Thèse de doctorat--Eberhard-Karls-Universität Tübingen, 2001. / Notes bibliogr.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Queensland, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. / Thesis advisor(s): Glenn Robinson, Jeanne Giraldo. Includes bibliographical references (p. 57-62). Also available online.

Thesis (doctoral)--University of Bradford, 1986. / BLDSC reference no.: D71575.

By virtue of their presence, observers alter what they are observing. Yet, the international soldiers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) did much more than observe events. From August 1949 until the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force in November 1956, the Western military officers assigned to UNTSO were compelled to take seriously the task of supervising the Arab-Israeli armistice, despite the unwillingness of all parties to accept an actual peace settlement. To the extent that a particular peacekeeping mission was successful – i.e., that peace was “kept” – what actually happened on the ground is usually considered far less important than broader politics. However, as efforts to forge a peace settlement failed one after another, UNTSO operations themselves became the most important mechanism for regional stability, particularly by providing a means by which otherwise implacable enemies could communicate with each other, thus helping to moderate the conflict. This communication played out against the backdrop of the dangerous early days of the Cold War, the crumbling of Western empires, and the emergence of the non-aligned movement. Analyses of the activities of the Mixed Armistice Commissions (MACs), the committees created to oversee the separate General Armistice Agreements signed between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, particularly those during the 1954 to 1956 tenure as UNTSO chief of staff of Canadian Major-General E.L.M. Burns, best evaluate both UNTSO effectiveness and Arab-Israeli interaction. / Thesis (Ph.D, History) -- Queen's University, 2009-05-28 14:21:45.625

No description available.

Why have numerous peace agreements not led to peace? Peacemaking evolves within a specific social, political and economic context involving different actors, numerous issues, and domestic and international constraints. However, political leaders ultimately prioritize the interests of the nation, politicize issues, and initialize policies. The study proposes, first, that the belief system and perceptions of political leaders play an important role in the making of peace by directly influencing the political environment during the implementation phase of peace agreements. Second, the main obstacle to peace may lie within the leaders' failure to transform the political environment into one more conducive to peace. A theoretical model attempts to bridge the gap between leaders, implementation phases, and outcome, or impact on the political environment. The process of transformation results from three factors: trust, increased direct communication, and a positive alteration of the image of the opponent. This provides the necessary foundation for both leaders and populations to begin the difficult and shaky process of belief alterations and perception corrections. The cases of the Camp David Agreements leading to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty of 1979, and the Oslo Accords of 1993 provide the basis for "probing" into the relevancy of these propositions.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Duke University, 2008.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Dept. of Political Science and Dept. of History. University of Missouri--Kansas City, 2003. / "A dissertation in political science and history." Advisor: Max J. Skidmore. Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 241-262).

Thesis (M.A.)--Carleton University, 1992. / Also available in electronic format on the Internet.