The object of this thesis is to explain why Pakistan which Muslim nationalist historians claim was created in the name of Islam failed to sustain a democratic political system. This question is explored by examining the politics of South Asian Muslims as a continuity from the colonial to the post-partition period, focusing on the tension between centripetal and centrifugal forces. The thesis begins by investigating the factors which helped politicize Muslim identity during the inter-war years. The interplay of nationalism, constitutional reforms and common identity based on confessional faith forged political identities which determined the course of subsequent events. Dyarchy set in motion processes which the Government of India Act of 1935 reinforced,- the emergence of political solidarities based on religion and region and alienation from nationalist politics. The Congress was able to neutralize the centrifugal developments among its Hindu constituency. It was not so successful among Muslims partly due to the impact of the Reforms and partly due to the activity of Hindu revivalists in the party. Simultaneously Muslim politics was moving away from the Congress, not towards the Muslim League but to the All-India Muslim Conference, around which most Muslims had gathered in opposition to the Nehru Report. However most regional and communitarian parties were not simply antagonistic to the Congress. They rejected centralist politics as a whole. This was amply demonstrated by the 1937 election results which underlined Jinnah's irrelevance to Muslim politics. Hence Muslims were in their political loyalties divided between strong currents focused on provincial interests and weak ones emphasizing sub-continental unity, national or Muslim. This configuration, the opposition between centrifugal and centripetal forces defined the basic parameters of Muslim politics. The second chapter describes how the political divisions between Muslims was partially overcome. The 1937 elections initiated a major political shift among the Muslim regional parties and caused great unease among the urban groupings. The Muslim regional partie's feared that the Congress Party's control over provincial ministries through a centralized structure and its rejection of the federal basis of the 1935 Act, would lead to their being roped into a Hindu-dominated unitary state. To fight this threat, an alternative political focus at the all-India level came to be considered necessary for the protection of their interests. The Muslim League's revival was indirectly facilitated by the Quit India Movement which temporarily removed the Congress from the arena of open politics and by the encouragement Jinnah received from the Raj. The League was able to gradually pull Muslim groups, particularly those in the Muslim-minority provinces, into its ranks through the use of anti-Congress propaganda. But among the urban masses of UP Jinnah was eclipsed by Mashriqi until the mid-1940s when the Khaksars became a spent force. This development combined with the increasing influence of the Pakistan slogan, vague yet immensely attractive, provided the ideological cutting edge of the League's agenda for Muslim unity. The ideological hegemony allowed the League to focus the forces of community consciousness as a battering ram to breakdown the regional parties resistance. The Pakistan slogan spread from the urban areas and Muslim-minority provinces into the rural areas of the Muslim-majority provinces. But in Bengal the regionalist had taken over the party, in the Punjab Khizr continued to resist and in the NWFP and Sind the Muslim League was a peripheral influence. Hence by the mid-1940s the League was only able to achieve partial unity under the Pakistan banner. The third chapter deals with the brief moment of political unity achieved through the combined impact of mass nationalism and communal riots. After the constitutional deadlock following the breakdown of the Simla Conference the League was able to make major advances by positing a clear choice between their and the Congress's plans for India's future. Muslim nationalism now centred on the League capitalized on the political uncertainties caused by the negotiations and won over many adherents from the provincial parties. An important factor which widened the League's area of influence was the increased significance of economic nationalism. It opened channels of communication between the elites and the masses, drew in groups previously unaffected by the Muslim League and turned the agitation for Pakistan into a mass movement. These factors combined with the weakness of the Congress due to their incarceration during the war resulted in the widespread shift away from the regional parties to the Muslim League. Jinnah was able to achieve for a brief moment political unity and used this as the basis to extract the maximum constitutional concessions from the British and the Congress. However the centralization process was weak and its frailty was at the root of ideological confusion. The confusion was manifest in the changing definition of Pakistan in this crucial period. The problem was compounded by the League's lack of strong party structure to control and enforce discipline over the regional supporters. Jinnah's interventions in the provinces were the exception and not the rule and limited to disciplining local leaders. For expanding the party's influence he was completely dependent on the provincial leaders. The regionalist forces were not genuine converts to Muslim nationalism. They used the League as a stalking horse for their provincial interests. Jinnah accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan due to the strong pressures from the Muslim-majority provinces who were not interested in a separate homeland for Muslims and later he supported Suhrawardy's attempt to avoid partition of Bengal. Jinnah had to be responsive to these different currents within the party in order to avoid a revolt against his leadership. Besides the internal pressure, pro-Congress opposition was still strong in Sarhad and Sind and they used regional ethnicity as a counter against the League. However the opposition collapsed when the civil disobedience movement mounted by the League at this extremely tense moment triggered off the communal explosion which engulfed northern India and as a result the Congress accepted partition. The fourth chapter deals with the Muslim League's effort to consolidate its position in Pakistan through the construction of a strong state and the potent anti-centre backlash it produced. Pakistan came into existence through the contingent circumstances attending the transfer of power and the League's leadership was ill-prepared to establishing itself in Pakistan. The perceived threat from India and the internal opposition to the leadership convinced them that the country and they themselves could survive politically only if a strong centre was established. However the ethnic composition of the ruling group was a source of tension which bedeviled the centralizing process. The Muslim League leadership was mainly Muhajirs who had no social base in Pakistan. They along with the Punjabis also dominated the military and the bureaucracy. Hence the push for a unitary structure alienated others such as the Bengalis, who were not represented in the upper echelons of the state. The political instability was aggravated by the ruling group's efforts to establish a strong centre not on the basis of a broad consensus but through strong arm tactics. As a result internal and external opposition to the League leadership was suppressed in an authoritarian manner. Karachi used the state apparatus to crush the emerging opposition and interfered in the provinces attempting to put its supporters into power.

This dissertation examines Muslim politics in the North-West Frontier Province of India between 1937 and 1947. It first investigates the nature of modern politics in the Frontier Province and its relationship with all-India politics. The N-WFP was the only Muslim majority province which supported the INC in its struggle to represent an Indian nation against the British raj, rather than of joining other Muslims in the AIML. The N-WFP had its own peculiar type of society, distinct from the rest of India. In the Frontier Province, Islam wa? iaierwoven to such an extent with Pashtoon society that it formed an essential and integral part of it; and the Pashtoons 1 sense of separate ethnic identity, within the bounds and framework of Islam, become an acknowledged fact. In this Muslim majority province, there was no fear of Hindu domination, as was prevalent among Muslims in Hindu majority provinces. This was a principal reason for the initial failure of ML to acquire support in the FP. The study also explores the rise of the Khudai Khidmatgars and the reasons for the preference of majority of the N-WFP Muslims for Congress. It argues that the coming together of the KKs and the Congress gave the former popularity, and an ally in all-India politics and the latter a significant base of support in a Muslim majority province. It elucidates the changing political contexts of the period 1937-47 and shows how loyalties were contingent on these circumstances. It is therefore not just about Frontier politics, but, at a deeper level, about the nature of evolving political identities in the sub-continent. The thesis concludes with a discussion of the All-India National Congress 'desertion' of the Frontier people on the eve of partition, the dismissal of the provincial Congress ministry by Jinnah, and the deeply ambiguous positions of the KKs in the context of the new nation of Pakistan.

This thesis deals with an influential young Muslim intellectual movement, Jong Islamieten Bond (JIB), which had active towards the end of the Dutch Colonial era in Indonesia. It will first investigate the circumstances under which the JIB was founded. Second, it will go on to survey the development of the organization with respect to its leadership between 1924 to 1942. Finally, this thesis will analyze in some detail the ideology and the activities of the movement. It will attempt to shed a light on the JIB's role in defining Islam as both a religion and an ideology in the struggle to form an Indonesian identity for the future Indonesian nation.

Several armed Islamist movements have shown remarkable behavioural and ideological transformations towards non-violence. The "de-radicalization" processes of these movements removed tens of thousands of former militants from the ranks of al-Qa'ida's supporter and acted as disincentives for would-be militants. These processes have taken place on a large scale in Egypt and Algeria, and on a smaller scale in Libya, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Jordan, Tajikistan, Malaysia and Indonesia. / This dissertation addresses crucial lacunae in the literature on Islamism, security and counterterrorism studies by asking the question 'why do radical Islamist militants revise their ideologies, strategies and objectives and initiate a de-radicalization process.' The dissertation also aims to answer the question of what are the necessary conditions under which this process can be successful. In the following chapters, I analyze how such factors as state policies, charismatic leadership and social interaction between the layers of an Islamist organization, as well as between the same organization and the "other," can all interact to shape the prospects for renunciation violence, both behaviourally and ideologically, by an Islamist movement. Empirically, I analyze the deradicalization processes of three cases in Egypt (the armed wings of the Muslim Brothers, the Islamic Group and al-Jihad Organization) and one case in Algeria (Islamic Salvation Army and affiliated militias). I also analyze two cases of deradicalization failure in Algeria, as a means to further explicate and examine my variables. / The arguments in the dissertation are based on qualitative comparative research. Archival interviews, supplemented by personal ones, with Islamist leaders, mid-ranking commanders, grassroots organization members, Islamist movements' specialists, former security and intelligence officers and state officials are analyzed to help identify the potential causes of de-radicalization from different perspectives. Content analysis is also used to examine original literature and statements produced by the Islamist groups under study and their leaders to both legitimize and, at a later stage, to de-legitimize violence. / In the conclusion, the dissertation provides a comprehensive theoretical framework that explains the causes of de-radicalization of armed Islamist movements. It also provides direction for future research agendas and addresses policy implications relevant to de-radicalization. / Plusieurs mouvements islamistes armes ont donne les signes d'importants changements sur le plan du comportement et de l'ideologie en faveur de la nonviolence. Les processus de de-radicalisation de ces mouvements ont conduit au retrait de dizaines de milliers d'anciens militants des rangs des supporteurs d' Al Qaida et ont eu un effet dissuasif sur ceux qui songeaient a se joindre a eux. Ces processus ont eu lieu a grande echelle en Egypte et en Algerie et a plus petite echelle en Libye, en Arabie Saoudite, au Yemen, en Jordanie, au Tadjikistan, en Malaisie et en Indonesie. / Cette these porte sur des lacunes importantes dans la litterature sur l'islamisme, les etudes de securite et le contreterrorisme. Elle cherche a savoir pourquoi les militants radicaux islamistes ont revise leurs ideologies, leurs strategies et leur objectifs et initie un processus de de-radicalisation. Cette these vise arepondre a ces questions afin de comprendre les conditions necessaires a la reussite d'un tel processus. Au cours des chapitres suivants, j'analyse comment des facteurs tels que les politiques etatiques, le leadership charismatique, et les interactions sociales entre les couches d'une organisation islamiste ainsi qu'entre la meme organisation et l' « Autre» peuvent tous interagir pour modifier les perspectives d'un mouvement islamiste de fayon aI'amener arenoncer ala violence, tant dans son comportement que dans son ideologie. De fayon empirique, j'analyse les processus de deradicalisation de trois cas en Egypte (l'aile armee des Freres musulmans, le Groupe islamique et l'Organisation du al-Jihad) et d'un cas en Algerie ( l'Armee islamique du salut et les milices affiliees). J'analyse egalement deux cas d'echec de la deradicalisation en Algerie afin d'examiner mes variables. / Les arguments de cette dissertation sont fondes sur une recherche qualitative comparee. Des entrevues archivees et des entrevues que j'ai moi-meme realisees avec des autorites islamistes, des sous-officiers ainsi qu' avec de jeunes sympathisants, des militants de souche, des specialistes des mouvements islamistes, des anciens officiers de la securite et du renseignement et des employes de l' etat sont analysees afin d'aider it identifier sous differents angles les causes potentielles de de-radicalisation. L'analyse de contenu est egalement utilisee pour examiner la litterature de base ainsi que les communiques produits par des groupes islamistes et leurs chefs pour legitimer et plus tard, pour delegitimer, la violence. / En conclusion, la these presente un cadre theorique qui explique les causes de la de-radicalisation des mouvements islamistes armes. Elle propose egalement des avenues de recherche et traite des implications concemant les politiques gouvemementales et autres relatives ala de-radicalisation.

This thesis deals with the political activities and Islamic political vision of Mohamad Roem (1908--1983), a prominent Masyumi leader and Indonesian diplomat in the first half of the twentieth century. His life and early education as well as his works are discussed in order to trace the sources which inspired his vision. In his political activities, Roem expressed his Islamic nationalism by joining and founding Islamic movements from the late Dutch colonial period through the beginning of the New Order. He had much political success, especially in the Republican period. However, he was one of many Muslim leaders who also suffered for his political involvement in the Soekarno era, he was jailed for about four years, while in the Soeharto era, he was banned from participating in political activities. He was a moderate Muslim leader who aspired to cooperate with "secular" leaders in his time for the sake of a larger cause. His Islamic political vision had a significant impact and was a major contribution to both the Indonesian state and the Islamic community. His moderation is reflected in his political correspondence with Nurcholish Madjid in which he argued for the need of an Islamic political party without demanding the creation of an Islamic state. Finally, Roem's political activities and Islamic political vision point to a model of activism in a religiously pluralistic country and could possibly serve as an inspiration to Muslim politicians, especially after Soeharto's fall when Islamic political parties found fertile ground for growth.

This thesis highlights a new approach to the programs and agenda of the Shi`ite representative body in Lebanon known under the acronym AMAL. The period studied is from 1969--1984. Previous studies have drawn insufficient attention to the important and quintessentially Islamic relation between religion and politics for this particular community. This relation becomes a focal point for this thesis. / Here, I study and tell the story of how a politically and socially marginalized sector of a society awakened unto itself and sought change in its political, social and economic position. This change involved a reaffirmation of specifically Shi`i doctrines, beliefs and motifs which helped this community assert themselves with a new identity during this fifteen year period.

This thesis is an attempt to examine one of the most important on-going debates in contemporary Islamists' discourses, namely, the status and rights of religious minorities in an Islamic state. The call by Islamists for the establishment of such a state governed by the Shari'ah has given rise to criticism that Islamization would entail the revival of the discriminatory rulings of traditional Islamic law with respect to non-Muslim citizens and the negation of the modern principle of the right to equality for all citizens irrespective of religious belief. To provide a background to the problem, this study presents a brief review of the stance of traditional Islamic law on the status and rights of non-Muslims living within the domain of Islam. This tradition has informed the discourses of contemporary Islamists on the question. Two currents of thought are examined: radical and moderate Islamism. Radical Islamists assert that granting non-Muslim citizens equal status and rights with Muslims is inconsistent with the teachings of Islam, although in stating this they confirm the apprehensions that Islamization would result in institutionalizing discrimination against religious minorities. Moderate Islamists on the other hand maintain that the concept of equal rights for all citizens is compatible with the tenets of Islam. Nonetheless, their arguments are not without problems as there are limits to how far they are willing to go in offering equal status and rights to non-Muslims.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2007. / The entire dissertation/thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file (which also appears in the research.pdf); a non-technical general description, or public abstract, appears in the public.pdf file. Title from title screen of research.pdf file (viewed on November 12, 2007) Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Adelaide, School of History and Politics, Discipline of Politics, 2005. / "December 2003" Includes bibliographical references (leaves 349-387).

Thesis (doctoral)--Lund University, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 279-298).