This dissertation investigates the extent to which between Islam and democracy are compatible in the Muslim world. While some scholars have argued that Islam is inherently incompatible with democracy many have found, in contrast, that Islam has many resources to accommodate a successful democratic state. If Islam is compatible with democratic governance at a doctrinal level, why then are the majority of Muslim countries largely authoritarian? To address this question, I introduce a refinement on this discrepancy by focusing on the coexistence of emerging Islamic institutions with democratic transitions in 49 Muslim-majority states. Traditionally, Islam has been operationalized as a "dichotomous" variable based on demographics or an "attitudinal" measure based on survey responses. Both measures have failed to account for an inherent variation of Islam's role across the Muslim world. I developed a new index to assess the variation in Islam factor across Muslim countries: <italic>Islamic Institutionalization Index</italic> (III). This new index avoids the shortcomings of the current approaches to quantifying "Islam" and captures the range of variation in Islamic Institutions across 49 countries by allowing scholars to gauge the density and level of Islam in each country. With the index I designed, I rely on three different levels of analysis to examine under which circumstances Islam and democracy can coexist. More precisely, by looking into three categories of Islamic institutions (educational, political, and financial), I raise the following question: "To what extent and in what levels do Islamic Institutions support the coexistence between Islam and Democracy?"Analyzing 49 Muslim-majority states, I utilize mixed methodology by using <italic>Configurational Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis</italic> (FS/QCA) and focused case study analysis. FS-QCA offers an innovative and robust approach to identify configurationally complex factors while discerning the emerging patterns displayed by medium size (N=49) cases. To further explain the complex interplay of conditions, I focus on two case studies in greater detail: Kazakhstan and Turkey. I find a strong empirical association between the density and scope of Islamic political, educational and financial institutions and the existence of democratic norms (civil and political liberties and democratic institutions). Findings further suggest that Islamic institutions can coexist with civil and political liberties when governments allow Islamic institutionalization to function in society with no stern political restrictions. Among the three categories of III, Islamic states with higher levels of <italic>Islamic political institutions</italic> manifest <italic>particularly</italic> higher levels of democracy. Conversely, states that ban the emergence of a range of Islamic institutions in politics, education, and interest-free banking exhibit low levels of freedom and stunted democratic institutions.

The main objective of this study is to analyze the political struggle between the Indonesian army and Islamic political parties in the New Order era between 1966--1977. The historical background of the involvement of the army in politics and the attempt of political Islam to establish an Islamic state is a central issue that characterized the relationship between these two groups. When the New Order came to power in 1966, it has exercised strict control over politically organized Islam. With the army emerged as the most significant political force, there was no choice for political Islam except to reformulate its political agenda in order to suit national development program undertaken by the military backed government. The future of political Islam and the involvement of the army in the social and political arena in Indonesia field has since then been central to the development of political system in that country.

No abstract available. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2012.

The ulama in Madura are an inseparable part of the local social structure. Their strategic position has given them an excellent opportunity to exercise a leadership role in the local context. The ulama's niche in the social order of the village and the forces that participate in the process of change can be seen through a study of village religion in a historical context. More specifically, this study examines village religion in a contemporary setting, and focuses on the internal structure of the villages and their relations to the outside world. The ulama play an important role in a number of domains, and thus occupy a central position in society. Indeed, their religious leadership has nurtured the emergence of complex networks of followers and colleagues which have, over time, sustained the stability of the ulama's leadership role in the face of social and political vicissitudes.

No description available.

No description available.

The main thesis of this study is that Islam played a role in the history of the Tunisian nationalist movement on two levels. It was considered as a fundamental component in defining the specificity of the Tunisian nation, source of legitimacy of the Tunisian nationalist movement both before and after independence. Moreover, as a fundamental component of the Tunisian "personality", it influenced the mode of communication used by nationalist leaders to mobilize the masses. / The biographical approach served to focus the issue through the prism of Habib Bourguiba's life. It revealed that even this most secular of Arab leaders could not shed the Arab-Islamic heritage of Tunisia precisely because Islam, as a fundamental component of the Tunisian "personality" and as the language of the masses, held the key to political legitimacy.

The political events that unfolded on September 11 200 I, marked a turning point in world history. The attacks on the United States brought into sharp focus, the very complex issue of political violence being perpetrated by elements from within the Muslim world, and the project of what is commonly referred to as Political Islam. These events have subsequently led to an intensification of scrutiny of Muslims globally, by the Western world, as well as the establishment of heightened security measures by many governments, with Muslims being subjected to increasing levels of suspicion and the curtailment of civil liberties. Accompanying this scrutiny of Muslims, has been the United States led "War on Terror," which has further fuelled anger and resentment within the Muslim world, and inspired the carrying out of further attacks of political violence against Western targets such as Britain and Spain, by Muslim militants. This thesis attempts to locate the unfolding of these acts of political violence, within the broad framework of an examination of what constitutes the arena of Political Islam (which is seen as the interface between the Islamic faith and political activity by Muslims), and to interrogate two streams of political expression within Political Islam. These are Militant Islam and Progressive Islam. This interrogation will attempt to take into account the historical development of political thought and action within the Muslim world, and Islam's encounter with the projects of colonialism, empire and orientalism, in order to understand and offer some analysis around the possible reasons for the phenomenon of contemporary political violence emanating from the Muslim world. The study will also argue that progressive expressions of Islam are more representative of the essence of Quranic teachings and that militancy, while sometimes necessary, is not an ideal way for Muslims to engage politics. The case study within which the broader theoretical argument unfolds, is the post-apartheid South African Muslim context. This case study examines how SA Muslims are expressing themselves politically in a democratic dispensation, and whether they are inclined towards militant or progressive expressions, as a faith based community engaging politics. The thesis concludes by offering suggestions for how SA Muslims can advance a peaceful progressive political agenda, which acts as a model for Muslim communities elsewhere. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2009.

This thesis investigates the activities of the Majlisul Islamil A`la Indonesia (MIAI), an Islamic federative organization of pre-independent Indonesia, elaborating in particular on the federation's socio-religious and political stance. Operating for only six years (1937--1943), the MIAI represented Muslim groups, as a counterpart to the "secularists," within the nationalist movement during both the final years of Dutch rule and the early stages of the Japanese occupation. The MIAI was established for the specific purpose of unifying the Islamic organizations---political and non-political, traditionalist and modernist alike---while at the same time reviving Muslim political and socio-religious strength after the decline of the Sarekat Islam, which had for almost fifteen years dominated the nationalist scene. / The mission of the MIAI was seen by Muslims as a response to the threat posed by external forces. It reacted in particular against Dutch policies considered discriminatory by Muslims concerning matters involving Islamic belief and practice, such as marriage and education. The federation also took a strong stand regarding Christian polemic aimed at Islam and took part in Indonesian Muslim response. That the establishment of the MIAI was favored by most Islamic organizations attested to the strong sentiment among Indonesian Muslims for a common front, regardless of their differences on socio-religious and political issues. Together with the GAPI (Gabungan Partai Politik Indonesia or the Federation of Indonesian Political Parties) and the PVPN (Persatuan Vakbonden Pegawai Negeri, or the Association of Government Employees), the MIAI took part in demanding political reform on behalf of Muslim groups. Indeed, notwithstanding its short life span, the MIAI was a pioneer for national unity in general and Indonesian Muslim unity in particular.

The object of this thesis is to explain why Pakistan which Muslim nationalist historians claim was created in the name of Islam failed to sustain a democratic political system. This question is explored by examining the politics of South Asian Muslims as a continuity from the colonial to the post-partition period, focusing on the tension between centripetal and centrifugal forces. The thesis begins by investigating the factors which helped politicize Muslim identity during the inter-war years. The interplay of nationalism, constitutional reforms and common identity based on confessional faith forged political identities which determined the course of subsequent events. Dyarchy set in motion processes which the Government of India Act of 1935 reinforced,- the emergence of political solidarities based on religion and region and alienation from nationalist politics. The Congress was able to neutralize the centrifugal developments among its Hindu constituency. It was not so successful among Muslims partly due to the impact of the Reforms and partly due to the activity of Hindu revivalists in the party. Simultaneously Muslim politics was moving away from the Congress, not towards the Muslim League but to the All-India Muslim Conference, around which most Muslims had gathered in opposition to the Nehru Report. However most regional and communitarian parties were not simply antagonistic to the Congress. They rejected centralist politics as a whole. This was amply demonstrated by the 1937 election results which underlined Jinnah's irrelevance to Muslim politics. Hence Muslims were in their political loyalties divided between strong currents focused on provincial interests and weak ones emphasizing sub-continental unity, national or Muslim. This configuration, the opposition between centrifugal and centripetal forces defined the basic parameters of Muslim politics. The second chapter describes how the political divisions between Muslims was partially overcome. The 1937 elections initiated a major political shift among the Muslim regional parties and caused great unease among the urban groupings. The Muslim regional partie's feared that the Congress Party's control over provincial ministries through a centralized structure and its rejection of the federal basis of the 1935 Act, would lead to their being roped into a Hindu-dominated unitary state. To fight this threat, an alternative political focus at the all-India level came to be considered necessary for the protection of their interests. The Muslim League's revival was indirectly facilitated by the Quit India Movement which temporarily removed the Congress from the arena of open politics and by the encouragement Jinnah received from the Raj. The League was able to gradually pull Muslim groups, particularly those in the Muslim-minority provinces, into its ranks through the use of anti-Congress propaganda. But among the urban masses of UP Jinnah was eclipsed by Mashriqi until the mid-1940s when the Khaksars became a spent force. This development combined with the increasing influence of the Pakistan slogan, vague yet immensely attractive, provided the ideological cutting edge of the League's agenda for Muslim unity. The ideological hegemony allowed the League to focus the forces of community consciousness as a battering ram to breakdown the regional parties resistance. The Pakistan slogan spread from the urban areas and Muslim-minority provinces into the rural areas of the Muslim-majority provinces. But in Bengal the regionalist had taken over the party, in the Punjab Khizr continued to resist and in the NWFP and Sind the Muslim League was a peripheral influence. Hence by the mid-1940s the League was only able to achieve partial unity under the Pakistan banner. The third chapter deals with the brief moment of political unity achieved through the combined impact of mass nationalism and communal riots. After the constitutional deadlock following the breakdown of the Simla Conference the League was able to make major advances by positing a clear choice between their and the Congress's plans for India's future. Muslim nationalism now centred on the League capitalized on the political uncertainties caused by the negotiations and won over many adherents from the provincial parties. An important factor which widened the League's area of influence was the increased significance of economic nationalism. It opened channels of communication between the elites and the masses, drew in groups previously unaffected by the Muslim League and turned the agitation for Pakistan into a mass movement. These factors combined with the weakness of the Congress due to their incarceration during the war resulted in the widespread shift away from the regional parties to the Muslim League. Jinnah was able to achieve for a brief moment political unity and used this as the basis to extract the maximum constitutional concessions from the British and the Congress. However the centralization process was weak and its frailty was at the root of ideological confusion. The confusion was manifest in the changing definition of Pakistan in this crucial period. The problem was compounded by the League's lack of strong party structure to control and enforce discipline over the regional supporters. Jinnah's interventions in the provinces were the exception and not the rule and limited to disciplining local leaders. For expanding the party's influence he was completely dependent on the provincial leaders. The regionalist forces were not genuine converts to Muslim nationalism. They used the League as a stalking horse for their provincial interests. Jinnah accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan due to the strong pressures from the Muslim-majority provinces who were not interested in a separate homeland for Muslims and later he supported Suhrawardy's attempt to avoid partition of Bengal. Jinnah had to be responsive to these different currents within the party in order to avoid a revolt against his leadership. Besides the internal pressure, pro-Congress opposition was still strong in Sarhad and Sind and they used regional ethnicity as a counter against the League. However the opposition collapsed when the civil disobedience movement mounted by the League at this extremely tense moment triggered off the communal explosion which engulfed northern India and as a result the Congress accepted partition. The fourth chapter deals with the Muslim League's effort to consolidate its position in Pakistan through the construction of a strong state and the potent anti-centre backlash it produced. Pakistan came into existence through the contingent circumstances attending the transfer of power and the League's leadership was ill-prepared to establishing itself in Pakistan. The perceived threat from India and the internal opposition to the leadership convinced them that the country and they themselves could survive politically only if a strong centre was established. However the ethnic composition of the ruling group was a source of tension which bedeviled the centralizing process. The Muslim League leadership was mainly Muhajirs who had no social base in Pakistan. They along with the Punjabis also dominated the military and the bureaucracy. Hence the push for a unitary structure alienated others such as the Bengalis, who were not represented in the upper echelons of the state. The political instability was aggravated by the ruling group's efforts to establish a strong centre not on the basis of a broad consensus but through strong arm tactics. As a result internal and external opposition to the League leadership was suppressed in an authoritarian manner. Karachi used the state apparatus to crush the emerging opposition and interfered in the provinces attempting to put its supporters into power.