bevorder. Ongelukkig het Suid-Afrika nog nie daarin geslaag om beduidende en standhoudende hoeveelhede direkte buitelandse belegging te lok nie en is deur die Unctad World Investment Report (2004:14) identifiseer as 'n land wat onderpresteer met betrekking tot sy vermoë om direkte buitelandse belegging te lok. Ander lande in Afrika, soos Nigerië, blyk in staat te wees om deurlopend meer direkte buitelandse belegging te lok, terwyl hulle minder kompeterend en polities minder stabiel is as Suid-Afrika. Die doel van hierdie studie is om die redes vir hierdie ongelykheid in die vloei van direkte buitelandse belegging te ondersoek met spesifieke verwysing na Nigerië en Suid-Afrika, om die verskille in kompeterendheid tussen die twee lande te oorweeg, om die impak hiervan op die vloei van direkte buitelandse belegging te ondersoek en om die redes vir direkte buitelandse belegging in Suid-Afrika en Nigerië te analiseer en te vergelyk met behulp van sekere van die Unctad en WAIPA kriteria. Die slotsom is dat multinasionale maatskappye winste najaag en dat hulle aansienlike risiko's sal neem (bv. politiese onstabiliteit), as die opbrengste hoog genoeg is. Nigerië lok meestal hulpbron-gedrewe direkte buitelandse belegging na sy ryk oliesektor deur internasionale oliemaatskappye wat beskik oor die tegnologie en kapasiteit om die olie ekonomies te ontgin. Dit gebeur ongeag die feit dat die land se infrastruktuur en organisasies swak is, wydverspreide geweld voorkom, politieke onstabiliteit aan die orde van die dag is, Nigerië 'n klein ekonomie (en dus 'n klein mark) het en geteister word deur hoë vlakke van korrupsie. In teenstelling hiermee het Suid-Afrika, wat ook oor natuurlike hulpbronne beskik, hoofsaaklik mark-gedrewe direkte buitelandse belegging gelok. Die Suid-Afrikaanse markte is egter nie eintlik groot nie as dit vergelyk word met ander eerstewêreldlande nie en hierdie vloei van direkte buitelandse belegging is nie volhoubaar nie. Suid-Afrika sal daarop moet konsentreer om meer effektief te word as hy meer direkte buitelandse belegging wil lok, maar sal moet meeding met ander lande soos Maleisië, Indië en Oos-Europa in 'n proses wat tans 'n uitdaging blyk te wees.

This Dissertation lays the groundwork for a private law theory of international investment law (IIL). This project intervenes in a polarized debate on the nature of the global investment regime. With few exceptions, the scholarship has tended to divide sharply according to stylized visions of IIL as either a system of private, commercial law, or a system of public law. The “commercial law school” tends to be associated with a thick, capital-centric vision of IIL – one that emphasizes insulating private interests from foreign state action. Scholars and practitioners in this vein tend to be apologists for the system, or advocates of only minimal structural reforms. By contrast, the “public law school,” tends to be associated with a thin vision of IIL, highly deferential to national sovereignty, where private interests take a back seat to bona fide national regulatory policy. Its adherents tend to style themselves as critics and reformers, decrying how the status quo seems to have sacrificed national regulatory autonomy at the altar of global capital. While the commercial lawyers have been far too dismissive of the threat posed by IIL to domestic public values, the public lawyers risk losing sight of the values states seek to achieve through IIL in the first place – the promotion of sorely needed foreign direct investment (FDI) and the protection of FDI providers. The debate thus far has proceeded mostly in caricature, and something important has been lost: the possibility of a nuanced system of international private law, sensitive to both the sovereign state’s public values and the private rights and interests of foreign investors whose protection is central to the object and purpose of the regime. These Chapters seek to fill that lacuna.

Law Wing Fai. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves [151]-156). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / ABSTRACT --- p.I / 摘要 --- p.II / ACKNOWLEDGEMENT --- p.III / TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.IV / Chapter CHAPTER ONE --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Background --- p.1 / Purpose --- p.3 / Organization --- p.4 / Chapter CHAPTER TWO --- REVIEW OF THEORIES AND LITERATURE --- p.5 / The Literature on Foreign Direct Investment --- p.5 / The Literature on Legal Issues --- p.10 / Chapter CHAPTER THREE --- METHODOLOGY --- p.17 / Data Collection --- p.17 / Control Variables in Detail --- p.20 / Design of Regression Models --- p.26 / Methodology --- p.28 / Chapter CHAPTER FOUR --- THE EFFECTS OF LEGAL FACTORS ON INVESTMENT MODE SELECTION --- p.29 / Rationale for the Study --- p.29 / Fundamental Differences between Partial Acquisition and JV --- p.30 / Importance of Legal Institutions in the Choice of M&A and JV --- p.33 / Hypothesis on the Effects of Legal Factors on Investment Mode Selection --- p.34 / Hypothesis on Legal Origin --- p.34 / Hypothesis on Shareholder Protection --- p.36 / Hypothesis on the Government Enforcement Efficiency --- p.39 / Hypothesis on Securities Regulation --- p.42 / Hypothesis on Accounting Standard and Corporate Transparency --- p.42 / Hypothesis on Other Legal Issues --- p.43 / Empirical Evidence for the Effects of Legal Factors on Investment Mode Selection --- p.45 / Legal Origin --- p.45 / Shareholder Protection --- p.48 / Government Enforcement Efficiency --- p.50 / "Securities Regulation, Accounting Standard and Corporate Transparency" --- p.52 / Other Legal Issues --- p.54 / Chapter CHAPTER FIVE --- THE EFFECTS OF LEGAL FACTORS ON OWNERSHIP PROPORTION DECISION --- p.57 / Rationale for the Study --- p.57 / Hypothesis on the Effects of Legal Factors on Ownership Proportion Decision --- p.57 / Hypothesis on Legal Origin --- p.59 / Hypothesis on Shareholder Protection --- p.59 / Hypothesis on Government Enforcement Efficiency --- p.59 / Hypothesis on Securities Regulation --- p.60 / Hypothesis on Accounting Standard and Corporate Transparency --- p.60 / Hypothesis on Legal Origin --- p.60 / Hypothesis on Shareholder Protection --- p.60 / Hypothesis on Government Enforcement Efficiency --- p.61 / Hypothesis on Securities Regulation --- p.61 / Hypothesis on Accounting Standard and Corporate Transparency --- p.61 / Hypothesis on Other Legal Issues --- p.61 / Empirical Evidence for the Effects of Legal Factors on Ownership Proportion Decision --- p.63 / Legal Origin --- p.63 / Shareholder Protection --- p.65 / Government Enforcement Efficiency --- p.66 / "Securities Regulation, Accounting Standard and Corporate Transparency" --- p.67 / Other Legal Issues --- p.68 / Chapter CHAPTER SIX --- DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION --- p.70 / TABLE --- p.73 / Table 1: The Variables --- p.73 / Table 2: Shareholder protection around the world --- p.82 / Table 3: Government enforcement efficiency around the world --- p.85 / "Table 4: Accounting standard, corporate transparency, securities regulation, mandatory bid rule and cross-border regulation around the world" --- p.88 / Table 5A: Effect of legal origin on investment mode selection --- p.91 / Table 5B: Effect of shareholder protection on investment mode selection --- p.93 / Table 5C: Effect of government enforcement efficiency on investment mode selection --- p.95 / "Table 5D: Effect of securities regulation, accounting standard and corporate transparency on investment mode selection" --- p.97 / Table 5E: Effect of other legal issues on investment mode selection --- p.99 / Table 6A: Effect of legal origin on investment mode selection (controlling the ex-post ownership proportion) --- p.101 / Table 6B: Effect of shareholder protection on investment mode selection (controlling the ex-post ownership proportion) --- p.103 / Table 6C: Effect of government enforcement efficiency on investment mode selection (controlling the ex-post ownership proportion) --- p.105 / "Table 6D: Effect of securities regulation, accounting standard and corporate transparency on investment mode selection (controlling the ex-post ownership proportion)" --- p.107 / Table 6E: Effect of other legal issues on investment mode selection (controlling the ex-post ownership proportion) --- p.109 / Table 7A: Effect of legal origin on investment mode selection (Majority ownership sample) --- p.111 / Table 7b: Effect of shareholder protection on investment mode selection (Majority ownership sample) --- p.113 / Table 7C: Effect of government enforcement efficiency on investment mode selection (majority ownership sample) --- p.115 / "Table 7D: Effect of shareholder protection, accounting standard and corporate transparency on investment mode selection (majority ownership sample)" --- p.117 / Table 7E: Effect of other legal issues on investment mode selection (Majority ownership sample) --- p.119 / Table 8 A: Effect of legal origin on investment mode selection (Minority ownership sample) --- p.121 / Table 8B: Effect of shareholder protection on investment mode selection (Minority ownership sample) --- p.123 / Table 8C: Effect of government enforcement efficiency on investment mode selection (minority ownership sample) --- p.125 / Table 8D: Effect of legal origin on investment mode selection (Minority ownership sample) --- p.127 / Table 8E: Effect of other legal issues on investment mode selection (Minority ownership sample) --- p.129 / Table 9A: Effect of legal origin on ownership proportion selection (M&A sample) --- p.131 / Table 9b: Effect of shareholder protection on ownership proportion selection (M&A sample) --- p.133 / Table 9C: Effect of government enforcement efficiency on ownership proportion selection (M&A sample) --- p.135 / "Table 9D: Effect of securities regulation, accounting standard and corporate transparency on ownership proportion selection (m&a sample)" --- p.137 / Table 9E: Effect of other legal issues on ownership proportion selection (M&A sample) --- p.139 / Table 10A: Effect of legal origin on ownership proportion selection (JV sample) --- p.141 / Table 10B: Effect of shareholder protection on ownership proportion selection (JV sample) --- p.143 / Table 10C: Effect of government enforcement efficiency on ownership proportion selection (jv sample) --- p.145 / "Table 10D: Effect of securities regulation, accounting standard and corporate transparency on ownership proportion selection (jv sample)" --- p.147 / Table 10E: Effect of other legal issues on ownership proportion selection (jv sample) --- p.149 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.151 / APPENDIX --- p.157 / Appendix 1: Summary statistics of the variables used in investigation of investment mode selection --- p.157 / Appendix 2: Summary statistics of the variables used in investigation of ownership proportion selection (m&a sample) --- p.159 / Appendix 3: Summary statistics of the variables used in investigation of ownership proportion selection (JV sample) --- p.161 / "Appendix 4: Correlations of Shareholder Protection, Corporate Transparency, Securities Regulation and other legal issues" --- p.163 / "Appendix 5: Correlations of Shareholder Protection, Government Enforcement Efficiency, Corporate Transparency, Securities Regulation and other legal issues" --- p.164 / "Appendix 6: Correlations of Shareholder Protection, Government Enforcement Efficiency and other legal issues" --- p.165 / Appendix 7: Correlations of firm-level and country-level control variables --- p.166

As a result of recent events, both domestic and international, the Mexican financial markets are now open to foreign investment. It was expected that the entry of investors and capital from abroad would aid in the strengthening of domestic intermediaries and would bolster the efficiency and depth of the markets in Mexico. In order to allow the entry of foreign investments, substantial amendments and additions to financial regulations have taken place within a relatively short period of time. / Investment in domestic institutions is now open to foreign participants, irrespective of the country of origin. However, access to the Mexican markets through wholly owned subsidiaries is limited to investors from countries that have executed financial treaties with Mexico. This is the case of investors from the NAFTA countries. / A number of reputable intermediaries worldwide have entered the Mexican markets. Nevertheless, the extent of the commitment to Mexican investments is limited by political, economical and legal concerns. It is expected that policies towards more open financial markets will continue to shape the actions of the Mexican government in the future.

FDI plays an important role in economic life. It is arguably an even more significant driving force behind economic growth than trade in goods and services nowadays. / China and Canada are both important FDI absorbers, but their FDI laws display various characteristics due to their different economic bases, political structures and legal systems etc. In order to guide FDI practice in the two countries and to draw on Canada's experience for China's FDI law, this thesis mainly introduces the FDI policies of China and Canada, analyzes the FDI law systems of the two countries, and expounds their general regulations on FDI.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2007. / Title from first page of PDF file (viewed August 7, 2007). Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 203-220).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2007. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 104-108). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 1998. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (LL.M.). / Written for the Faculty of Law. Title from title page of PDF (viewed 2009/09/07). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Reading, 1990. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 352-366).