葉錦明. / Thesis (M.A.)--香港中文大學, 1988. / Reprint ed. / Includes bibliographical references: leaves 165-172. / Ye Jinming. / Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 1988. / Chapter 第一章 --- 總論 / Chapter 第一節 --- 「哲學的退位」與邏輯實證論 --- p.1-9 / Chapter 第二節 --- 分析的工具與溝通的進路 --- p.10-17 / 註釋〈一〉 --- p.18-20 / Chapter 第二章 --- 邏輯實證論的背景理論──邏輯原子論 / Chapter 第一節 --- 維根斯坦與維也那學團 --- p.21-24 / Chapter 第二節 --- 命題與事實 --- p.25-33 / Chapter 第三節 --- 邏輯原子論的缺點 --- p.34-42 / 註釋〈二〉 --- p.43-45 / Chapter 第三章 --- 「分析／綜合」區分 --- p.46 / Chapter 第一節 --- 邏輯實證論的「分析／綜合」區分 --- p.47-52 / Chapter 第二節 --- 奎因對「分析性」的批評 --- p.53-62 / Chapter 第三節 --- 評估 / Chapter （三、一） --- 一種約略的區分 --- p.63-65 / Chapter （三、二） --- 形式科學與經驗科學 --- p.65-69 / Chapter （三、三） --- 論「先驗綜合」 --- p.70-82 / 註釋〈三〉 --- p.83-85 / Chapter 第四章 --- 意義判準 --- p.86-89 / Chapter 第一節 --- 檢証原則 --- p.90-97 / Chapter 第二節 --- 否証原則 --- p.98-105 / Chapter 第三節 --- 印証原則 --- p.106-115 / Chapter 第四節 --- 評估 --- p.115-116 / Chapter （四、一） --- 實有型態的形而上學 --- p.117-120 / Chapter （四、二） --- 境界形態的形而上學 --- p.121-129 / 註釋〈四〉 --- p.130-133 / Chapter 第五章 --- 情緒主義 --- p.134-135 / Chapter 第一節 --- 情緒主義的內容 --- p.136-138 / Chapter （一、一） --- 卡納普的情緒主義 --- p.139-141 / Chapter （一、二） --- 艾耶的情緒主義 --- p.142-146 / Chapter 第二節 --- 評估 / Chapter （二、一） --- 倫理學的失墜 --- p.147-149 / Chapter （二、二） --- 斷裂性的二分 --- p.150-153 / Chapter （二、三） --- 相對主義 --- p.154-161 / 註釋〈五〉 --- p.162-164 / 參考書目 --- p.165-172

Thesis (Ph.D.) -- McMaster University, 1997. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 140-149). Also available via World Wide Web.

No description available.

No description available.

This project proceeds from the premise that the historical and logical value of Boole's logical calculus and its connection with Frege's logic remain to be recognised. It begins by discussing Gillies' application of Kuhn's concepts to the history oflogic and proposing the use of the concept of research programme as a methodological tool in the historiography oflogic. Then it analyses'the development of mathematical logic from Boole to Frege in terms of overlapping research programmes whilst discussing especially Boole's logical calculus. Two streams of development run through the project: 1. A discussion and appraisal of Boole's research programme in the context of logical debates and the emergence of symbolical algebra in Britain in the nineteenth century, including the improvements which Venn brings to logic as algebra, and the axiomatisation of 'Boolean algebras', which is due to Huntington and Sheffer. 2. An investigation of the particularity of the Fregean research programme, including an analysis ofthe extent to which certain elements of Begriffsschrift are new; and an account of Frege's discussion of Boole which focuses on the domain common to the two formal languages and shows the logical connection between Boole's logical calculus and Frege's. As a result, it is shown that the progress made in mathematical logic stemmed from two continuous and overlapping research programmes: Boole's introduction ofmathematics in logic and Frege's introduction oflogic in mathematics. In particular, Boole is regarded as the grandfather of metamathematics, and Lowenheim's theorem ofl915 is seen as a revival of his research programme.

No description available.

"Rostocker Inaugural-Dissertation." / Includes bibliographical references (p. 126-127).

No description available.

The subject of this thesis is physicalism, understood not as some particular doctrine pertaining narrowly to the philosophy of mind, but rather as a quite general metaphysical claim to the effect that everything is, or is fundamentally, physical. Thus physicalism explicates the thought that in some sense physics is the basic science. The aim of the thesis is to defend a particular brand of physicalism, which I call eliminative type physicalism. It claims, roughly, that every property is a physical property – a property mentioned in the laws of physics, and hence that any putative property not identifiable with a physical property must be eliminated from our ontology. Eliminative type physicalism is apt to face three objections, and so my thesis, like Caesar's Gaul, falls into three parts. In the first, I argue against the idea that there are tenable positions, both physicalist and non-physicalist, alternative to eliminative type physicalism. I argue that each of these positions – token physicalism (Fodor, middle Putnam), supervenience physicalism (Lewis, Horgan) and and a non-physicalist view I call pluralism (Goodman, late Putnam) – is defective. In the second part, responding to the objection that there is just no reason to be a physicalist, I develop a positive argument for eliminative type physicalism, an argument resting upon a strong version of the explanatory test for reality according to which only explanatorily indispensable properties can justifiably be said to exist. In the third and final part, I argue, against the charge that eliminative type physicalism cannot accommodate what I call phenomenal properties (qualia, raw feels etc.), that there is no good reason to deny, and one good reason to affirm, that phenomenal properties just are physical properties.

xi, 358 leaves ; 30 cm. / Title page, contents and abstract only. The complete thesis in print form is available from the University Library. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Adelaide, Dept. of Philosophy, 1976