Esta pesquisa se dedicou à introdução dos jogos lógicos na sala de aula, em específico, ela busca a investigação das dificuldades encontradas pelos alunos com os diferentes estilos de jogos apresentados e quais são os raciocínios lógicos utilizados para a resolução dos problemas propostos. Buscamos os benefícios que estes jogos podem trazer para o ensino e a aprendizagem na sala de aula. Aliado a isso também trabalhamos a parte geométrica dos tabuleiros, e com isso os alunos utilizaram como ferramentas a régua e o compasso para a construção dos tabuleiros apresentados.. Para tanto, a metodologia de pesquisa escolhida foi o Estudo de Caso, de acordo com Fiorentini e Lorenzato (2006), Ventura (2007) e Gil (2002). O referencial teórico é baseado nos trabalhos de Macedo (2007), Grando (2011), Skovsmose (2000), Huizinga (2000), Kishimoto (2006), Zuin (2001), bem como os PCNs e outros artigos/livros relacionados aos jogos lógicos e as construções geométricas com a régua e o compasso. As atividades foram desenvolvidas com uma turma do 9º ano do Ensino Fundamental de em uma Escola Municipal de Porto Alegre, no ano de 2015. Em especial sugerimos que é possível a inserção desses materiais a fim de serem usados como ferramentas de auxílio no ensino aprendizagem de matemática contribuindo positivamente para a formação dos alunos. Os registros coletados no estudo de caso possibilitaram a validação da proposta. / The present research has focused on the introduction of the logical games in the class. It aims to pin point difficulties presented by the students on the different styles of games proposed and a logical ratiocination is required to solve the tasks proposed. The benefits of the games along with the teaching and learning in the classroom was the goal. Additionally, the geometric segment of board games have been investigated and students used tools as ruler and compass to the construction of the boards presented. Therefore, the chosen researching methodology was the Case Study, according to Fiorentini e Lorenzato (2006), Ventura (2007) e Gil (2002). The theoretical referential is based on Works from Macedo (2007), Grando (2011), Skovsmose (2000), Huizinga (2000), Kishimoto (2006), Zuin (2001), along with the PCNs and others articles/books related to logical games and geometric constructions with a ruler and a compass. The activities were performed by a 9th grade group of the Elementary School in a Municipal School in Porto Alegre, in 2015. We showed in particular that is possible the insertion of these materials in order to be used as a sustenance tool on Mathematics Learning contributing positively to students formation. The data collected in the case study enabled the authentication of the proposal.

Esta pesquisa se dedicou à introdução dos jogos lógicos na sala de aula, em específico, ela busca a investigação das dificuldades encontradas pelos alunos com os diferentes estilos de jogos apresentados e quais são os raciocínios lógicos utilizados para a resolução dos problemas propostos. Buscamos os benefícios que estes jogos podem trazer para o ensino e a aprendizagem na sala de aula. Aliado a isso também trabalhamos a parte geométrica dos tabuleiros, e com isso os alunos utilizaram como ferramentas a régua e o compasso para a construção dos tabuleiros apresentados.. Para tanto, a metodologia de pesquisa escolhida foi o Estudo de Caso, de acordo com Fiorentini e Lorenzato (2006), Ventura (2007) e Gil (2002). O referencial teórico é baseado nos trabalhos de Macedo (2007), Grando (2011), Skovsmose (2000), Huizinga (2000), Kishimoto (2006), Zuin (2001), bem como os PCNs e outros artigos/livros relacionados aos jogos lógicos e as construções geométricas com a régua e o compasso. As atividades foram desenvolvidas com uma turma do 9º ano do Ensino Fundamental de em uma Escola Municipal de Porto Alegre, no ano de 2015. Em especial sugerimos que é possível a inserção desses materiais a fim de serem usados como ferramentas de auxílio no ensino aprendizagem de matemática contribuindo positivamente para a formação dos alunos. Os registros coletados no estudo de caso possibilitaram a validação da proposta. / The present research has focused on the introduction of the logical games in the class. It aims to pin point difficulties presented by the students on the different styles of games proposed and a logical ratiocination is required to solve the tasks proposed. The benefits of the games along with the teaching and learning in the classroom was the goal. Additionally, the geometric segment of board games have been investigated and students used tools as ruler and compass to the construction of the boards presented. Therefore, the chosen researching methodology was the Case Study, according to Fiorentini e Lorenzato (2006), Ventura (2007) e Gil (2002). The theoretical referential is based on Works from Macedo (2007), Grando (2011), Skovsmose (2000), Huizinga (2000), Kishimoto (2006), Zuin (2001), along with the PCNs and others articles/books related to logical games and geometric constructions with a ruler and a compass. The activities were performed by a 9th grade group of the Elementary School in a Municipal School in Porto Alegre, in 2015. We showed in particular that is possible the insertion of these materials in order to be used as a sustenance tool on Mathematics Learning contributing positively to students formation. The data collected in the case study enabled the authentication of the proposal.

FundaÃÃo de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado do Cearà / CoordenaÃÃo de AperfeiÃoamento de Pessoal de NÃvel Superior / Este presente estudo examina a mudanÃa paradigmÃtica da filosofia de Wittgenstein. Tal mudanÃa ocorre quando o filÃsofo percebe que sua concepÃÃo atomista contÃm erros irrecusÃveis. O ponto de dissoluÃÃo dessa concepÃÃo foi a mudanÃa quanto à concepÃÃo de proposiÃÃo elementar/estado de coisas, a saber, quando Wittgenstein percebe que nÃo à mais possÃvel concebÃ-los atomicamente. O artigo Algumas ObservaÃÃes sobre a Forma LÃgica apresenta esse momento de ruptura, levando o filÃsofo a repensar sua concepÃÃo filosÃfica. Em um primeiro momento o filÃsofo vienense apoia-se em uma concepÃÃo de linguagem fenomenolÃgica, chegando a negÃ-la pouco tempo depois. Por fim, o estudo aponta para uma ruptura com essa concepÃÃo fenomenolÃgica, quando Wittgenstein entÃo parecerà defender uma concepÃÃo de linguagem como a da fÃsica, i. e., hipotÃtica. / The present study examines the paradigmatic change of Wittgensteinâs philosophy. Such a change takes place when the philosopher realizes that his atomistic approach has unsolving problems. The dissolution point of that conception concerns the change regarding the notion of elementary proposition/state of things, that is to say, when Wittgenstein realizes that it is no more reasonable conceiving them as logical atoms. His paper Some remarks on logical forms presents this breaking point and leads him to reevaluate his philosophical conception. Firstly, he is based on a phenomenological conception of language, but afterwords he negates it. Then, this study focuses on that break regarding his phenomenological conception, when Wittgenstein comes to defend a hypothetical conception of language, such as the Physics.

This dissertation explores one family's experience of a son's disclosure of homosexuality, through the use of a second-order cybernetic epistemology, and social constructionist theory. Second-order cybernetics enables a description of patterns and themes that recursively connect the family's ideas and behaviour. Social constructionism enables the family's reaction to disclosure to be recursively linked to their fit with wider society. By using semantic and political frames of reference to describe the family's narratives around disclosure, this study indicates that disclosure is a relational metaphor, dependent on the family's locally co-constructed and transgenerational meanings. It also shows that although the family change with disclosure, stability is regained in a way consistent with the family's rules and norms. This study therefore demystifies viewing disclosure in one way only and creates alternative ways of conceptualising it. / Psychology / M.A. (Clinical Psychology)

This thesis is concerned with extending properties of regular word languages to richer structures. We consider intricate properties like the relationship between one-way and two-way temporal logics, minimization of automata, and the ability to effectively characterize logics. We investigate whether these properties can be extended to tree languages or word languages over an infinite alphabet. It is known that linear temporal logic (LTL) is as expressive as first-order logic over finite words [Kam68, GPSS80]. LTL is a unidirectional logic, that can only navigate forwards in a word, hence it is quite surprising that it can capture all of first-order logic. In fact, one of the main ideas of the proof of [GPSS80] is to show that the expressiveness of LTL is not increased if modalities for navigating backwards are added. It is also known that an extension of bidirectional LTL to ordered trees, called Conditional XPath, is first-order complete [Mar04]. We investigate whether the unidirectional fragment of Conditional XPath is also first-order complete. We show that this is not the case. In fact we show that there is a strict hierarchy of expressiveness consisting of languages that are all weaker than first-order logic. Unidirectional Conditional XPath is contained in the lowest level of this hierarchy. In the second part of the thesis we consider data word languages. That is, word languages over an infinite alphabet. We extend the theorem of Myhill and Nerode to a class of automata for data word languages, called deterministic finite memory automata (DMA). We give a characterization of the languages that are accepted by DMA, and also provide an algorithm for minimizing DMA. Finally we extend theorems of Büchi, Schützenberger, McNaughton, and Papert to data word languages. A theorem of Büchi states that a language is regular iff it can be defined in monadic second-order logic. Schützenberger, McNaughton, and Papert have provided an effective characterization of first-order logic, that is, an algorithm for deciding whether a regular language can be defined in first-order logic. We provide a counterpart of Büchi's theorem for data languages. More precisely we define a new logic and we show that it has the same expressiveness as non-deterministic finite memory automata. We then turn to a smaller class of data languages, those that are recognized by algebraic objects called orbit finite data monoids. We define a second new logic and show that it can define precisely the languages accepted by orbit finite data monoids. We provide an effective characterization of a first-order variant of this second logic, as well as of restrictions of first-order logic, such as its two variable fragment and local variants.

This dissertation examines the use of argumentum ad baculum in preaching in general and the sermons of George Whitefield in particular. Argumentum ad baculum has traditionally been considered an informal fallacy of relevance. The fallacy can be defined as an appeal to force or an appeal to fear. Chapter 1 discusses the relationship of argumentum ad baculum with the empirical study of fear appeals and the rhetorical use of pathos. Attention is also given to the preaching of Whitefield and his place in the history of preaching as an innovator. Whitefield's role in the shift to a more passionate and emotional sermon style is noted. The chapter also addresses the challenges a study of Whitefield's sermons presents. Chapter 2 is devoted to defining argumentum ad baculum, examining the history of the phrase, the two ways it has been defined, the nature of it as a fallacy, and fear appeals as a part of the definition. The chapter includes a discussion of source credibility in relation to fear appeals. Chapter 3 analyses the sermons of Whitefield to identify his use of fear appeals. The types of fear appeals he used in his sermons are listed along with evidentiary sermon material. The types of material Whitefield used to formulate the appeals are also discussed. Chapter 4 gives attention to the effect of Whitefield's fear appeals on his auditors. In order for an appeal to be effective, it must first arouse fear in the recipients of the appeal. Historical narratives are examined from Whitefield himself, eyewitness accounts, and personal testimonies of those who were present at his meetings. The chapter provides evidence of the general and specific effect of Whitefield's fear appeals. Chapter 5 concerns the ethicality of Whitefield's appeals. The chapter surveys a number of standards for ethical judgment. The chapter argues that Whitefield's use of fear in his published sermons was ethical, primarily because of the intention with which he used them. Chapter 6 offers guidelines for the contemporary use of argumentum ad baculum in preaching. Modern audiences are unaccustomed to the use of fear for persuasive means. However, this type of argumentation can be used ethically and effectively.

黃秉傑. / Thesis (M.A.)--香港中文大學硏究院哲學部. / Manuscript (cops. 2 & 3 reprint copies) / Includes bibliographical references: leaves 1-8 (5th group) / Huang Bingjie. / Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue yan jiu yuan zhe xue bu. / 序言 --- p.I-III / Chapter 第一章 --- 邏輯語意學的理論背景 / 本章大要 --- p.i-ii / Chapter §1 --- 卡納普與邏輯經驗論　 --- p.1-13 / Chapter §2 --- 卡納普的哲學發展 --- p.13-18 / Chapter §3 --- 卡納普的後設哲學與哲學方法 --- p.19-20 / Chapter §4 --- 卡納普的邏輯語法學 / Chapter 4.1 --- 邏輯法學之建構目的　 --- p.21-23 / Chapter 4.2 --- 邏輯語法學之性質與方法 --- p.24-28 / Chapter 4.3 --- 邏輯語法學之哲學應用　 --- p.28-38 / Chapter 4.4 --- 邏輯語法學之不足 --- p.38-47 / Chapter 第二章 --- 卡納普邏輯語意學的要素 / 本章大要 --- p.i-ix / Chapter §1 --- 邏輯語意學建構之目的及其主要工作 --- p.48-54 / Chapter §2 --- 記號學的基本概念 / Chapter 2.1 --- 研究語意的三種路伺 --- p.55-56 / Chapter 2.2 --- 描述語意學與純語意學之區分　 --- p.57-60 / Chapter 2.3 --- 對象語言與後設語言之區分　 --- p.60-61 / Chapter 2.4 --- 記號與表式之劃分 --- p.61-63 / Chapter §3 --- 語意系統之建構 / Chapter 3.1 --- 建構語意系統的兩種途徑´ؤ´ؤ語典系統S1與語言系統S2 --- p.63-70 / Chapter 3.2 --- 具有無限語句的語意系統S3 --- p.71-77 / Chapter 3.3 --- 具有變項的語意系統S6　 --- p.77-82 / Chapter §4 --- 定義「真」之適當性條件 --- p.83-86 / Chapter §5 --- 基概念 --- p.86-95 / Chapter §6 --- L－語意學 / Chapter 6.1 --- L－概念的重要性 --- p.96-101 / Chapter 6.2 --- 有關L－概念的公設與定理 --- p.101-113 / Chapter 6.3 --- 定義L－概念之適當性條件 --- p.114-120 / Chapter 6.4 --- 在特定的語意系統內定義L－概念 --- p.120-128 / Chapter 6.5 --- 「L－域」´ؤ´ؤ一個可作為L－語意學基礎的概念　 --- p.128-134 / Chapter 6.6 --- 有關「L－域」的公設與定理 --- p.135-138 / Chapter 6.7 --- 在外範語言內定義「L－域」´ؤ´ؤ程序19-E與程序19-F　 --- p.139-149 / Chapter 6.8 --- 擴大指謂關係的用法　 --- p.149-157 / Chapter 6.9 --- 絶對概念 --- p.157-162 / Chapter 6.10 --- 在內涵語言內定義「L－域」──程序18-A --- p.162-170 / Chapter 6.11 --- 以「L－域」為基始概念所建構的普遍語意學　 --- p.170-177 / Chapter 6.12 --- 同樣可作為L－語意學之基礎的L－內容」──有關的公設與定理 --- p.178-183 / Chapter 6.13 --- 在－外範語言內定義「L－內容」－程序23-F　 --- p.183-186 / Chapter §7 --- F－概念　 --- p.187-191 / Chapter §8 --- 意義公設 --- p.192-198 / Chapter §9 --- 演算系與̐ơÐ－概念　　 --- p.198-204 / Chapter §10 --- 語意學與語法學之關係──演算系及其解釋 --- p.204-211 / Chapter §11 --- 語言系統之建構 --- p.211-215 / Chapter §12 --- 邏輯究竟是約定的還是受限制 --- p.215-219 / Chapter §13 --- 語意學中的抽象實體　　 --- p.219-230 / Chapter 第三章 --- 對邏輯語意學的評鑑 / 本章大要　 --- p.i-ii / Chapter §1 --- 論邏輯語意學的哲學意義及其影響　 --- p.231-234 / Chapter §2 --- 評瑰英對「分析／綜合」的批評 --- p.234-261 / Chapter §3 --- 論史特勞遜對特構語言進路的批評　 --- p.262-273 / 結論 --- p.274-275 / 註目 --- p.1-24 / 參考書目 --- p.1-8

I here defend logical atomism. This defense rests on reinterpreting logical atomism as a search for logical forms. This reinterpretation has two parts comprising six chapters. In the first part, I do some historically-driven recovery. In the introduction, I review the literature on Russell's logical atomism. In Chapter 1, I argue that the dominant interpretation of logical atomism is wrong on historical grounds: it accounts for neither the history of logical atomism nor for crucial elements of the logical atomist texts. In Chapter 2, I then use Russell's writings to recover what I argue is the core of logical atomism. I explicate the critical notions and essential ingredients of logical atomism using "Principia Mathematica" as the archetype of logical atomism. I argue that logical atomsts are term busters. The essential ingredient of a logical atomist's term busting practice is a higher-order logic with the power of impredicative comprehension. In Chapter 3, I discuss the widespread view that Wittgenstein held a version of logical atomism. Focusing on his pre-"Tractatus" writings and changes in his earlier views, I argue that Wittgenstein embraced a philosophy of logic incompatible with emulating impredicative comprehension in April 1914. As such, Wittgenstein was a logical atomist, if ever, in October 1913, possibly through April 1914. In the second part, having clarified what logical atomism is, I present a modern logical atomism. In Chapter 4, I develop a philosophy of logic for logical atomism based on the notion of a pure logic. I critically discuss normativity in logic, the epistemology of pure logic, and logical pluralism. In Chapter 5, I propose a formal logic for logical atomism. I argue for the logic of logical atomism being an infinitely-descending and infinitely-ascending simple type theory with impredicative comprehension compatible with a domain empty of particulars. In Chapter 6, I critically discuss what the ontology of logical atomism should be, that is, what the ontology of the logical atomist's logic must be. This includes an ontology of logical concepts and of logical forms as completely-general, necessarily-existing logical facts with no constituents. I conclude by indicating avenues for new work on logical atomism.

In this thesis, it is argued that the fundamental goal of education is one of equipping individuals to partake of the good life as members of a just democratic society. It is argued further that a necessary condition for the realisation of this goal is that individuals are equipped to think well; more precisely, to make decisions on the basis of arguments that are both logically cogent (that is, which have true premises and which are either inductively strong or deductively valid) and ethically grounded (that is, with premises which express appropriate regard for the welfare of others). The concern of the thesis is the role education might play in fostering both the capability and the readiness to engage widely in such thinking. Although this concern has a long and complex history within the Western tradition, insufficient educational progress has been made. It is suggested that progress has been hampered on the one hand by the stark disciplinary divide between the descriptive approach of psychology and the normative stance of philosophy; and on the other, by a failure on the part of educational programme developers to take into account the constraints of prevailing educational structures. It is argued that what is needed is a new model of interdisciplinary research.

The core pluralist thesis about logic, broadly construed, is the claim that two or more logics are correct. In this thesis I discuss a uniquely interesting variant of logical pluralism that I call logical contextualism. Roughly, the logical contextualists’ thought is that, for fixed values p and q, the statement “p entails q” and its cognates such as “q is a logical consequence of p” or “the argument from p to q is logically valid,” are true in some contexts and false in others. After developing a contextualist account of logical pluralism I proceed to examine implications that, if true, logical contextualism would have on discussions about reasonable disagreement among epistemic peers and on discussions about the aim and purpose of argumentation. I show that logical contextualism allows for the possibility of logically-based reasonable disagreements among epistemic peers. In the face of such disagreements there is no obligation to revise one’s belief, nor is there any obligation to degrade the peer status of the agent with whom one stands in disagreement. The possibility of logically-based reasonable disagreements, it will be argued, suggests a reconceptualization of the aims and purpose of argumentation. Most accounts of the purpose of argumentation hold that argumentation’s primary purpose is to achieve rational agreement on a contested issue. Such an agreement is thought to require that at least one of the parties in the argumentation change their beliefs or commitments. However, the existence of logically-based reasonable disagreements, I argue, implies that there are some argumentations that ought not to resolve with agreement. Therefore, rather than understanding argumentation as purely an effort to convince an opponent, or as a means to reach consensus, I claim that argumentation ought to be understood as an effort to gain a better understanding of divergent and perhaps irreconcilable perspectives.