Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, Dept. of Philosophy, 1976.

This thesis is an examination of the linguistic approach to modality (also known as 'linguistic conventionalism') - i.e. the view that necessity is to be explained in terms of the linguistic rules that we have adopted. Drawing on an investigation into the history of this approach, I argue against the currently prevalent attitude that it can be dismissed as misguided. The aim, however, is not to argue that the linguistic approach is correct, but, more modestly, to put it back on the table as an interesting and viable research program. The thesis is divided into three parts. In part A, I articulate a conception of the commitments of the approach based on the ideas that influenced it, how it emerged and developed in the work of the logical positivists, and, in particular, the role it was meant to play in "making a consistent empiricism possible". Next, in part B, I defend the core ideas of the approach against various objections. Notably, I consider the objection that truth cannot be "created" by convention, the objection that necessities cannot be explained in terms of contingencies, and the objection that determining what the linguistic conventions are, unlike determining what the modal facts are, is a straightforwardly empirical matter. In part C, finally, I turn to objections which purport to show that there are limits to what can be explained in terms of linguistic convention. Specifically, I consider whether we need to assume a non-conventional distinction between admissible and inadmissible linguistic rules, a non-conventional consequence relation, or a non-conventional starting-point in order to get the linguistic approach off the ground. An overarching question is whether we are forced to take some logic for granted in a way which would undermine the explanatory ambitions of the approach. I argue that some of the prominent objections rely on misunderstandings, that some can be answered head-on, and that some point to genuine challenges and constraints which put pressure on the linguistic approach, but do not warrant a wholesale rejection of the view. Instead, they point to areas where further work is needed.

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Thesis (M.A.)--香港中文大學. / Manuscript. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 302-307). / Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue. / Chapter 一 --- 導言 / Chapter 二 --- 維也納學團之起源與發展簡史 / Chapter 1 --- 維也納學團的起源 / Chapter 2 --- 維也納學團的目的與方法 / Chapter 3 --- 維也納學團的理論淵源 / Chapter 4 --- 維也納學團的發展 / Chapter 三 --- 意義判準的提出 / Chapter 5 --- 形上學的消除 / Chapter 6 --- 述句的區分 / Chapter 四 --- 意義判準的早期陳構式 / Chapter 7 --- 意義判準最早期陳構式──完全檢証性原則 / Chapter 8 --- 完全否証性原則及其困難 / Chapter 五 --- 意義判準其他不同之陳構及其困難 / Chapter 9 --- 意義判準第三個樣式──部分檢証性原則 / Chapter 10 --- 可翻譯性原則 / Chapter 11 --- 以可隸屬性來代替可翻譯性 / Chapter 12 --- 「隸屬於人」的意義的釐清 / Chapter 六 --- 經驗論語言及傾向性概念與理論概念之引介 / Chapter 13 --- 語言系統人的建構 / Chapter 14 --- 傾向性概念與化約句子方法 / Chapter 15 --- 理論概念與關連規則 / Chapter 16 --- 語言結構的釐定 / Chapter 七 --- 部分印証性原則 / Chapter 17 --- 意義判準的第四個樣式----------部分印証性原則 / Chapter 八 --- 基礎問題論旨 / Chapter 18 --- 什麽是基礎問題 / Chapter 九 --- 基料述句之性質徵定 / Chapter 19 --- 維根斯坦與基本命題 / Chapter 20 --- 舒力克之基料述句理論 / Chapter 21 --- 奈拿夫之基料述句 / Chapter 22 --- 卡納晉之原始基料述句基料述句 / Chapter 十 --- 基料述句之物理化 / Chapter 23 --- 物理語言為一互為主觀的語言的証明 / Chapter 24 --- 物理語言的互為主觀性 / Chapter 十一 --- 基料述句之語法觀及其困難 / Chapter 25 --- 將「基料述句」視為一語法指謂辭的理論 / Chapter 26 --- 基料述句之語法觀的批評 / Chapter 27 --- 融貫真理論的批評 / Chapter 28 --- 命題與事實的關係 / Chapter 29 --- 「命題與事實比較」是什麽意義? / Chapter 十二 --- 語言結構的選取與基料述句 / Chapter 30 --- 語言結構與基料述句 / Chapter 31 --- 基本謂詞選取的兩個方法論上的決定 / Chapter 32 --- 基本謂詞內容的確定──物理謂詞或心理謂詞之選擇 / Chapter 十三 --- 真確知識基礎之重估

In this essay I have considered some of the philosophical problems involved in attempting to settle the question, What are scientific theories about? And in order to expose these problems, I have dealt with two influential responses to this question of the referents of scientific theories - namely, logical empiricism and realism.

To be numerate is to have the ability to understand numbers and be confident with numeric information presented in day-to-day situations. The way numeracy is defined varies between researchers; however, most agree that having skills in numeracy is essential to function in the world. In order to provide students with the opportunity for exposure to basic numeracy skills, McMaster University’s course Math 2UU3 – “Numbers for Life” is offered to non-mathematics major students in second year or above. To measure the effectiveness of this course, and to determine whether students retain the numeracy skills and knowledge acquired in the course, we developed a series of assessments with questions based on content learned throughout the semester. Students were tested three times – once before completing the course, once after completing the course, and once again a year later. This study focuses in on the logical reasoning aspect of numeracy which includes understanding logical structures and being able to work through problems rationally and systematically. The results from the study reveal that students who took the course and participated in completing the given assessments showed improvement with their logical reasoning skills significantly. / Thesis / Master of Science (MSc)

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In this thesis I study the problem of logical constants with respect to logical truth and logical consequence. In order to do that, I focused on the following two questions. First, what is a logical constant and what kind of relation there is between a logical truth, logical consequence and logical constant? Second, what are the solutions to the problem and to what extent these criteria can solve it? The main argument of my thesis is to determine that all of the examined systems are satisfactory to considerable level still none of these is completely acceptable.