This thesis seeks to examine the status of retail investors’ protection in the Hellenic legal order, under the light of EU law; focusing on investment firm failure as a result of tort, it investigates whether the EU and Hellenic normative systems aim at and achieve effective protection of retail investors. It explores in particular the issue of ex lege liability of compensation schemes and the issue of non-contractual liability of supervisory authorities. In case of intermediary failure the minimum protection is awarded by EU law in the form of ex lege compensation does not establish a coherent system, and the legal status of retail investors vis-à-vis depositors remains uncertain in many respects. The ECJ has denied application of the acquis on individual protection to depositors in Peter Paul, with regard to non-contractual liability of supervisors, but the application of its reasoning in the area of investment services is doubtful. The new EU finance law and architecture does not fundamentally affect these conclusions. On the other hand, retail investor protection may validly be considered as an autonomous aim of finance law in the Hellenic legal order. Despite inefficiencies connected also to the structure of relevant EU rules transposed, and despite the incoherence of the various national rules on the liquidation of financial intermediaries and the operation of compensation schemes –in particular with regard to claim verification– yet effective protection of retail investors may a priori be achieved through the existing national judicial mechanism. This dynamic is demonstrated by recent case-law on protection of retail investors in the context of ex lege compensation; yet it seems to lessen in the area of non-contractual liability of supervisors. Even though ex lege immunity of supervisors has been denied by case-law, the effectiveness of protection has been mitigated by the strict substantive criteria formulated.

One of the main factors that spurred the 2008 financial crisis was the trading of securitized products without a clear understanding of the risks that those products bore. I argue that an appropriate regime of mandatory disclosure is the primary instrument regulators should refer to in order to correct the informational asymmetries that are present in the market for securities products. Subsequently, I take into consideration the CSA proposed legislation for the mandatory disclosure of securitized products and analyze its main components under the light of the principles of investor protection and market efficiency. I find that the new legislation should be welcome by market operators because it is a good balancing effort between the necessity to protect the investors and fostering the efficiency of the market.

One of the main factors that spurred the 2008 financial crisis was the trading of securitized products without a clear understanding of the risks that those products bore. I argue that an appropriate regime of mandatory disclosure is the primary instrument regulators should refer to in order to correct the informational asymmetries that are present in the market for securities products. Subsequently, I take into consideration the CSA proposed legislation for the mandatory disclosure of securitized products and analyze its main components under the light of the principles of investor protection and market efficiency. I find that the new legislation should be welcome by market operators because it is a good balancing effort between the necessity to protect the investors and fostering the efficiency of the market.

Yes / We study the asset pricing implications arising from imperfect investor protection using a new governance measure. This is defined as the product of institutional quality in a country and the proportion of free float shares, which captures the impact of controlling block holders. Using monthly returns of 4756 blue chip firms from 50 international equity markets for 13 years, we show through tests of variants of the augmented-CAPM, that a two factor CAPM augmented with a factor mimicking portfolio based on our new investor protection metric yields the highest explanatory power, especially for markets that exhibit true variation in ownership types.

This research studies the moderating effect of ownership concentration and the strength of investor protection on the relationship between the level of board independence, as measured by the number of non-executive directors in relation to total number of directors and the firm performance. Using a sample of 9018 observations on all non-financial publicly listed firmsin 27 OECD countries between the year 2012 and 2015. The findings show a positive correlation between board independence and firm performancein all regression models. Furthermore, I find the negative moderating effect on both shareholder concentration and investor protection on the main relationship.

There is a renewed interest in further exploring the significance of culture to the accounting disclosure model in view of a highly competitive global business environment. To date, there is no empirical research to investigate this issue with respect to a specific industry, namely banking. There are three main reasons for focusing only on the banking industry (Hooi 2004). First, it is considered to be the most important industry for the country’s economic and financial stability. Moreover, the IASB has recognised its significance by issuing unique accounting standards i.e. IAS30, IAS32 and IAS39. Second, Saidenberg and Schuermann (2003) argue that with the scope and complexity of Basel II, it provides opportunities for researching issues through Pillar 3. Third, with national banking systems being non-homogenous, it is important to investigate the effects of national culture because prior research has argued that cultural differences have partly explained international differences in disclosure framework of accounting systems. The purpose of this study is to apply and extend Gray’s (1988) theoretical framework of national culture with respect to four research questions. First, to contribute to Gray’s (1988) theory of cultural influence on international banking disclosures. Second, to investigate the possible significance of investor protection to the banking disclosure model. Third, to explore Gray’s (1988) theory on the relationship of national culture to capital market research using banking returns. Fourth, to investigate the value relevance of investor protection and banking disclosures to the returns model. Seventeen developed and developing countries with a representative sample of 37 listed domestic commercial banks were examined in 2004. For the disclosure model, the study finds that national culture is a significant factor in the banking industry. Individualism has been found as the primary cultural dimension for banking disclosures. Moreover, the explanatory power of the model significantly improves with the legal dimensions of common law and anti-director rights. The positive association between common law and banking disclosures is consistent with La Porta et al. (1998) which argue that common law countries with stronger investor protection are more transparent than civil law countries. However, there is a negative association between investor protection variable of anti-director rights with banking disclosures. This may suggest that investor protection does not encourage minority investors to enter the stock market specifically in the global banking industry. This situation may lead to a lack of demand for transparency through a smaller dispersion of ownership across the domestic banks. For the returns model, the study finds that national culture is value relevant in the banking industry. Collectivism and power distance have been found to be the two primary cultural dimensions for banking returns. Moreover, the explanatory power of the model significantly improves with anti-director rights and banking disclosures. These results are (1) consistent with La Porta et al. (2002) which argue that investor protection increases firm valuation with respect to Tobin’s Q and (2) international investors tend to support the Basel Committee’s commitment in providing a more transparent framework by implementing Pillar 3 in the near future, starting with the Basel member countries. Finally, an interesting finding from the study is that firm size has a negative association with banking returns.

We investigate whether multiple large shareholders (MLS) play an internal corporate governance role in mitigating agency problems between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders in a cross-country sample of public firms. We draw our conclusion by examining the market reaction (in terms of bidder announcement period abnormal returns) to acquisition announcements made by firms with and without MLS in their ownership structure. Using an international sample of acquisition announcements made by firms with at least one large shareholder from 10 Western European and 5 East Asian countries between 1996 and 2000, we find the presence of MLS, their voting rights, relative voting power, the number of blockholders and the relative voting power of these blockholders have a positive and significant impact on bidder announcement period abnormal returns. We also find that the legal institutions such as disclosure requirement, investor protection, common-law legal origin and anti-self-dealing have positive effects on bidder announcement period abnormal returns.

We investigate whether multiple large shareholders (MLS) play an internal corporate governance role in mitigating agency problems between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders in a cross-country sample of public firms. We draw our conclusion by examining the market reaction (in terms of bidder announcement period abnormal returns) to acquisition announcements made by firms with and without MLS in their ownership structure. Using an international sample of acquisition announcements made by firms with at least one large shareholder from 10 Western European and 5 East Asian countries between 1996 and 2000, we find the presence of MLS, their voting rights, relative voting power, the number of blockholders and the relative voting power of these blockholders have a positive and significant impact on bidder announcement period abnormal returns. We also find that the legal institutions such as disclosure requirement, investor protection, common-law legal origin and anti-self-dealing have positive effects on bidder announcement period abnormal returns.

This study examines the relationship of firm-level corporate governance and firm value, proposing a moderating effect by country-level creditor protection rights in case of M&As. In order to analyse this setting a sample of 331 deals over the period of 14 years (2002-2015) was evaluated. Evidence for a negative relationship of corporate governance and firm value could be found and provides support for the negative spillover theory. Moreover, proof for a negative moderating effect of creditor protection rights is in line with previous literature which suggests that stronger creditor protection rights result in lower risk-taking behaviour which consequently leads to lower firm value. This connection of creditor rights and risk-taking is therefore influencing corporate governance. Furthermore, stronger creditor protection rights are assumed to directly affect firm value. However, no definite conclusion regarding the assumed negative relationship of firm value and creditor protection rights can be drawn since this finding is lacking statistical significance.

This study examines the effect of corporate liquidity and investor protection on the relation between financial distress and equity returns using a European sample over the 2002-2016 period. The results show that returns are hump-shaped and decreasing for increasing default risk. This can be rationalized by corporate liquidity indicating that higher cash holdings decrease liquidity risk. Moreover, firms in countries with high investor protection exhibit a more severe decrease of returns when default risk increases relative to firms in countries with low investor protection. This is because of the legal system that allows investors to renegotiate upon distress and to more accurately price equities.