<p> Parenting styles create different social environments in the lives of children within the home. Many studies have investigated the effects of parenting style on children's emotional development and behavior (Liem, Cavell, &amp; Lustig, 2010; Pezzella, 2010; Schaffer, Clark, &amp; Jeglic, 2009; Steward &amp; Bond, 2002; Timpano, Keough, Mahaffey, Schmidt, &amp; Abramowitz, 2010) as well as differences in parenting across cultures (Keels, 2009; Paulussen-Hoogeboom, Stams, Hermanns, Peetsma, &amp; Wittenboer, 2008). Limited research has been conducted on parenting style and religion, however, and especially in Muslim families, and among Muslim American families in particular. There is also a lack of research that focuses on the effects of all four parenting styles (i.e. authoritarian, authoritative, permissive, and neglectful) on child development in Muslim families. Most scholars focus on authoritarian and authoritative parenting styles in their studies and disregard the permissive and neglectful parenting styles (Mayseless, Scharf, &amp; Sholt, 2003; Takeuchi &amp; Takeuchi, 2008). </p><p> The present study focused on associations between parenting style and measures of emotional and behavioral problems in Muslim American children. No statistically significant differences were found in emotional and behavior problems between the various parenting groups. Consistency in parenting was also not associated with emotional and behavioral difficulty scores. Authoritative parenting was found to be the most frequent parenting style among Muslim fathers in the study sample, while authoritarian parenting was the most frequently reported parenting style among the Muslim mothers in the sample. </p><p> <i>Keywords:</i> parenting style, children emotional and behavioral, cross-cultural, Muslim</p>

<p> Honor killings are perpetrated for a wide range of offenses in several parts of the world, including marital infidelity, pre-marital sex, flirting, and divorce. This study investigated the opinions of 18 to 22 Muslim American women, born in the United States, aged 25 to 40, of South Asian nationality, regarding their perspectives on honor killing within their religious and cultural communities. Through the use of autoethnography, my study additionally created a personal narrative through having read research, listened to recordings, as well as engagement in interactive interviews on the topic of honor killings. The intent of autoethnography was to acknowledge the inextricable link between the personal and the cultural and to make room for nontraditional forms of inquiry and expression (Wall, 2006). As a first generation Muslim American woman, I explored how personal cultural experiences may have impacted views and reactions to the subject of honor killings. Through structured interviews as well as self-reflective, interactive research process, I aimed to investigate Muslim American women's attitudes and beliefs surrounding this highly sensitive practice of killing women and girls in order to regain family honor. </p><p> In order to better understand attitudes and beliefs surrounding honor killings among Muslim women in the United States, this study utilized the methods of structured qualitative interviews with Muslim Americans, as well as an autoethnography portion to help understand and explain my own attitudes and cultural influences regarding this topic. Through the structured interviews, participants answered questions about demographics and discussed their opinions about honor killings.</p>

<p> The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of social dominance orientation (SDO) and right wing authoritarianism (RWA) on discrimination in the face of a threat to either resources or in-group identity. SDO can be viewed as the attitudinal manifestation of realistic conflict theory (RTC) while RWA can be viewed as that of social identity theory (SIT). An online survey was administered to 631 college students assessing prejudice, SDO, and RWA. Emails were sent from a fictitious campus organization to 503 participants who agreed to be contacted for a subsequent study. The emails manipulated either a threat to resources by offering a scholarship or a threat to in-group identity by offering an invitation to join a culturally based campus club and were incorrectly addressed to a male target with either a Muslim or European-American name. It was made clear that if the email had been sent in error, it was necessary to return it to the source or the recipient would lose his chance to receive these opportunities. Return rates were recorded as a behavioral measure of discrimination. Overall, it was expected that more emails addressed to the European American target would be returned than emails addressed to the Muslim target (H1). Based on RCT, it was also expected that in the face of a threat to resources (scholarship offer) participants high in SDO would be less likely to return emails addressed to the Muslim target than participants high in RWA (H2). Finally, based on SIT, it was expected that in the face of a threat to in-group identity (membership invitation), participants high in RWA would be less likely to return emails addressed to the Muslim target than participants high in SDO (H3). In both instances interactions were anticipated between the target and the attitudinal measure (SDO or RWA). Although the results were not statistically significant for the hypotheses, marginally significant results were observed and some interesting trends were noted. Additionally, prejudice against Muslims was found to have significant effects on email return rates.</p>

<p> High fertility rates may not pose short-term threats to Pakistan's stability however, Pakistan's long-term survival largely depends on reducing the rate at which the population is expanding because this growth is outstripping economic development. This paper seeks to highlight a viable strategy for Pakistan to improve its population planning approach. The Iranian government's experience with population reduction from 1986-2010 will form the basis of comparison in this paper, helping to identify a way forward for Pakistan. The first section introduces the current population growth in Pakistan and the economic and security risks associated with these high fertility rates. This section also explains the similarities between Pakistan and Iran and why Iran's population programs could be paired with elements of population programs being initiated by the Pakistani government. The second section examines family planning promotion in both Iran and Pakistan. Iran's unique strategy in introducing family planning to a nation of conservative Muslims involved several unique approaches. In Pakistan, these same approaches, if implemented, could bolster Pakistani receptiveness of family planning. The third part reviews ways Pakistan could improve their family planning education model. In Iran, family planning education promoted birth spacing as way to reduce the religious stigma that might forbid contraception. Iran's government also undertook a serious effort to educate men, young adults and couples through family planning education workshops. The final reviews the role that female empowerment, literacy and employment have in reducing nationwide fertility in both Pakistan and Iran. The Iranian government elevated of the status of women by integrating them into civil society. This social change reduced nationwide fertility and overall lifetime fertility. In Pakistan, female education has indirectly reduced fertility rates but has not been promoted by the government to the same degree as in Iran.</p>

À la fin de l'année 2003, un avocat ontarien de confession musulmane annonce son intention de créer, comme la loi ontarienne le lui permet, un service d'arbitrage religieux pour trancher des litiges familiaux. L'opposition quasi immédiate de femmes musulmanes déclenche un débat qui durera deux ans et qui gravitera autour d'un enjeu commun aux débats portant sur la reconnaissance des différences religieuses et ethnoculturelles, soit celui des limites aux accommodements demandes. Quelles sont en effet les limites normatives à l'accommodement des différences ethnoculturelles et religieuses et comment s'agencent-elles, surtout lorsqu'il est question de liberté de conscience et de religion et de droit à l'égalité des sexes? À travers l'analyse des prises de position sur le recours à l'arbitrage familial fondé sur le droit musulman que publieront quatre quotidiens torontois de décembre 2003 à février 2006, cette thèse tente de cerner les limites normatives envisagées par opposants et partisans du projet. Opposants et partisans ont-ils tente de définir certaines limites normatives aux accommodements et quelle place ont-ils accordée au droit à l'égalité des sexes dans la définition de ces limites? L'hypothèse mise de l'avant est que pour les opposants et partisans du projet ontarien d'arbitrage familial fondé sur le droit musulman, l'égalité des sexes est devenue un droit incontournable et la limite à ne pas outrepasser en matière d'accommodement des différences, un principe qui a imprégné toutes les positions favorables et défavorables au projet, de même que la pluralité des conceptions normatives qui orientent ces positions. Après une présentation de diverses approches théoriques pertinentes, le premier chapitre décrit le corpus étudié qui comprend les éditoriaux, chroniques, textes d'opinion et lettres parus dans le Globe and Mail, le National Post, le Toronto Star et le Toronto Sun. Il présente ensuite l'approche méthodologique retenue, soit une analyse interprétative inspirée de l'approche herméneutique de Hans-Georg Gadamer. Le second chapitre, plus factuel, clarifie quelques éléments essentiels concernant l'Islam et la charia, la présence musulmane au Canada et le système d'arbitrage ontarien. Il résume aussi les faits entourant la proposition ontarienne de système d'arbitrage fondé sur le droit musulman. L'analyse interpretative se divise en deux grands volets. Le premier, présente dans le troisième chapitre, met en relief l'importance que tous les camps accordent à l'égalité et combien leur conception de l'égalité des sexes - de jure ou substantive - influence leur appui ou opposition à l'arbitrage religieux en droit familial. Le recours à l'argument du respect de l'égalité des sexes semble d'ailleurs s'être impose comme un critère de légitimité du discours public dans le cadre de ce débat. Le second volet de l'analyse, expose dans le quatrième chapitre, relève le lien qui existe entre la conception de l'égalité des sexes - formelle ou substantive - et la portée donnée à la liberté de conscience, à la neutralité de l'État, à la capacité de juger de pratiques différentes ou encore à la conformité aux normes majoritaires. Cette analyse, dont certaines limites sont présentées à la fin de la thèse, permet de conclure que le respect de l'égalité des sexes, et non seulement de l'égalité prise dans son sens large, est le nouvel étalon de mesure pour évaluer des demandes d'accommodement, ce qui tend à confirmer la préseance croissante de ce droit dans l'édifice des valeurs communes de la société ontarienne.

A generation of young people in Canada has grown up in the face of the so-called "War on Terror". Where previous generations have confronted the Cold War or the World Wars, this is the war that has shaped today's young people's narratives of collective memory. My study investigates the following research questions: How young people in Canada understand "the War on Terror"? How they see "the War on Terror" affecting their lives and their constructions of imagined communities (Anderson, 1983)? How they make collective memories of "the War on Terror" based on these understandings? I collect my data in the form of written narratives, follow-up interviews, and demographic questionnaires. Building on theoretical models from the field of collective memory studies (Halbwachs, 1980; Wertsch, 2002), nationalism studies (Anderson, 1983; Billig, 1995), and cultural representations (Said, 1980; Hall, 1980, 1997, 2000, 2002), I explore the understandings, representations and experiences of young people in the form of the collective memories of "the War on Terror". I find that the terrain of collective memory is like the topography. This topography has three main features: human agents, technologies of memory (Wertsch, 2002) and different social groups or communities. My participants construct collective memories through processes that involve a collectivity of significant 'others', including parents and teachers, or what I call 'interpretative communities'. Significantly, the hegemonic narrative, according to the participants of my study, is not the official Canadian government's narrative of "the War on Terror", rather my participants reject the image of Canada as a military nation in favor of that of a multicultural peaceful nation. I also find that "the War on Terror" has personally affected the young Canadian Muslim participants of this study in ways that it has not the non-Muslim participants.

No description available.

This dissertation examines the production and reproduction of knowledge among Salafi groups in post-Soeharto Indonesia. It specifically discusses the issues of how Salafi groups produce the knowledge they claim to be based on the authentic form of Islam in the context of social, political, and economic change. Salafis advocate the need for a return to the authoritative religious sources: the Holy Qur’an, the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad, and the Salafi manhaj (methods and paths of Salafi teachings). Without the last element, Salafis claim, the proper understanding and practice of Islamic teachings are impossible. The research was carried out in three major sites: Jakarta, Yogyakarta, and Makassar, where significant numbers of Salafis are found. Ethnographic fieldwork, conducted from January to June 2011, and from July 2012 to February 2013, focused on the individual roles, organizational networks, and historical and sociological processes which shaped the reproduction of Salafi knowledge. To create an ideal community based on the Salafist understanding of Islamic ethics, many Salafis create separate enclaves where they erect madrasa and mosques, two strategic institutions fundamental for their development. Claiming to be based on the authority of the Prophet, Salafis develop a medicine and market it to other Muslim groups. Most Salafis engage in endogamous marriage to maintain the groups’ solidity. The roles of women within Salafi groups are highly circumscribed. While having careers is possible, women are expected to stay at home and take care of their families. Salafis represent only a tiny minority of Indonesian Muslims, and they compete with a diverse admixture of Muslim groups, which challenge Salafi interpretations of Islamic knowledge. The political aspects of Salafism are visible in a number of matters of religious knowledge and practice. Salafis use the issues of religious purification as a political tool to maintain their identities and to attack other Muslim groups. Heated debates between Salafis and traditionalist, and to a lesser degree, reformist Muslims, which sometimes lead to violent conflicts, are inevitable. While creating sharp social and religious divisions, debates also result in an exchange of ideas among Muslim groups, heightening the diversity of Salafist forms of knowledge and practice.

No description available.

The question of whether the door of ijtihad is open, closed, or ever did close, has been around for centuries. The answer to this question is crucial for our times. The research will present a chronological overview of the historical development of the concept of ijtihad, how it developed, became limited in certain circles, and if it ever ceased to be practiced. It can be concluded from the research that the doors of ijtihad were never closed, but were limited to a particular type of educational training. Those who completed this training proceeded on to become jurists. Those who could not, were requested to follow their leaders or engage in "taqlid." This study will show that this question arose from a power struggle between modernists and traditionalists regarding who had the power to interpret and make rulings for the Muslim community. It will further show how traditionalists are trying to maintain their power in order to preserve traditional Islam and how the modernists are trying to solve contemporary problems by opening the doors to interpretation for those who are not classically trained. / Religion