India has faced the challenge of religious terrorism for almost three decades. This phenomenon – in-spite of the Indian government’s comprehensive effort to contain it – has been spreading its vicious influence and expanding its support base among the conflicting religious communities in many parts of the country. The existing views, in regard to the rise of religious terrorism, suggest that economic, socio-political or geo-political issues (that cropped up during the post-partition period) are responsible for the birth of the problem. However, so far no study is done collectively on the four (Sikh, Kashmiri Muslim, Hindu and Naga Christian) religious communities to explain the cause of the problem. Therefore, this thesis studies these four religious traditions together to further investigate the main cause of this problem. In this regard the first six chapters examine: the historical background of religious antagonism and religious ideological basis (religious texts and symbols); the significance of religion in the Indian society and the relationship between the sacred and secular; the effects of the partition of India and socio-political developments (following the partition till the late 1970s) on the aggravation of the communal problem; and the impact of the worldwide religious resurgence on galvanization of religious and ethno-religious nationalism, communalism and religious violence. In doing so the thesis argues that, in contrast to the existing explanations, religion (religious ideologies) and historical and socio-political factors are intensely interconnected for the rise of the problem. Finally, the thesis proposes that rebuilding of the communal harmony, by utilising the interconnecting social threads of the coexisting sections of the Indian society, is essential for the deconstruction of the religious terror in India.

A pro-poor market-based approach has increasingly been adopted by INGOs as a livelihoods rebuilding strategy following destructive armed-conflicts. However, there remains a gap in knowledge of the feasibility of such an approach in post-conflict contexts. This research seeks to address this gap. It questions whether pro-poor and donor-led market-based approaches work within post-conflict environments and, if so, under what conditions? The results are from an analysis of case study-based data collected from twenty-one microenterprise groups from three diverse counties of Liberia, six years after the armed conflict. The research reveals that local context in post-conflict environments play an important role in the extent to which a market-based approach might achieve its underlying objectives of broad-based, sustainability and growth enterprises. On one hand, the losses and changes in the entitlement systems of the poor restrict their ability to both operate and to potentially sustain market-based livelihoods promoted through donor-led initiatives beyond the period of direct support. On the other, the extent to which conflict affects local market-systems also shapes outcomes of a post-conflict market-based approach. Shortcomings within the private and government sectors hinder application of market-based principles by increasing the role of the INGO to more than a facilitating role, thus further compromising sustainability of microenterprises. Positively, results suggest that, in spite of low income gains, a market based approach holds potential to empower direct beneficiaries through skills gains, improve their self-esteem and contribute towards peacebuilding within local communities. To further advance this field of research, future donor-led programme design and implementation needs to balance the post-conflict reconstruction urgency with context-specificity, not only that related to the target groups, but also the extent to which the wider and immediate market environment are able to support a market-based approach. Hurried actions risk exclusion of the most vulnerable groups in society through both direct and indirect factors arising from conflict. Yet, a broad-based economic development is essential in a post-conflict environment to reduce both underdevelopment and the risk to return to war.

Noting the inadequacies of existing IR theories to explain the security policies of states in the global south and the frequent intra-state conflicts there, this research demonstrates the analytical capacity of the insecurity dilemma as an alternative framework. The research develops the insecurity dilemma first and then applies it on the Chinese-Tibetan conflict. Over sixty years of violence and dialogue has brought the Chinese and the Tibetans no closer to a resolution of their conflict. The insecurity dilemma provides a nuanced understanding of the underlying reasons for this protracted conflict. This research argues that, conscious of its weakness as a state, which has implications for state, regime and ‘national’ security, China has pursued state-building through its policies on religion, language, education and economy in Tibet. Beijing has also denied the existence of a ‘Tibet Issue’ and rejected a number of Tibetan proposals for autonomy out of fears that they threaten their state-building project in Tibet. Conversely, Tibetan identity insecurity, generated by the Chinese policies, migration and cultural influences inside Tibet, explains both the Dalai Lama’s unpopular decision to give up his erstwhile aspiration for Tibetan independence as well as his steadfast demands for autonomy and unification of all Tibetans under one administration. Identity insecurity also drives the multi-faceted Tibetan resistance both inside Tibet and in the diaspora. Although the intentions of both Beijing and the Tibetans are to increase their respective securities identified above, the outcome is greater insecurity for both, plunging them into dilemmatic cycles of state-building and hardening of policies on the Chinese side and strengthening of identity and resistance on the Tibetan side. This study gives play to a multiplicity of actors, objectives and strategies on both sides and examines the feed-back effect that exists between the Sino-Tibetan conflict and the regional and global political strategic and ideological competitions.

Nationalism has been an important issue for China in both domestic politics and international relations. In the Post-Tiananmen Era, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) turned to nationalism as an ideological instrument to bolster the faith of the Chinese people and legitimise the Party’s rule. Meanwhile, the early 1990s also witnessed rapid developments in information and communications technologies (ICTs) in China, which have catalysed the emergence of online nationalism. Much of the existing literature focuses on either the external impact of Chinese nationalism on foreign policy or highlights the rise of popular nationalism as an independent force that makes the state fragile. There is, however, insufficient attention paid to the internal construct of Chinese nationalism. In the digital age, it also becomes increasingly evident that contemporary Chinese nationalism cannot be properly understood without reference to the role of digital communication. This thesis analyses the politics of Chinese nationalism through the lens of digital communicative practices. This offers an original and nuanced understanding of the political and social dynamics in contemporary China. The thesis focuses on two dimensions. First, it highlights the link between official nationalism and popular nationalism, revealing the changing dynamics within the construction of Chinese nationalism. Second, it focuses on Chinese online nationalism, illuminating the relationship between nationalism and technology. The thesis presents the first major work in examining both top-down construction and popular reception in Chinese nationalism studies from an ethnosymbolic approach. It highlights that the theoretical framework of ethno-symbolism is helpful in providing a more situated, nuanced understanding from a historical and cultural dimension. This thesis considers the (re)construction of China’s national myths of the Second Sino-Japanese War and examines the construction of national humiliation and national pride in the changing state-society dynamics. The study primarily focuses on discourse, in both textual and visual modes, relating to national humiliation and national pride that constitute the two key ingredients of Chinese nationalism. Accordingly, two cases are chosen for empirical investigation: the commemoration events for the Nanjing Massacre and the 2015 Victory Day Parade event. The study uses discourse analytical tools from Discourse Historical Approach and multimodal approach and highlights the importance of having a situated understanding of Chinese nationalism from historical and cultural perspective. It argues that Chinese online nationalism is (re)constructed by a multiplicity of discourses via digital practices, characterised by the evolving dynamics between state and society and situated in the wider political and cultural contexts. The thesis shows that digital communication has changed the means by which the landscape of Chinese nationalism is shaped, which is manifest in two ways. Firstly, national symbols and rituals, as an important means of patriotic education for the CCP, have been “relocated” from physical space, such as Nanjing and Tiananmen, to virtual cyberspace. By incorporating technology into its patriotic education framework, the CCP increasingly extends its discursive power in propagating patriotism, thereby making the Internet an institutionalised patriotic education venue. Secondly, online nationalist expressions and communication provide fertile ground for Chinese Internet users to explore their discursive space in political communication, allowing them to reshape the mythscape of the national past and reconstruct national identity.

This research investigates the implementation of e-government systems in Dubai, as seen through and shaped by the lived experiences of ICT professionals who work in the public sector. The research employs a conceptual lens based on Fountain’s technology enactment framework for e-government. This is used to capture the discursive relationship between institutional arrangements within the UAE’s public sector and enacted technology. Concepts of sensemaking and enactment are used to explore the local perceptions and actions of ICT professionals drawing on both new and existing institutional resources. The research draws on the case study of one of the largest public sector organizations in Dubai that was engaged with the implementation of e-government projects in the period of 1999-2007. The research explores the lived experiences of ICT professionals working on the planning, development and management of e-government systems and their responses to events over the course of the project. The research focuses on key events during three definitive time periods: The beginning of the e-government project; progress in the implementation of the project and finally the closure of the project and starting the new. The implementation of the e-government project is informed by these lived experiences that occur within and relate to wider institutional dynamics. Namely, the dynamics as new public management and e-government encounter local traditions of bureaucracy and socio-cultural norms of the UAE’s public sector. The research shows how micro level interactions are part of an on-going process of appropriating the newly arrived formats for e-government. The main argument in this thesis is that the ICT staff’s actions respond to dynamics between new and existing institutions and this substantially contributes to the emergence and shaping of locally meaningful ICT innovations in Dubai’s public sector. The research adds to the limited body of exploratory studies of e-government implementation that are based on a social constructivist view. The research further extends the discourse on globalization and ICTs by discussing how the influences of disembedded global institutions take form within local contexts and shape e-government projects.

This dissertation has two objectives: one, to dispel the “myth” and assumption that China holds on to an “absolute” view of sovereignty, and has arguably acted in accordance to this view; and two, to forward an alternative view of sovereignty as seen through Beijing’s eyes. This dissertation argues that China’s sovereignty is one which flexibly accommodates, at times voluntarily concedes, different mix of de facto rights according to each respective context and issue. This is attributed to China’s historical experiences with the concept, as well as its discourses. When “sovereignty” was introduced into Chinese thinking, the result is a “view” of sovereignty which juxtaposed Chinese previous understanding of “supreme authority” with an interpretation of the Western concept of sovereignty. “Sovereignty,” in this view, is essentially a de jure construct as its de facto component (or “right of governance”) is purposely and effectively detached from the concept to serve the political needs of the regime. It thus approximates one grounded on graded rings of sovereignty, where authority emanates from the core, but each “level of sovereignty” is entrusted to exercise different “right of governance.” As long as no overt challenge is posed to the idea that a single, de jure sovereignty— more specifically understood as a nominal “supreme authority”—resides in Beijing, this Chinese view of sovereignty is upheld. A “light” constructivist approach which explores the relationship between norms, ideational structures, agency and “discursive formations” is applied to the case studies of Hong Kong (and Macao) and Taiwan to support the arguments in this dissertation. Chinese discourses on “sovereignty” were examined in details through analysing a large sample size of Chinese academic writings from 1980 till 2008, in addition to policy documents and announced official positions of the Chinese leadership. This is further augmented by analyses of Beijing’s policy behaviours towards, in particular, Hong Kong’s autonomy and Taiwan’s international space.

This thesis engages in the debates on Japan’s foreign policy objectives and direction in the post-Cold War era by examining the case of Japan’s Myanmar policy with a particular focus on the question as to why Japan maintained its engagement policy line, although shifting to a more critical one, toward the Myanmar military government which was established in 1988. This thesis employs the analytical framework of neoclassical realism, recognizing international structure as the primary determinant of a state’s foreign policy while at the same time shedding light on domestic level factors, namely policy-makers’ perceptions, the government’s resource mobilization and the domestic policy-making system as intervening variables that incorporate international structural incentives into a state’s actual conduct of foreign policy. In conclusion, the empirical study reveals that Japan adhered to an engagement policy primarily because of Japanese policy-makers’ perceptions that it was the most practical and effective policy to promote Myanmar’s political and economic development, which would eventually contribute to regional stability and progress. This indicates a persistent feature of Japan’s foreign policy which can be described as ‘problem-driven pragmatism’, or Japan’s behavioural pattern of taking actions in response to concrete problems and pursuing practical problem-solving for bringing about incremental and pragmatic improvements in the problems by making necessary compromises with structural pressures and existing systems. This thesis makes a distinctive contribution from three aspects: providing new empirical evidence which fills the gap in conventional debates on Japan’s Myanmar policy objectives; proposing ‘problem-driven pragmatism’ as a new model of Japan’s foreign policy which addresses the shortcomings of existing arguments; and, affirming the applicability and efficacy of neoclassical realism for foreign policy analysis with the implication that it is necessary to examine multiple foreign policy agendas and multi-dimensional international structure in comprehending the critical tradeoffs that a state often faces.

This thesis is a study of environmental governance reform in China. It investigates how new governance policies and arrangements are being introduced in order to overcome problems associated with China’s sizable environmental protection ‘implementation deficit’. Using an analytical framework based on ‘good governance’ criteria of accountability, transparency, participation, and rule of law, it focuses on developments within China’s environmental state, which includes state agencies and their policies, and civil society, incorporating environmental protection NGOs, citizen activists, and the media. Based on in-depth, qualitative research, this thesis examines several aspects of environmental governance reform in China: attempts to make local officials pay greater attention to environmental issues, formal public participation legislation and mechanisms, information disclosure, and ‘private interest’ activism. This thesis identifies interactions between the environmental state and civil society as vital in establishing new, more participatory governance processes. Through acting as ‘policy pioneers’, environmental activists can consolidate governance reforms emanating from the environmental state, and promote new governance norms. At the same time, however, this thesis identifies significant obstacles to the establishment of a more inclusive ‘governance’ approach to environmental protection in China that goes beyond Party-state institutions and actors. For this reason, it challenges the argument that China’s system of environmental governance is likely to converge any further with those observed in western liberal democracies.

This thesis draws on a synthesis of foreign policy analysis (FPA) and constructivism in order to demonstrate how post Cold War Mongolia’s relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) can be analysed through a multisectoral approach to explain the dilemmas that a weak state faces when conducting its relations with a much more powerful neighbour. It proposes that the dissonance between Mongolia’s social identity and its structures of governance is the basis for the Mongolian state’s weakness and that such weakness makes growing economic dependency on the PRC more difficult to manage. Moreover, the resulting combination of economic dependency and state weakness seriously limits the government’s ability to maintain an effective broader foreign policy. The dissertation draws on government texts, academic and media articles, and interviews in Mandarin Chinese, Mongolian, and English. The thesis looks in detail at the nature of Mongolian identity politics by focusing on identity development over la longue durée. It then demonstrates how the international community failed to take account of the dynamics of Mongolian identity politics when it came to assisting the Mongolian government with the country’s post Cold War transition from communism. This led to an undue reliance on what can be termed ‘Washington Consensus’ type political and economic reforms that considerably added to the weakness of the state. The thesis then focuses on Mongolia’s economic relations with the PRC to show how such state weakness has resulted in a relationship of growing dependency. Building on economic dependency theory, the thesis then further examines the implications of Mongolia-Sino relations from environmental, societal, and military perspectives. In conclusion, the dissertation argues that the division between the Mongolian state and society has been exacerbated by the country’s adherence to capitalism and democracy in ways that have created the potential for domestic instability by increasing the depth and breadth of economic dependence on the PRC. This imposes severe constraints on foreign policy options but has also demanded some imaginative innovations that give interesting insights into the measures a vulnerable state can take to maximise its international presence. Ultimately, however, the disjuncture between social identity and the state acts as a constraining factor on such initiatives in the case of Mongolia.

It is expected that the ICTs can maximise the benefits for improved governance and electronic democracy in the information age. This study explores the impact of e-government upon citizens and demonstrates how this kind of electronic medium affects the quality of democracy in the context of the new democracies. Taiwan's peculiar characteristics, which combine a Confucian context, a new democracy and a leading performance in e-government, offers an interesting example of the conceptual diversity of e-government in itself, especially in relation to the level of democracy. Thus, this study uses the Taiwanese experience of developing, using and understanding e-government to identify the effect of e-governance in the new democracies. It integrates larger theoretical and empirical evidence, drawing upon several disciplines, including political science and public administration, communications studies, education and the sociology of technology. The research methods deployed are: documentary analysis, secondary analysis, content analysis and interview. The data are cross-referred and the analysis is presented in different sections. In this study, four themes are discussed: civil education, the policy initiatives, the public use and the public understanding of e-government. I first indicate that civic education in Taiwan has gradually paid more attention to the mode of participation, but the values supporting democracy have not yet been fully instilled. Secondly, the Taiwanese government has been more inclined to use e-government to reorganise itself than to incorporate more of the public in its operation. Thirdly, democratic participation has not yet extended in the public use of e-government in Taiwan. Fourthly, e-government in Taiwan has a modem format, but lacks political efficacy, since it lacks the mechanisms through which people can affect public policy. I conclude that e-government has been used as a modem means to rework authoritarianism. People suffer from a 'democratic deficit' in their understanding and use of e-government. The effects of e-governance have been constrained by the legacy of authoritarianism and the public's democratic deficit. Therefore, in the new democracies, the prospects of electronic democracy should not be overestimated. E-government may be over-rated as a weapon for consolidating democracy.