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This dissertation examines how the legal structuring of foreign investment works as a mechanism of political domination. It focuses on two nodes in world economy—Paris and Guinea. I show that political authority in both places has been structured by private foreign capital all the while state-based jurisdictional arbitrage conditions transnational capital. The dissertation is based on three sets of material. The centerpiece is an extended case study of so-far unrealized projects to mine iron ore in the Simandou mountain chain in Guinea. This is based on five months of ethnography in Guinea and the study of over fifteen thousand pages of documents that became public in the investor-state arbitral case BSGR vs. Guinea. Secondly, I rely on one year of ethnography with investment arbitration and project finance lawyers and investment promotion milieus in Paris, especially regarding Africa-directed investments. Finally, the dissertation draws on diverse archives and secondary literature to document the longer history of foreign investment. I draw on and contribute to three separate literatures : (a) work on legal techniques and market devices within Social Studies of Finance; (b) studies of regulatory diversity and uneven development in world economy; (c) empirical studies of moral economies of ordinary economic setups. The first chapter shows how transnational property ownership was conceived as foreign capital between 1870 and 1960 but became to be understood as foreign investment after 1960 shifting the emphasis from foreign ownership to foreigners’ contribution to domestic development. The second chapter studies how foreign investment has come to be seen a major tool for economic development and betterment based on ethnography at investment promotion events and visions of professional excellence of investment intermediaries. Chapters three and four focus on the Simandou case study. Chapter three tells how the Simandou mining contracts were negotiated and how through recourse to stabilization and investment arbitration clauses and integration of English and French law these investor-state contracts partially disembedded Guinean mineral resources from state sovereignty to become international financial assets. The fourth chapter shows how different overlapping ways to structure property over the Simandou mountain chain and its iron ore reserves were unequally scalable with investor-state arbitration backed permits being more easily convertible financial assets than land control via the host-stranger settlement paradigm. This allowed international mining companies to earn financial benefits from holding their Guinean mining titles as foreign property while presenting them as foreign investment.

by Young Yee-hoi, Kitty. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1992. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 194-210). / ABSTRACT --- p.ii / ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS --- p.x / TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.xiii / LIST OF TABLES --- p.xvi / LIST OF FIGURES --- p.xix / LIST OF APPENDICES --- p.xx / CHAPTER / Chapter I. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Historical Background --- p.4 / The Situation in Hong Kong --- p.6 / Effects on Hong Kong --- p.9 / Financial Instability --- p.9 / Brain Drain --- p.10 / Exodus of Firms --- p.12 / Relocation of Manufacturing Plants --- p.14 / "Diplomatic Relations: China, Britain and Hong Kong" --- p.15 / Confidence in Local Government --- p.16 / Change in Government Policy --- p.16 / Level of Overseas Investment --- p.17 / Studies on Political Risk in Hong Kong --- p.21 / Chapter II. --- LITERATURE REVIEW --- p.25 / Political Risk --- p.25 / Characteristics of Political Risk --- p.29 / Interpretations of Political Risk --- p.32 / Political Risk Indicators --- p.33 / Effects of Political Risk --- p.42 / Profit --- p.42 / Operations of the Firm --- p.43 / Financial Status of the Firm --- p.45 / Transferability of Assets --- p.45 / Revenue --- p.46 / Expropriation and Confiscation of the Firm --- p.47 / Policy and Strategy of the Firm --- p.47 / Dealing With Political Risk --- p.49 / Maximization of Short-term Profits --- p.49 / Minimization of Capital Commitment --- p.52 / Increase of Global Flexibilities --- p.54 / Adapt to Local Requests --- p.56 / Changing the Environment --- p.56 / Transferring the Risk --- p.58 / Divesting --- p.58 / Prospect Theory --- p.60 / Previous Studies --- p.64 / Previous Business-related Studies on Prospects Theory --- p.65 / Application of Prospect Theory in Business --- p.69 / Chapter III. --- RESEARCH DESIGN --- p.71 / Purpose of the Study --- p.71 / Scope of Study --- p.76 / Conceptual Model --- p.79 / General Introduction --- p.79 / Perception of Political Risk --- p.83 / Reference Point --- p.86 / Risk Handling Strategies --- p.87 / Company and Personal Characteristics --- p.88 / Operationalization of the Major Constructs --- p.89 / Assessment of Political Risk --- p.89 / Political Risk Handling Methods --- p.90 / Reference Point --- p.91 / Moderators: Company and Individual Characteristics --- p.94 / Hypothesis --- p.95 / Risk Handling Strategies --- p.95 / Role of the Moderators --- p.102 / Development of the Questionnaire --- p.104 / Survey Design --- p.107 / Chapter IV. --- DATA ANALYSIS --- p.110 / General Description --- p.110 / Company and Individual Characteristics --- p.111 / Assessment of Political Risk --- p.115 / Political Risk Handling Strategies --- p.120 / Reference Point --- p.125 / Data Analysis --- p.126 / Method of Analysis --- p.130 / Findings --- p.133 / Political Risk Assessment --- p.133 / Prospect Theory --- p.135 / Political Risk Assessment and Reference Point --- p.136 / Relating Strategies and Political Risk Assessment --- p.140 / Effects of Moderating Variables on Strategies --- p.150 / Implications --- p.175 / Prospect Theory --- p.175 / Political Risk Studies --- p.179 / Implications for Headquarters --- p.183 / Chapter V. --- CONCLUSION --- p.187 / Prospect Theory --- p.187 / Applying Prospect Theory in Business Strategies --- p.189 / Value to Theorists --- p.190 / Value to Management --- p.191 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.194 / APPENDICES --- p.211

Thesis (PhD)--University of Stellenbosch, 2002. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: As the title suggests, the major challenge that this study faces is to set out and design a model for analysing and enabling the management of political risk as investment risk - a model that is both sensitive to and reflective of the comprehensive business and investment climate in a country, not only credit or country risk, or only pure political risk in its narrowest definition. In reading about past and more recent research in the field of political risk analysis, it becomes clear that many authors begin by noting the diversity and the discrepancies of the existing definitions of political risk, but evidence in political risk insurance shows that the major perceived political risks that investors insure their interests against seem to be confiscation, expropriation and nationalisation. In the light of this study's findings though, a case can be put forward for urging that the conceptualisation of political risk be extended to further include any or all of the micro political risk factors and their indicators that have been identified to ensure that political events do not impact negatively on a foreign company's profitability. Foreign investors put assets at risk to achieve their objectives and the assessment of these risks, including political risks, is the key to successful operations. Opportunities and risks are often two sides of the same coin and political risk comprises a large part of the environmental forces in terms of the management challenges a Multinational Company (MNC) faces in any investment climate. A firm's foreign investment strategy deals with the positioning of the organisation in an uncertain host country environment and investment climate. This study attempts to explain how a firm's political risk exposure, which refers to the sensitivity of a firm's projected profitability and operationability in a host country to changes in the investment climate, could be managed and reduced. It is hoped that political risk analysis and management can assist foreign operations in managing the risks that might have otherwise proven to be destructive to profitability and operationability. It is irresponsible to present a potential investor with a risk assessment that does not incorporate political risk factors and their indicators, let alone environmental, societal and socio-economic risk factor indicators. Ultimately any business climate, regardless of the country being studied, is underwritten by a political system, political climate, political culture and business culture of the system in which foreign business wishes to operate profitably. What is often labelled as unnecessary and irrelevant detail in risk analysis often results in a lack of using micro risk factors and their indicators and an underestimation of the importance of such micro risk indicators. Hopefully this study takes up the challenge of showing that political risk can be managed and political risk analysis can be made more precise - that it is possible to measure and manage political risk. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Soos die titel van hierdie studie voorstel is een van die grootste uitdagings die ontwerp van 'n model vir die analise van politieke risiko as beleggingsrisiko - 'n model wat ter selfde tyd sensitief is vir en weerspieëlend van 'n land se algemeen omvattende besigheids- en beleggingsklimaat, en nie slegs suiwer politieke risiko in die nouste sin van die woord nie. 'n Literatuurstudie van meer onlangse navorsing, asook navorsing wat in die verlede gedoen is oor politieke risiko en die analise daarvan, dui daarop dat baie outeurs melding maak van die diversiteit en teenstrydighede in die bestaande definisies van politieke risiko. Die teenwoordigheid van versekering teen politieke risiko wys egter daarop dat die primêre politieke risiko's waarteen beleggers hulle belange verseker meesal nasionalisering en onteiening is, asook die beslaglegging op beleggings. Teen die agtergrond van hierdie studie se bevindinge, kan daar egter 'n saak uitgemaak word vir die verbreeding van die konseptualisering van politieke risiko om enige of alle van die mikro-politieke risiko faktorindikatore wat in hierdie studie identifiseer word in te sluit, om sodoende te verseker dat die negatiewe gevolge wat politieke gebeure moontlik mag inhou vir 'n buitelandse maatskappy se belange, sover moontlik beperk word. Buitelandse beleggers stel bates bloot aan risiko's ten einde voorafgestelde doelwitte te bereik en die assessering van hierdie risiko's, insluitende politieke risiko's, is 'n groot bydraende' faktor tot die suksesvolle bedryf van buitelandse beleggings. Geleenthede en risiko's is dikwels twee kante van diesIefde muntstuk en politieke risiko maak 'n groot deel uit van die uitdagende beleggingsomgewing waarin die bestuur van 'n multinasionale korporasie (MNK) daagliks moet funksioneer. 'n Maatskappy se buitelandse beleggingstrategie handel met die posisionering van die organisasie in die onvoorspelbare beleggingsklimaat van 'n vreemde land. Hierdie studie poog ook om te verduidelik hoe die mate waarin 'n firma blootgestel word aan politieke risiko, met ander woorde die sensitiwiteit van 'n firma se voorgenome winsgewendheid en bedryf teenoor veranderinge in die beleggingsklimaat van 'n vreemde land, bestuur en verminder kan word. Daar word gehoop dat politieke risiko analise en die bestuur daarvan 'n bydra kan lewer tot buitelandse besighede se bestuur van hierdie risiko's, wat andersins 'n vemietgende impak kan hê op die winsgewendheid van buitelandse bedrywighede. Dit is onverantwoordelik om aan 'n buitelandse belegger 'n risiko analise voor te lê wat nie politieke risiko faktore en die daarmee gepaardgaande indikatore insluit nie. Die studie argumenteer verder dat faktorindikatore wat die fisiese omgewing, sosiale asook sosio-ekonomiese faktore aanspreek ook in 'n risiko analise ingesluit moet word. Oplaas is enige besigheidsklimaat, nieteenstaande die land wat bestudeer word, onderskryf deur 'n politieke stelsel, politieke klimaat, politieke kultuur en besigheidskultuur van die stelsel waarin die buitelandse besigheid winsgewende resultate as doelwit het. Wat dikwels beskou word as onnodige en irrelevante detail in risiko analise lei dikwels tot 'n gebrek aan die insluiting van mikro-risiko faktore en hulle indikatore weens 'n onderskatting van die noodsaaklikheid daarvan om juis sulke mikro-risiko faktorindikatore in 'n risiko analise in te bou. Hierdie studie aanvaar hopelik die uitdaging om te wys dat politieke risiko tog bestuur kan word en dat politieke risiko analise tog meer eksak gemaak kan word - dat dit wel moontlik is om politieke risiko te meet en bestuur.

This dissertation is concerned with international financial crisis response and the role that formal and informal international institutions play in this process. It is about understanding the potential of and limits to international crisis governance. It tries to answer three interrelated questions. First, what are the mechanics of international crisis lending? Second, what role can international institutions play in effectively distributing information so that policy responses can be optimized? Finally, what crisis governance structures are best suited to economic and political circumstances of the global financial system? In order to address these questions this dissertation uses a combination of formal (game theory) and informal theory building. It then examines these theoretical arguments using an empirical analysis based on historical survey of crisis response since the late nineteenth century and a comparative case study of crisis management during the Great Depression (1930-31) and the Asian Financial Crisis (1997-98). With regard to the first question, it argues that crisis lending is not simply shaped by the interaction of crisis lenders and borrowers. Ultimately, the terms of a crisis loan are negotiated in a space whose limits are determined by two additional actors: international investors/speculators and domestic political opposition. With regard to the second, it argues that both formal and informal international institutions play an important role in disseminating information and thus policy adaptation and change. However, there are clear limits to what institutions can do. In practice, this means that the goal of creating a crisis-free system is impossible. Finally, with regard to the broad question of crisis governance, it argues that the most effective financial governance system is one build around a partnership between a concert of key financial powers and an international financial institution dedicated to maintaining stability in the financial system.