published_or_final_version / Business Administration / Master / Master of Business Administration

published_or_final_version / Business Administration / Master / Master of Business Administration

Bibliography: leaves 303-339. / 339 leaves ; 30 cm. / Title page, contents and abstract only. The complete thesis in print form is available from the University Library. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Adelaide, Graduate School of Management, 2001

While investment incentives are increasingly employed by the developing economies, the vast amount of literature has failed to reach a consensus on the role of incentive regimes. A fundamental problem with the previous econometric studies is that they assume a mature market condition, under which the government should remain outside FDI competition. However, in reality, most developing countries lack a mature market and market-oriented regulatory institutions. This thesis adds to the conventional wisdom by examining whether and how Chinese investment incentive regimes have been successful in harnessing FDI during the last three decades. Like many developing economies, China is still in the process of building a market economy. The striking ability of China to attract FDI with numerous incentives presents a meaningful laboratory for examining the role of investment incentives. In contrast to most previous economic studies, this thesis does not attempt to examine the economic mechanisms of investment incentives. The basic presumption of this thesis is that incentive measures are instrument of state intervention with designed policy goals. A policy-oriented approach has thus been adopted, under which the role of investment incentives is examined against precisely defined policy objectives in a particular policy context. In China’s case, the efficacy of investment incentives is shown by a strategic and dynamic correlation between the investment incentive regime and its achieved development goals. In the given policy context, their functions cannot be replaced by more desirable instruments due to the political and economic constraints. Besides the economic evaluation, the study adds the legal dimension of evaluation on investment incentives. From a legal perspective, the regulatory space for developing countries is increasingly defined by the international legal regime. Investment incentives should be framed in a way to balance national interests and the level of protection required for foreign investment. The evolution of China’s incentive regime presents a good example to integrate global consensus with domestic imperatives. By unifying its income tax system, China adopted an incentive regime generally consistent with its WTO commitments and could be utilized to its advantages. However, serious problems inherent in the incentive system have already emerged in China, which may hamper its economic development in the long run. The thesis shows that the state’s capacity to channel FDI towards development goals is declining, as its intrusiveness has given way to arbitrariness. A top-down approach deprives foreign investors of their channels to communicate their opinions to the policymakers. The local arbitrariness and corruption in incentive implementation will compound the problem and hinder the inflows of high quality foreign investment. The thesis then proposes that the investment incentive regime in China needs to be upgraded into a more legalized system with non-discrimination, transparency, coherence and an effective monitoring mechanism as its central features. The legalization process would help to alleviate the negative effects of investment incentives. In the absence of a political infrastructure compatible with a rules-based system, the Chinese government needs to start with redefining the government-business relationship with a legal framework and reinforcing an independent judicial system. / published_or_final_version / Law / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

Foreign direct investment (FDI) was unknown to Chinese people before the opening policy in 1979, but since then China's economy has been surging ahead in the past twenty eight years. As one aspect of the FDI policy, I focused on the corporate taxation field to be my research interest, and the topic of my thesis. In the thesis, the reader will learn how FDI developed in China and degree of FDI development. Also, I provide the reader with China's tax system and policy-oriented in as much detail as possible, most of which is the tax incentive policy towards the FDI in China. However, the policies and incentives raise some issues. As the result of offering FDI tax preference, Chinese government tax revenue as a percentage of GDP has been declining steadily. Problems such as tax avoidance and evasion, and local "fake" FDI entities are getting serious. The new Corporate Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China (CIT Law) was passed by the PRC National People's Congress on March 16 2007 and will take effect on January 2008. When China entered into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, compliance with the general rules required China improve its tax system as soon as possible. The CIT law section in the thesis includes the policy-changing behind the legislation and expected influence on the FDI in China in the future. As a result of the changes to be brought about by the CIT Law, foreign and domestic business in China must adapt to the new tax regime, and I offer some recommendations in that regard. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

by Choi Cheong-Wo. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 103-106). / ABSTRACT --- p.4 / TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.5 / LIST OF TABLES & CHARTS --- p.7 / Chapter CHAPTER 1 --- INTRODUCTION --- p.9 / Research Objectives --- p.9 / Importance of Research --- p.9 / Organization --- p.10 / Chapter CHAPTER 2 --- SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY IN CHINA --- p.12 / History and Milestone --- p.12 / Current State of Affairs --- p.16 / Projection towards Year 2000 --- p.21 / The goals for the 9th FIVE Year Plan --- p.21 / The Changing Tactics --- p.23 / Other General Policies --- p.24 / Chapter CHAPTER 3 --- GENERAL ANALYSIS --- p.27 / Advance of Technology in Semiconductor in China --- p.27 / Capability vs Capacity --- p.35 / How does the development of the IC industry fair with the state of development of its economy? --- p.36 / SWOT analysis on the current Semiconductor Industry in China --- p.38 / Chapter CHAPTER 4 --- FOREIGN DIRECT- INVESTMENT IN CHINA AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER --- p.42 / Economy Evolution in China and Foreign Direct Investment --- p.42 / Form of Foreign Direct Investment in China --- p.47 / Some practical concerns on licensing arrangement and technology transfer --- p.48 / Foreign Direct Investment in the semiconductor industry in China --- p.49 / Business realities of Technology Transfer --- p.52 / Problem with FDI in China --- p.56 / The arts of mating State Plan with Company Objectives --- p.57 / Behavior of Transnational Company: A Literature Review --- p.59 / Technology Transfer by FDI in China: A Literature Review --- p.65 / Technology Transfer by FDI: Lessons to China --- p.67 / Chapter CHAPTER 5 --- EXPERIENCES IN SOUTH EAST ASIA --- p.70 / Overview --- p.71 / Korea --- p.73 / The Strategies --- p.73 / Success Factors (3) --- p.76 / Problems --- p.79 / Taiwan --- p.81 / The Strategies --- p.81 / A Distinguished Success --- p.83 / Success Factors (5) --- p.87 / Perfect Sailing Ahead …? --- p.90 / Lessons for China --- p.91 / Chapter CHAPTER 6 --- CONCLUSION --- p.101 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.103

This dissertation examines the relationship between political institutions and development policies across a wide array of policy arenas. It consists of three essays. In the first essay, I examine how corruption in political institutions affects citizens’ attitudes towards proposed policy reforms that should yield long-run benefits. I argue that where corruption in political institutions reduces citizens’ benefits from existing programs, governmental promises to deliver benefits via reforms are less credible. Thus, citizens will cling to inefficient policies not because they are unable to recognize the benefits of reform but because they do not trust political institutions to implement reforms in ways that will benefit them in practice. I use this logic to explain why citizens frequently resist attempts to reform the economically and environmentally costly practice of setting domestic gasoline prices below market prices. To reveal these patterns, I rely on original survey and administrative data from Indonesia. The second essay maintains the focuses on the quality of political institutions and natural resource governance but from a more macro perspective. In this essay, I argue that political regimes and political time horizons shape financial arrangements between governments and multinational oil companies. This essentially asks the reverse of a central question in comparative politics. Rather than asking how oil income affects political institutions, I ask how political institutions motivate politicians to make policy choices that increase or decrease the government’s access to oil income over time. To do so, I utilize an original dataset on financial arrangements between host countries and multinational oil companies, as reflected in historically confidential oil contracts. The final essay travels to a different substantive area of development policy, yet allows for a critical role for political institutions. This essay argues that the relationship between developing country governments and foreign aid donors should be conditional on the quality of political institutions, with aid donors giving countries with institutions better able to commit to selecting policies that promote development wider latitude to direct foreign aid resources towards local priorities. Instead, I find that political and security alliances shape whether donors give developing country governments more “ownership” over aid flows. Overall, the dissertation deepens understanding of the relationship between the quality of political institutions and policies within developing countries, while offering insights into contemporary policy debates about natural resource governance, environmental politics, and development aid.

In their negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between 2011 and 2016, the European Union and the United States of America (U.S.) aimed to not only reduce tariffs but to also establish regulatory coherence. For the U.S. federal states, the proposed comprehensive deal could offer both possibilities to expand transatlantic trade as well as threats to their legislative authority. This study investigates why and how some states represent their transatlantic trade promotion and trade policy interests despite constitutional limitations, why there is variation regarding these two topics of states’ interest representation and what intergovernmental conflicts arise. Based on original qualitative expert interviews, the analysis shows that U.S. states as noncentral governments are viable actors in transatlantic trade and investment relations. It is evident that a small number of mostly progressive state legislators actively engage U.S. federal and European officials to prevent the loss of state regulatory authority. Regarding the proposed trade deal, interest representation is centered around issues of federalism and sovereignty rather than economic growth opportunities. While trade promotion remains the key driver of states’ overall transatlantic activities, these findings expand our view on states’ international affairs beyond economic development.

As a result of recent events, both domestic and international, the Mexican financial markets are now open to foreign investment. It was expected that the entry of investors and capital from abroad would aid in the strengthening of domestic intermediaries and would bolster the efficiency and depth of the markets in Mexico. In order to allow the entry of foreign investments, substantial amendments and additions to financial regulations have taken place within a relatively short period of time. / Investment in domestic institutions is now open to foreign participants, irrespective of the country of origin. However, access to the Mexican markets through wholly owned subsidiaries is limited to investors from countries that have executed financial treaties with Mexico. This is the case of investors from the NAFTA countries. / A number of reputable intermediaries worldwide have entered the Mexican markets. Nevertheless, the extent of the commitment to Mexican investments is limited by political, economical and legal concerns. It is expected that policies towards more open financial markets will continue to shape the actions of the Mexican government in the future.

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is a key element in achieving progress. In a world with increasing competition for capital, it is mandatory for countries to develop different mechanisms to attract FDI. Mexico is an example of a developing country that in recent years has greatly benefited from FDI. This trend results from this country's development of a number of mechanisms on both the domestic and the international scene promoting this type of investment. Along with the investment openings being fostered on the domestic scene, Mexico has been conducting international efforts to reach FDI objectives. It has entered into a number of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) as well as Bilateral and Regional Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). The most important goals achieved by this country encouraging the reception of FDI are the preferential trade agreements signed with the two biggest markets in the world, North America and the European Union. Mexico's participation in the WTO represents one of its efforts to establish lateral ties to achieve its FDI objectives. The fact that there is a relationship between trade and investment has been established.