This thesis explores Jurgen Habermas's dualist, system and action methodology of the social sciences as a continuation of Frankfurt School critical theory. It also interprets it as a reworking of this tradition. First, it lays out the criteria and models Habermas uses for a theory of rational modern progress, and relates these ideals to his empirical political theory of practice in the public sphere (Chapter One). Then, it looks for positivisms and objectivisms in the project that threaten its critical function (Chapter Two). Finally, it illustrates these positivisms at work in Habermas's dualist theory of new social movements (Chapter Three). Habermas's dialogue with new social movement theory illuminates some hidden instrumentalisms in his critical theory of society.

No description available.

卓廸舜. / "2004年4月". / 論文(神(道)學碩士)--香港中文大學, 2004. / 參考文獻 (leaves 41-42) / "2004 nian 4 yue". / Abstracts in Chinese and English. / Zhuo Dishun. / Lun wen (shen (dao) xue shuo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2004. / Can kao wen xian (leaves 41-42) / Chapter 第一章 --- 引言 --- p.4 / Chapter 第二章 --- 莫特曼對上帝受苦的理解 / Chapter I. --- 引言 --- p.7 / Chapter II. --- 莫特曼對上帝受苦的理解 --- p.8 / Chapter III. --- 愛與受苦 --- p.9 / Chapter IV. --- 受苦與解放 --- p.10 / Chapter V. --- 上帝的受苦與人的受苦 --- p.11 / Chapter VI. --- 小結 --- p.12 / Chapter 第三章 --- 被釘十字架的上帝 / Chapter I. --- 引言 --- p.13 / Chapter II. --- 受苦與十字架 --- p.13 / Chapter III. --- 上帝彼此的受苦 --- p.17 / Chapter IV. --- 小 結 --- p.18 / Chapter 第四章 --- 莫特曼的三一論建構 / Chapter I. --- 引言 --- p.19 / Chapter II. --- 三一論建構 --- p.19 / Chapter 1. --- 受苦的三一上帝 --- p.22 / Chapter 2. --- 三一上帝的自我捨棄 --- p.22 / Chapter 3. --- 哲學討論的限制 --- p.23 / Chapter 4. --- 三一論的聖經基礎 --- p.26 / Chapter 5. --- 三一上帝的歷史向度 --- p.28 / Chapter 6. --- 莫特曼的三一建構 --- p.30 / Chapter III. --- 小結 --- p.32 / Chapter 第五章 --- 三一論的補充與批評 / Chapter I. --- 引言 --- p.33 / Chapter II. --- 聖靈的工作 --- p.33 / Chapter III. --- 批評 --- p.36 / Chapter IV. --- 小結 --- p.37 / Chapter 第六章 --- 總結 --- p.38

曾瑞明. / "2004年8月". / 論文(哲學碩士)--香港中文大學, 2004. / 參考文獻 (leaves i-xii). / 附中英文摘要. / "2004 nian 8 yue". / Zeng Ruiming. / Lun wen (zhe xue shuo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2004. / Can kao wen xian (leaves i-xii). / Fu Zhong Ying wen zhai yao. / 論文摘要 / 鳴謝 / 導論：哈貝馬斯的交談倫理學槪論 / 甚麼是交談倫理學？ --- p.1-2 / 哈貝馬斯的交談倫理學 --- p.3-5 / 本文的工作 --- p.5-8 / Chapter 第一章： --- 康德的道德哲學與交談倫理學 / Chapter 1.1 --- 普遍法則的程式 --- p.9-13 / Chapter 1.2 --- 普遍化測試的原理 --- p.13-16 / Chapter 1.3 --- 不道德的行爲是否必然是不理性的行爲？ --- p.17-18 / Chapter 1.4 --- 爲什麼一個人必須意願他的格準能普遍化？ --- p.19-20 / Chapter 1.5 --- 「普遍化下的不一致」與「非普遍化下的不一致」 --- p.20-22 / Chapter 1.6 --- 人性的程式 --- p.22-26 / Chapter 第二章： --- 利益的協調 / Chapter 2.1 --- 引言 --- p.27-28 / Chapter 2.2 --- 倫理與道德的對立 --- p.28-38 / Chapter 2.3 --- 可普遍化利益 --- p.38-39 / Chapter 2.4 --- 實在論與普遍化利益 --- p.39-41 / Chapter 2.5 --- 創造進路 --- p.41-43 / Chapter 2.6 --- 詮釋進路 --- p.43-48 / Chapter 第三章： --- 普遍原則的證立 / Chapter 3.1 --- 引言 --- p.49-52 / Chapter 3.2 --- 「證立規條」的意思(前提一) --- p.52-53 / Chapter 3.3 --- 語用上論辯的預設(前提二) --- p.53-56 / Chapter 3.4 --- 推出對話式的普遍原則 --- p.56-58 / Chapter 3.5 --- 交談倫理學的有效性 --- p.59-70 / Chapter 3.6 --- 言行的矛盾 --- p.70-77 / Chapter 第四章： --- 交談原則 / Chapter 4.1 --- 引言 --- p.78-82 / Chapter 4.2 --- 「詮釋」的論證 --- p.82-83 / Chapter 4.3 --- 「不扭曲利益」的論證 --- p.83-88 / Chapter 4.4 --- 「共同的意向」的論證 --- p.89-90 / Chapter 4.5 --- 交談原則與有關什麼是正確的道德規條的判斷的客觀性 --- p.91-94 / Chapter 4.6 --- 對麥克馬和哈貝馬斯的一些批評 --- p.94-100 / Chapter 4.7 --- 結論 --- p.100-101 / Chapter 第五章： --- 交談倫理學與道德建構論 / Chapter 5.1 --- 後形上學進路 --- p.102-107 / Chapter 5.2 --- 道德建構論與交談倫理學 --- p.107-112 / Chapter 5.3 --- 實在論者的可能反駭 --- p.112-116 / Chapter 5.4 --- 道道德建構主義、交談倫理學與相對主義 --- p.116-124 / Chapter 5.5 --- 哈貝馬斯的溝通行動理論 --- p.125-130 / 結論和展望 --- p.131-133 / 參考書目 --- p.I-XII

梁永生. / "2012年5月". / "2012 nian 5 yue". / Thesis (M.Div.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2012. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 57-63). / Abstract in Chinese and English. / Liang Yongsheng. / 序 --- p.i / 摘要 --- p.ii / Abstract --- p.iii / 目錄 --- p.iv / 引言 --- p.1 / Chapter 一 ´Ø --- 現代歷史觀 --- p.4 / 現代主義 --- p.4 / 線性時間觀 --- p.6 / 進步歷史觀 --- p.8 / Chapter 二 ´Ø --- 進步神話的破滅 --- p.12 / 兩次世界大戰：進步神話破滅 --- p.12 / 存在主義對現代歷史觀的结問 --- p.13 / 莫特曼的神學起始點 --- p.14 / Chapter 三´Ø --- 莫特曼對現代歷史觀的「診斷」 --- p.16 / 現代歷史觀與基督教終末論的淵源 --- p.16 / 歷史的自然神論、世俗化的終末論 --- p.20 / 歷史的暴力 --- p.23 / 小结 --- p.25 / Chapter 四´Ø --- 莫特曼的终末論：批判現代歷史觀的神學 --- p.27 / 終末的時間形態：來臨的终末論 --- p.28 / 作為歷史终結的終末：萬物更新 --- p.32 / 作為歷史目標的終末：拯救 --- p.38 / 小结 --- p.43 / Chapter 五´Ø --- 對莫特曼終末論的評論 --- p.45 / 對現代歷史觀有力的批判 --- p.45 / 普世的終末論 --- p.46 / 從亞洲神學觀點的評論 --- p.50 / 小結 --- p.54 / 總結 --- p.55 / 參考資料 --- p.57

This thesis maintains that Jürgen Habermas‘s moral and political theories rely on a modified version of Kant‘s notion of normativity. Taking this as a starting point, it examines this component in light of criticisms inspired by Hegel‘s critique of Kant. The thesis shows that Habermas can answer most of the criticisms that could arise from Hegel‘s critique. That said, Hegel‘s criticism of the will as a tester of maxims does apply to Habermas. This criticism states that Kant cannot connect the universal will of morality and the particular will of the empirical subject because he rules out particular contents as susceptible of being universalized. And it can apply to Habermas because he set strict limits to what can count as a content which may bleed into the justification of moral norms and, following Kenneth Baynes – in his interpretation of Habermas‘s theory –, of legal and political norms. To be justifiable, – according to Habermas – these norms need to embody generalizable interests and they cannot be based on particular interests. However, Habermas infers from this that norms can only be justified with impartial, that is agent-neutral reasons, and cannot be justified with agent-relative reasons. From this, emerges the question whether and to what extent a theory of this sort can successfully include particular contents (for example a particular agents‘ real interests, inclinations and needs). The strict version of the generalizability of norms seems to occlude this possibility. Nonetheless, it is possible to rebut this criticism by slackening the strong version of normative justification that Habermas has built into the theory. By means of an analysis of two elements that he incorporates into his reconstruction of the normative point of view, namely, the concept of ideal role taking and the notion of mutual recognition, it is possible to argue that the loosening of the strict notion of generalizability is a modification that does not contradict and actually coheres with Habermas‘s Kantian concept of moral reason, and this operation fortifies the theory in the face of the Hegelian criticism of the will as a tester of maxims. To develop these issues, this work is divided in two parts with two chapters each part. Part I is an analysis of Habermas‘s notion of moral reason and autonomy and it reconstructs its normative Kantianism. After that, it discusses Hegelian criticisms of Habermas‘s moral theory. Part II focuses on Habermas‘s political Kantianism in Between Facts and Norms and in the debate with Rawls and it examines Hegelian criticisms of that Kantianism.

This thesis examines the “postsecular turn” taken by the philosophy of Jürgen Habermas since 2001, with a particular focus on his political theory. It argues that the postsecular turn was motivated primarily by the limitations of Habermas' philosophical paradigm of postmetaphysical thinking. It then analyses his model of postsecular deliberative democracy, and argues that the model should be rejected due to its reliance on an unworkable procedure of sacred-to-secular translation. The thesis is divided into three parts. Part 1 is an analysis of the place of religion in Habermas' writings on social theory from the 1970s and 1980s. It outlines his original account of religious language, and of the “linguistification of the sacred” which accompanies the transition from traditional to modern societies. Part 2 focuses on Habermas' paradigm of postmetaphysical thinking, and shows that the paradigm creates the conditions for postmetaphysical thinkers to appropriate religious concepts. It also argues that Habermas' inability to address the “anthropic problem” in postmetaphysical terms led to his turn to postsecularism. Part 3 examines the model of postsecular deliberative democracy which Habermas has argued for since 2001. Drawing on the accounts of religious language from Part 1 and of appropriation from Part 2, it concludes that the procedure of sacred-to-secular translation on which the model relies is unworkable.

Note:

Dès l'apparition de la Théorie de l'agir communicationnel, les philosophes critiquent le modèle système/monde vécu. Cette théorie de la société repose sur la nouvelle théorie habermassienne de la pragmatique universelle et de son appropriation à la théorie des systèmes de Talcott Parsons. La plupart de ces critiques doutent de la viabilité théorique de d'un modèle binaire de la société. Toutefois, dans cette thèse, je constate l'impossibilité de réconcilier cette nouvelle conception de la société avec les positions politiques antérieures d'Habermas. Il est improbable qu'Habermas aurait pu participer à ces débats tout en défendant sa théorie binaire de la société. Finalement, je constate l'impossibilité de réconcilier ce nouveau modèle théorique avec la théorie du droit développée dans Droit et démocratie. J'arrive à la conclusion suivante : le modèle système/monde vécu doit être modifié ou abandonné.

李天鈞 / "2002年4月" / 論文 (神道學碩士)--香港中文大學, 2002. / 參考文獻 (leaves 32-36) / 附中英文摘要. / "2002 nian 4 yue" / Li Tianjun / Lun wen (shen dao xue shuo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2002. / Can kao wen xian (leaves 32-36) / Fu Zhong Ying wen zhai yao. / Chapter 1. --- 引言 --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- 研究目的及範圍 --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- 本論文的結構及進路 --- p.1 / Chapter 2. --- 對聖靈位格討論的背景分析 --- p.2 / Chapter 2.1 --- 聖靈位格的討論内容 --- p.2 / Chapter 2.2 --- 初期教會的討論情況 --- p.2 / Chapter 2.3 --- 今天仍產生的疑問及討論 --- p.4 / Chapter 2.4 --- 今天討論內容的分析 --- p.5 / Chapter 3. --- 莫特曼對這討論的最初分析及結果 --- p.11 / Chapter 3.1 --- 莫特曼對這次討論的分析 --- p.11 / Chapter 3.2 --- 對位格的理解 --- p.11 / Chapter 3.3 --- 聖靈作為一獨立的主體 --- p.12 / Chapter 4. --- 莫特曼對這討論的第二次分析及結果 --- p.13 / Chapter 4.1 --- 莫特曼對這次討論的分析 --- p.13 / Chapter 4.2 --- 對聖靈不同經驗的隱喻 --- p.15 / Chapter 4.3 --- 聖靈的流動性位格 --- p.19 / Chapter 4.4 --- 在三一關係下的聖靈位格 --- p.20 / Chapter 5. --- 對莫特曼討論聖靈位格的分析 --- p.23 / Chapter 5.1 --- 莫特曼第二次討論中對最初討論内容的轉向 --- p.23 / Chapter 5.2 --- 如何理解莫特曼對這封論的轉向 --- p.24 / Chapter 5.3 --- 分析莫特曼對聖靈位格的理解的根據：基督教的歷史傳統 R --- p.25 / Chapter 6. --- 評論莫特曼對這討論的理解 --- p.28 / Chapter 6.1 --- 莫特曼對聖靈位格的理解的評論 --- p.28 / Chapter 6.2 --- 莫特曼對聖靈位格討論的敌迪：對聖靈位格討論的新方向 --- p.29 / Chapter 7. --- 結論 --- p.31