Este estudo objetiva definir uma metodologia para cálculo do potencial de expropriação de fluxo de caixa dos acionistas controladores sobre os acionistas minoritários e correlacionar esse potencial com os mecanismos de Governança Corporativa (GC) comumente citados, de forma a verificar se tais mecanismos realmente influenciam nos níveis de expropriação das empresas de capital aberto no Brasil. Para tanto, apresenta três etapas: 1) definição de uma metodologia para cálculo do potencial de expropriação de fluxo de caixa dos acionistas controladores; 2) mensuração do potencial definido para as empresas que realizaram operações de alienação/venda de controle acionário no Brasil nos anos de 2004 a 2010 conforme prerrogativas da Instrução CVM nº 361/2002, a qual exige que as empresas publiquem, dentre outros dados, o preço ofertado pelo controle; e 3) correlação do potencial de expropriação calculado com os mecanismos de Governança Corporativa mais citados para analisar a efetividade destes no combate à expropriação. Por meio de deduções algébricas para a definição do potencial de expropriação e análise multivariada de dados (regressões múltiplas) para a análise da correlação entre este e os mecanismos de GC destacam-se os seguintes resultados: 1) a definição de uma próxi viável para o cálculo do potencial de expropriação e 2) a expropriação de fluxo de caixa é determinada pelo free float das ações ordinárias, pelo porte do ativo, pelo Return on Equiy (ROE), pela composição da Diretoria Executiva e da presidência do Conselho de Administração e pelos Níveis de GC da Bovespa. As relações entre o potencial de expropriação e as suas variáveis determinantes são: o potencial de expropriação é menor quanto menor for o free float, quanto maior for o porte do ativo, em empresas nas quais o Diretor Executivo e o Presidente do Conselho são a mesma pessoa e nas empresas com níveis de GC da Bovespa, sendo baixa a representatividade dessas duas últimas devido ao baixo número de empresas na amostra com tais características. Tais relações contrariam a teoria corrente, principalmente quanto à influência do free float, que é apontado como uma forma de minimizar o problema da expropriação, sendo até mesmo exigido em níveis diferenciados de governança como forma de limitar o risco da empresa, porém consistente com os resultados obtidos no decorrer da dedução do potencial de expropriação. / This study means to define a methodology to calculate the expropriation potential of cash flow by controlling shareholders over minority shareholders and to correlate this potential with Corporate Governance (CG) mechanisms commonly cited in order to verify if these mechanisms influence levels of expropriation of Brazilian publicly traded companies. For both, has three steps: 1) definition of a methodology to calculate the expropriation potential of cash flow by controlling shareholders; 2) mensuration of the defined potential for companies that sold or alienated their control in Brazil in the years 2004 to 2010 as prerogatives of CVM Instruction nº 361/2002, which requires that companies publish, among other data, the price offered by the control; and 3) correlation of expropriation potential with Corporate Governance mechanisms more cited to analyze their effectiveness to reduce the expropriation. By means of algebraic deductions and multivariate analysis (Multiple Regression) for correlation analysis of it and the Corporate Governance mechanisms, highlight the following results: 1) the viable definition of a proxy to calculate the expropriation potential and 2) the cash flow expropriation is determined by the free float of ordinary shares, by Return on Equity (ROE), by asset size, by the composition of Executive Direction and the Chairman of the Board and by CG levels according Bovespas Classification. The relations between the expropriation potential and its determinants variables are: the expropriation potential is lower than lower the free float, than higher the Return on Equity (ROE), than lower the asset size, in companies that the Executive Director and the Chairman of the Board are the same person and in companies that has the Corporate Governance level by Bovespa, but the representative of these last two variables is low, because there are few companies with these characteristics. These relations contradict the current theory, especially regarding the influence of free float, which is targeted as a way to minimize the expropriation problem, being required even at levels of Corporate Governance as a form to limit the companys risk, but it is consistent with the results of expropriation potential deduction.

Submitted by Vinicius Augusto Brunassi Silva (vinicius.vitio@gmail.com) on 2011-12-06T18:47:12Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Vinicius_Dissertação.pdf: 237652 bytes, checksum: 20111eda1d23b9c396a750183cbdc94c (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Gisele Isaura Hannickel (gisele.hannickel@fgv.br) on 2011-12-06T18:48:13Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Vinicius_Dissertação.pdf: 237652 bytes, checksum: 20111eda1d23b9c396a750183cbdc94c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2011-12-07T12:55:58Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Vinicius_Dissertação.pdf: 237652 bytes, checksum: 20111eda1d23b9c396a750183cbdc94c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-11-25 / This paper examines the relationship between covenants, short-term and long-term debt with companies which face growth opportunities. Using a sample of 159 Brazilian corporate bonds, we found evidence that: 1) Covenants and short-term debt are substitute tools to minimize agency conflict, since they presented a negative and significant relation and; 2) The negative relation between short-term debt and growth opportunities might be attenuated in the presence of covenants. / Esta dissertação tem como objetivo analisar a relação entre covenants e alavancagem financeira no curto e longo prazo com oportunidades de crescimento. A partir de uma amostra de 159 debêntures, encontramos evidência de que: 1) Covenants e dívida de curto-prazo podem ser considerados substitutos na atenuação do conflito de agência, uma vez que apresentaram relação negativa e significante e; 2) A relação negativa existente entre dívida de curto prazo e oportunidades de crescimento pode ser reduzida através da utilização de covenants.

Este estudo objetiva definir uma metodologia para cálculo do potencial de expropriação de fluxo de caixa dos acionistas controladores sobre os acionistas minoritários e correlacionar esse potencial com os mecanismos de Governança Corporativa (GC) comumente citados, de forma a verificar se tais mecanismos realmente influenciam nos níveis de expropriação das empresas de capital aberto no Brasil. Para tanto, apresenta três etapas: 1) definição de uma metodologia para cálculo do potencial de expropriação de fluxo de caixa dos acionistas controladores; 2) mensuração do potencial definido para as empresas que realizaram operações de alienação/venda de controle acionário no Brasil nos anos de 2004 a 2010 conforme prerrogativas da Instrução CVM nº 361/2002, a qual exige que as empresas publiquem, dentre outros dados, o preço ofertado pelo controle; e 3) correlação do potencial de expropriação calculado com os mecanismos de Governança Corporativa mais citados para analisar a efetividade destes no combate à expropriação. Por meio de deduções algébricas para a definição do potencial de expropriação e análise multivariada de dados (regressões múltiplas) para a análise da correlação entre este e os mecanismos de GC destacam-se os seguintes resultados: 1) a definição de uma próxi viável para o cálculo do potencial de expropriação e 2) a expropriação de fluxo de caixa é determinada pelo free float das ações ordinárias, pelo porte do ativo, pelo Return on Equiy (ROE), pela composição da Diretoria Executiva e da presidência do Conselho de Administração e pelos Níveis de GC da Bovespa. As relações entre o potencial de expropriação e as suas variáveis determinantes são: o potencial de expropriação é menor quanto menor for o free float, quanto maior for o porte do ativo, em empresas nas quais o Diretor Executivo e o Presidente do Conselho são a mesma pessoa e nas empresas com níveis de GC da Bovespa, sendo baixa a representatividade dessas duas últimas devido ao baixo número de empresas na amostra com tais características. Tais relações contrariam a teoria corrente, principalmente quanto à influência do free float, que é apontado como uma forma de minimizar o problema da expropriação, sendo até mesmo exigido em níveis diferenciados de governança como forma de limitar o risco da empresa, porém consistente com os resultados obtidos no decorrer da dedução do potencial de expropriação. / This study means to define a methodology to calculate the expropriation potential of cash flow by controlling shareholders over minority shareholders and to correlate this potential with Corporate Governance (CG) mechanisms commonly cited in order to verify if these mechanisms influence levels of expropriation of Brazilian publicly traded companies. For both, has three steps: 1) definition of a methodology to calculate the expropriation potential of cash flow by controlling shareholders; 2) mensuration of the defined potential for companies that sold or alienated their control in Brazil in the years 2004 to 2010 as prerogatives of CVM Instruction nº 361/2002, which requires that companies publish, among other data, the price offered by the control; and 3) correlation of expropriation potential with Corporate Governance mechanisms more cited to analyze their effectiveness to reduce the expropriation. By means of algebraic deductions and multivariate analysis (Multiple Regression) for correlation analysis of it and the Corporate Governance mechanisms, highlight the following results: 1) the viable definition of a proxy to calculate the expropriation potential and 2) the cash flow expropriation is determined by the free float of ordinary shares, by Return on Equity (ROE), by asset size, by the composition of Executive Direction and the Chairman of the Board and by CG levels according Bovespas Classification. The relations between the expropriation potential and its determinants variables are: the expropriation potential is lower than lower the free float, than higher the Return on Equity (ROE), than lower the asset size, in companies that the Executive Director and the Chairman of the Board are the same person and in companies that has the Corporate Governance level by Bovespa, but the representative of these last two variables is low, because there are few companies with these characteristics. These relations contradict the current theory, especially regarding the influence of free float, which is targeted as a way to minimize the expropriation problem, being required even at levels of Corporate Governance as a form to limit the companys risk, but it is consistent with the results of expropriation potential deduction.

This study examines the relationship of firm-level corporate governance and firm value, proposing a moderating effect by country-level creditor protection rights in case of M&As. In order to analyse this setting a sample of 331 deals over the period of 14 years (2002-2015) was evaluated. Evidence for a negative relationship of corporate governance and firm value could be found and provides support for the negative spillover theory. Moreover, proof for a negative moderating effect of creditor protection rights is in line with previous literature which suggests that stronger creditor protection rights result in lower risk-taking behaviour which consequently leads to lower firm value. This connection of creditor rights and risk-taking is therefore influencing corporate governance. Furthermore, stronger creditor protection rights are assumed to directly affect firm value. However, no definite conclusion regarding the assumed negative relationship of firm value and creditor protection rights can be drawn since this finding is lacking statistical significance.

We re-examine the determinants of institutional ownership (IO) from a segmentation perspective -- i.e. accounting for a hypothesized systematic exclusion of stocks that cause high implementation or agency costs. Incorporating segmentation effects substantially improves both explained variance in IO and model parsimony (essentially requiring just one input: market capitalization). Our evidence clearly establishes a role for both implementation costs and agency considerations in explaining segmentation effects. Implementation costs bind for larger, less diversified, and higher turnover institutions. Agency costs bind for smaller institutions and clienteles sensitive to fiduciary diligence. Agency concerns dominate; characteristics relating to the agency hypothesis have far more explanatory power in identifying the cross-section of segmentation effects than characteristics relating to the implementation hypothesis. Importantly, our study finds evidence for interior optimum with respect to the institution's scale, due to the counteracting effect between implementation and agency frictions. We then explore three implications of segmentation for the equity market. First, a mass exodus of publicly listed stocks predicted to fall outside institutions' investable universe helps explain the listing puzzle. There has been no comparable exit by institutionally investable stocks. Second, institutional segmentation can lead to narrow investment opportunity sets, which limit money managers' ability to take advantage of profitable opportunities outside their investment segment. In this respect, we construct pricing factors that are feasible (ex-ante) for institutions and benchmark their performance. We find evidence consistent with the demand-based asset pricing view. Specifically, IO return factors yield higher return premia and worsened institutional performance relative to standard benchmarks in an expanding institutional setting (pre-millennium). Third, we use our logistic model and examine the effect of aggregated segmentation on the institutions' portfolio returns. Our findings suggest that investment constraints cut profitable opportunities and restrict institutions from generating alpha. In addition, we find that stocks with abnormal institutional ownership generate significant positive returns, suggesting institution actions are informed. / Doctor of Philosophy / We demonstrate that implementation and agency frictions restrict professional money managers from ownership of particular stocks. We characterize this systematic exclusion of stocks as segmentation and show that a specification that accommodates the segmentation effect substantially improves the empirical fit of institutional demand. The adjusted R-squared increases substantially; the residuals are better behaved, and the dimensionality of institutions' demands for stock characteristics reduces from a list of 8-10 standard characteristics (e.g., market cap, liquidity, index membership, volatility, beta) to just one: a stock's market capitalization. Our evidence identifies a prominent role for both implementation costs and agency costs as determinants of institutional segmentation. Implementation costs bind for larger, less diversified, and higher turnover institutions. Agency costs bind for smaller institutions and clienteles sensitive to fiduciary diligence. In fact, we find that segmentation arises from a trade-off between implementation costs (which bind for larger institutions) and agency considerations (which bind for smaller institutions). Agency concerns dominate; characteristics relating to the agency hypothesis have far more explanatory power in identifying the cross-section of segmentation effects than characteristics relating to the implementation hypothesis. More importantly, we find evidence for interior optimum with respect to the institution's scale, due to the counteracting effect between implementation and agency frictions. This conclusion is important to considerations of scale economies/diseconomies in investment management. The agency story goes in the opposite direction to the conventional wisdom underlying scale arguments. We then explore three implications of segmentation for the equity market. First, our evidence suggests that institutional segmentation coupled with growing institutional dominance in public equity markets may have had a truncating effect on the universe of listed stocks. Stocks predicted to fall outside of institutions' investable universe were common prior to the 1990s, but are now almost nonexistent. By contrast, stocks predicted to fall within institutions' investable universe have not declined over time. Second, institutional segmentation can lead to narrow investment opportunity sets, which limit money managers' ability to take advantage of profitable opportunities outside their investment segment. In this respect, we construct pricing factors that are feasible (ex-ante) for institutions and benchmark their performance. We find evidence consistent with the demand-based asset pricing view. Specifically, feasible return factors yield higher return premia and worsened institutional performance relative to standard benchmarks in an expanding institutional setting (pre-millennium). Third, we use logistic specification and examine the effect of aggregated segmentation on the institutions' portfolio returns. Our findings suggest that investment constraints cut profitable opportunities and restrict institutions from generating alpha. In addition, we find that stocks with high (low) abnormal institutional ownership generate significant positive (negative) returns, suggesting institution actions are informed.

Esta tese dá continuidade aos trabalhos de Vianna (1982, 1989), que discute o uso da subjetividade em previsões. A partir de uma crítica da visão objetivista preponderante na teoria administrativa, apresenta um método híbrido de análise do ambiente empresarial. Ainda como instrumento de análise é formulada uma matriz de confronto entre as expectativas dos administradores, declaradas em relatórios a acionistas, e as reais possibilidades circunstanciais indicadas pelo método híbrido. O confronto contribui para evidenciar possíveis conflitos de agência. Em seguida, o método híbrido proposto é aplicado por meio de um estudo de caso no setor aeroviário comercial brasileiro. / This thesis draws upon extends Vianna’s (1982, 1989) work on the use of subjectivity in administrative forecasts. Taking as a starting point a critical stance on objectivist conceptions in administrative theories, this thesis offers a hybrid method for the analysis of managerial environments. It also introduces a novel analytical category - a matrix which allows one to contrast, on the one hand, managerial expectations, declared in reports to the stockholders, and, on the other hand, actual circumstantial possibilities, such as revealed by the hybrid method. The contrast contributes to the identification of agency conflicts. Next, after description and discussion of the analytical categories adopted, the hybrid methodology is applied, through one case study, to the analysis of aspects of the Brazilian commercial air transportation sector.

O propósito deste estudo é investigar os potenciais determinantes da qualidade das auditorias no Brasil. Seus determinantes foram definidos a partir da abordagem teórica oferecida pelo modelo de Arruñada (1997), expandido na dimensão de competência profissional dos auditores. Adicionalmente, no sentido de se testar, empiricamente, os determinantes da qualidade das auditorias realizadas nas empresas listadas na Bovespa no período de 1998 a 2008, um construto inédito (o Índice de Qualidade das Auditorias IQUA) foi desenvolvido. Os resultados alcançados sugeriram que a qualidade das auditorias é inferior quanto maior o conflito de agência entre controladores e não controladores e quanto maior o tempo de relacionamento contínuo entre o auditor e a entidade auditada. Adicionalmente, as evidências empíricas coletadas indicaram que as firmas de auditoria chamadas de Big-N, bem como os auditores especialistas nos segmentos de indústria de seus clientes, oferecem serviços de maior qualidade. / The aim of this research is to investigate the potential determinants of audit quality in Brazil. Such determinants were defined by using the theoretical perspective of Arruñadas (1997) model, expanded in the dimension of auditors professional competence. Furthermore, in order to empirically test the determinants of audit quality for Brazilian listed companies between 1998 and 2008, an original construct (Audit Quality Index IQUA) has been developed. Results from such tests suggest that audit quality is lower when agency conflicts between controlling and non-controlling shareholders are higher and when auditors tenure is higher. Moreover, evidence obtained from empirical testing indicated that the so-called Big-N audit firms, as well as specialized auditors, offer higher quality audit services to their clients.

This study employs ethnographic research to investigate the extent to which local governance affects both poverty and natural resources management in the Delta region. The research develops a framework for governance of natural resources to understand the daily practices of different actors within the local context using informal observation and interviews. In applying the framework, the study places emphasis on resources for governance, actors' agency, arrangements of access to resources and governance outcomes in the Delta region. Evidence from the study shows that while the state and corporate actors only contextualise resources in terms of economic value, local actors interprete resources beyond economic value to incorporate symbolic and socio-culturally constructed values linked with historic values. The study also identified relational, routine practices and structural factors which differently shape actors' agency for resources management. The context which shapes different arrangements of access to local resources by actors varies. These arrangements are subject to negotiation, power differences and socio-cultural factors. The findings related to governance outcomes reveal both positive (favourable) and negative (unfavourable) outcomes for the livelihood of different actors. The study concludes by exploring implications for local governance in order to address poverty and enhance optimal resource management in the Delta region.

O propósito deste estudo é investigar os potenciais determinantes da qualidade das auditorias no Brasil. Seus determinantes foram definidos a partir da abordagem teórica oferecida pelo modelo de Arruñada (1997), expandido na dimensão de competência profissional dos auditores. Adicionalmente, no sentido de se testar, empiricamente, os determinantes da qualidade das auditorias realizadas nas empresas listadas na Bovespa no período de 1998 a 2008, um construto inédito (o Índice de Qualidade das Auditorias IQUA) foi desenvolvido. Os resultados alcançados sugeriram que a qualidade das auditorias é inferior quanto maior o conflito de agência entre controladores e não controladores e quanto maior o tempo de relacionamento contínuo entre o auditor e a entidade auditada. Adicionalmente, as evidências empíricas coletadas indicaram que as firmas de auditoria chamadas de Big-N, bem como os auditores especialistas nos segmentos de indústria de seus clientes, oferecem serviços de maior qualidade. / The aim of this research is to investigate the potential determinants of audit quality in Brazil. Such determinants were defined by using the theoretical perspective of Arruñadas (1997) model, expanded in the dimension of auditors professional competence. Furthermore, in order to empirically test the determinants of audit quality for Brazilian listed companies between 1998 and 2008, an original construct (Audit Quality Index IQUA) has been developed. Results from such tests suggest that audit quality is lower when agency conflicts between controlling and non-controlling shareholders are higher and when auditors tenure is higher. Moreover, evidence obtained from empirical testing indicated that the so-called Big-N audit firms, as well as specialized auditors, offer higher quality audit services to their clients.

Esta tese dá continuidade aos trabalhos de Vianna (1982, 1989), que discute o uso da subjetividade em previsões. A partir de uma crítica da visão objetivista preponderante na teoria administrativa, apresenta um método híbrido de análise do ambiente empresarial. Ainda como instrumento de análise é formulada uma matriz de confronto entre as expectativas dos administradores, declaradas em relatórios a acionistas, e as reais possibilidades circunstanciais indicadas pelo método híbrido. O confronto contribui para evidenciar possíveis conflitos de agência. Em seguida, o método híbrido proposto é aplicado por meio de um estudo de caso no setor aeroviário comercial brasileiro. / This thesis draws upon extends Vianna’s (1982, 1989) work on the use of subjectivity in administrative forecasts. Taking as a starting point a critical stance on objectivist conceptions in administrative theories, this thesis offers a hybrid method for the analysis of managerial environments. It also introduces a novel analytical category - a matrix which allows one to contrast, on the one hand, managerial expectations, declared in reports to the stockholders, and, on the other hand, actual circumstantial possibilities, such as revealed by the hybrid method. The contrast contributes to the identification of agency conflicts. Next, after description and discussion of the analytical categories adopted, the hybrid methodology is applied, through one case study, to the analysis of aspects of the Brazilian commercial air transportation sector.