Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Asian Languages and Societies, Faculty of Arts, 2002. / Typescript (photocopy). Includes bibliographical references (leaves 463-491).

Thesis (master's)--Jāmiʻat al-Qāhirah. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 236-244).

This thesis investigates whether beliefs acquired by way of prophecy are safe. By ‘prophecy’ I have in mind the presentation of the prophetic method as found in the Guide of the Perplexed, which was Moses Maimonides’ philosophical masterpiece. And by ‘safe’ I have in mind the work by Timothy Williamson on the safety condition for knowledge. Both authors have proven to be dominant forces on these respective topics. The significance of this investigation derives from the centrality of prophecy to the three monotheistic religions. My main goal in this thesis is to identify those safety risks associated with the prophetic method. In this manner I aim to undermine any presumption in favor of prophetic beliefs as a whole being safe. Importantly, this general conclusion does not entail of a specific prophetic belief p that p is unsafe. Additionally, the scope of these results is restricted to the model of prophecy found in the Guide. The thesis begins with a critical elucidation of Williamson’s extensive work on the safety condition for knowledge. Particular attention is paid to those issues related to method individuation and Williamson’s cumulative conception of bases. Matters concerning these two topics inform the reading of Maimonides on prophecy found in the second chapter. In particular, I argue that Maimonides should be read as defending a cumulative conception of prophecy. As I emphasize several times during the chapter, the epistemology of prophecy cannot be reduced to the epistemology of testimony since prophecy for Maimonides does not involve the transfer of a proposition from God to the prophet. The third chapter is devoted to identifying those elements of the prophetic method that involve room for error. I argue that while all belief-forming methods in a fallibilist epistemology contain room for error, some are riskier than others. Prophecy should be considered one of the riskier sort. The fourth and final chapter shifts attention to non-standard semantics for ‘knows,’ David Lewis’s in particular. I argue that the interaction between such semantics and the laws governing prophecy in Jewish law is problematic. In particular, I demonstrate that such semantics destabilize the prophetic phenomenon. As such, we must either choose invariantism and gain stability, or choose non-standard semantics for ‘knows’ and live with this lack of stability.

This thesis examines the role that scholarly digests and commentaries played in the formation of legal rules in the Muslim legal institution known as the madhhab. I posit that a shared approach to legal rule-determination, and the respect of juristic precedent that it entails, underlies the jurisprudential processes of all of the four post-classical Sunni madhhabs (the Ḥanafī, Mālikī, Shāfi'ī, and Ḥanbalī), and unites them in a wider ‘madhhab-law tradition’. Taking the Ḥanafī madhhab as a case study, the thesis analyses a commentary written by the late Mamluk jurist Ibn Quṭlūbughā (d. 879/1474) upon the digest of the celebrated Abbasid-era Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Qudūrī (d. 428/1037). In discussing the madhhab's heritage of precedent, Ibn Quṭlūbughā's commentary weaves an intricate tapestry of quotations and references from previous jurists and works, providing us with insight into how author-scholars reacted to, and interacted with, other jurists over space and time. Chapter 1 provides a short introduction to the lives of Qudūrī and Ibn Quṭlūbughā, and the contexts within which they produced their works. Chapter 2 employs both quantitative and qualitative analysis of the commentary, in order to deduce historical and geographical patterns out of which a periodisation of rule-determination in the Ḥanafī madhhab is proposed. In Chapter 3, Ibn Quṭlūbughā's jurisprudential theory of rule-determination is studied, examining both the justifications and the processes employed by jurists in arriving at a legal rule in the Ḥanafī madhhab. Chapter 4 then turns to the craft of commentary itself, analysing over eighty case examples for the logical relationships, rhetorical devices, and legal arguments that inform the actual practice of rule-determination through commentary. A final chapter then summarises the conclusions, and situates them within a broader discussion as to the nature of the madhhab-law tradition.

The Philosophers such as ibn-Sina had maintained that time and space were co-eternal with Allah, emanating by necessity from His Attributes, and not being the results of a deliberate act of creation. This must be the case, for otherwise nothing would have been present to induce Him to create the world after a period of non-existence. Al-Ghazali's refutation of this is that Allah had decreed in pre-eternity that the world would materialize at a future, predetermined date, selecting an instance for its birth from a myriad like-instances by exercising His Free Will and manifesting therewith a cause with a delayed effect. The Philosophers' explanation of local phenomena as resulting from the perpetual motion of the spheres is flawed, since perpetual celestial motions would result in perpetual, not transient phenomena. Time, the measure of motion, does not extend beyond the physical realm. Time, and hence motion, is finite. / Religious Studies and Arabic / M.A. (Ancient Languages & Cultures)

The Philosophers such as ibn-Sina had maintained that time and space were co-eternal with Allah, emanating by necessity from His Attributes, and not being the results of a deliberate act of creation. This must be the case, for otherwise nothing would have been present to induce Him to create the world after a period of non-existence. Al-Ghazali's refutation of this is that Allah had decreed in pre-eternity that the world would materialize at a future, predetermined date, selecting an instance for its birth from a myriad like-instances by exercising His Free Will and manifesting therewith a cause with a delayed effect. The Philosophers' explanation of local phenomena as resulting from the perpetual motion of the spheres is flawed, since perpetual celestial motions would result in perpetual, not transient phenomena. Time, the measure of motion, does not extend beyond the physical realm. Time, and hence motion, is finite. / Religious Studies and Arabic / M.A. (Ancient Languages & Cultures)